Where France has moved more decisively than its partners is in affordable deep-strike systems.
Firm contracts are in place for the MBDA One-Way Effector and the Turgis & Gaillard Chorus. If it stays on course, France could emerge as Europe's leader in this capability area.
5/5
Several programs are already running late.
More comprehensive French strike capability cannot realistically be expected before the mid-2030s, leaving the late-2020s window, which European officials have identified as the period of greatest danger, unaddressed.
4/5
The binding constraints are financial capacity and industrial bandwidth.
MBDA and ArianeGroup are running development programs across nearly every strike category while also executing nuclear modernization commitments, including for the ASMPA-R, ASN4G, and M51.4.
3/5
France is advancing 12 programs across four areas: rocket artillery, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and one-way effectors.
These span subsonic and supersonic cruise missiles, ballistic missiles with potential hypersonic payloads, and low-cost strike capabilities.
2/5
🚀 I published a new Missile Matters post reviewing France's long-range and deep-strike rearmament programs.
France is developing 12 distinct systems — more than any other European state.
Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/french-lon...
Short summary below.
1/5
This air campaign will not win Ukraine the war on its own.
But unlike the U.S.-Israeli air campaign against Iran, the instrumentality of the Ukrainian effort, that is, the link between the strategic air campaign and political aims, is considerably clearer.
5/5
Russia retains significant refining capacity, and some industry is being dispersed to the east.
But some infrastructure cannot be easily relocated. Primorsk, Ust-Luga, and Novorossiysk are fixed assets, and they remain as vulnerable as they are critical.
4/5
Three factors explain this:
1. Major ramp-up in Ukrainian drone production since late 2024
2. SEAD campaign: hundreds of confirmed strikes on air defense targets between June 2025 and March 2026
3. Russian industrial constraints limiting repair and replacement
3/5
Cumulative damage now appears to outpace Russia's repair capacity. Oil exports fell 43% in a single week in late March, representing an estimated $1B in lost revenue.
Some estimates put refining capacity cuts at ~17%, or 1.1M barrels/day.
2/5
🚀 I published a new Missile Matters post earlier today, discussing how Ukraine's deep-strike drone campaign against Russian oil infrastructure has likely crossed a threshold that earlier phases did not reach.
Link to the piece:
missilematters.substack.com/p/ukraines-d...
Summary below.
1/5
Thread. NB: “The deeper issue is scale. European states do not need hundreds of missiles; they need thousands. Current production lines cannot sustain resupply during war, including across the late-2020s, the period officials have identified as the period of greatest danger for Europe.”
There is quite a bit of ambiguous info out there. What is confirmed is that MBDA UK is refurbishing existing Storm Shadow missiles whose certification has expired. In some outlets, this has been interpreted as UK restarting production. But I haven't seen any confirmation on new orders from the UK.
🚀 I published a new Missile Matters post reviewing the state of European long-range strike procurement, and diagnosing what I call a European Sonderweg: a divergence from the rest of the world in this capability area.
Link:
missilematters.substack.com/p/a-european...
Summary below.
1/4
The global context renders Europe's lack of ambition in this area particularly striking.
China, the United States, Russia, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have all made outsized investments in long-range strike in recent years.
Europe constitutes the exception.
4/4
The deeper issue is scale. European states do not need hundreds of missiles; they need thousands.
Current production lines cannot sustain resupply during war, including across the late-2020s, the period officials have identified as the period of greatest danger for Europe.
3/4
Most procurement projects remain stuck in concept and development phases.
Where systems are being produced in quantity, they are American or South Korean in origin.
ELSA has produced little beyond concepts since mid-2024. Germany has yet to contract a bridging solution.
2/4
🚀 I published a new Missile Matters post reviewing the state of European long-range strike procurement, and diagnosing what I call a European Sonderweg: a divergence from the rest of the world in this capability area.
Link:
missilematters.substack.com/p/a-european...
Summary below.
1/4
Patriot-Abwehrraketen sind rar und werden nicht erst seit dem Iran-Krieg stark nachgefragt. Doch die deutsche Luftverteidigung hat noch andere Probleme, wie mir Experte @frhoffmann.bsky.social erklärt hat.
The Iran War — Peril and Opportunity for Ukraine | “Ukraine helps partners who help ensure our security and protect the lives of our people.” President Zelenskyy @frhoffmann.bsky.social
Thread. NB: “At this point, I assess that the Gulf states are in a comfortable position, relatively speaking of course. Don't discount the Iranian ballistic missile threat entirely, and long-range drones continue to pose challenges. But the period of greatest danger is likely over.”
At this point, I assess that the Gulf states are in a comfortable position, relatively speaking of course.
Don't discount the Iranian ballistic missile threat entirely, and long-range drones continue to pose challenges.
But the period of greatest danger is likely over.
5/5
The same applies to other Gulf states, though less data is available for them.
This means that concerns about interceptor shortages were justified.
However, strike intensity has declined sharply since, greatly reducing the Iranian ballistic missile threat
4/5
In the first two days of the war, Iranian strike intensity was relatively high.
During that period, I estimate that the UAE may have expended as much as 20-40% of its interceptor arsenal.
Had that intensity continued, the UAE would likely have faced shortages within days.
3/5
The best way to describe the early phase of the war is as a race to the bottom.
Iran has attempted to quickly deplete Gulf state ballistic missile interceptor arsenals.
The United States and Israel have sought to rapidly degrade Iran’s mobile missile launcher capability.
2/5
🚀 I published my latest Missile Matters post earlier today, providing a first assassment of the missile war over the Gulf region.
In short: The U.S.-Israeli counter-TEL strategy appears to be working.
Access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/race-to-th...
Short summary below.
1/5
Race to the Bottom: Who's Winning the Missile War in the Middle East?
missilematters.substack.com/p/race-to-th...
TEL hunting, interceptor availability, and implications for Ukraine
Buen análisis de @frhoffmann.bsky.social
Der heutige Substack von @frhoffmann.bsky.social meldet euch auch mal für den Newsletter an.
missilematters.substack.com/p/race-to-th...
Some quick thoughts on Macron‘s speech and the announcement of deploying parts of the French Strategic Air Force an allied territory. 👇
I published a new Missile Matters post earlier today, discussing Ukraine's recent deep strike against the Votkinsk missile plant and its implications for the missile supply chain.
You can access the post here:
missilematters.substack.com/p/flamingo-f...
Short summary below
1/7
The good news is that Russia’s industries remain heavily centralized and its air defense has suffered badly. This creates vulnerabilities that can be exploited.
As such, there is real potential, and Europe must do everything possible to enable Ukrainian deep strikes.
7/7