An 'uncensored' dark web AI will teach you how to make meth An anonymous developer has launched an AI chatbot on the dark web in an effort to provide access to "uncensored" information.

#AI on #Tor… A pop group?
Every “known” AI now wants your ID to tie your list of questions to your persona for #PeterThiel.
An #anonymous #developer launched an AI #chatbot on the #DarkWeb in an effort to provide "#uncensored" #access to #information. dailydot.com/oniongpt-unc...

A Server That Forgets: Exploring Stateless Relays Running Tor relays requires constant work against adversaries, private and state-backed, who try to undermine the network by attacking the nodes that make it up. On top of that, some operators have to deal with seizures, raids, and direct physical access to hardware. There are precedents in Austria, Germany, the United States, Russia, and likely many others. In those instances, the server can become a liability. Tor exists because we want to shield internet users from unwanted surveillance. The network is designed so that no single operator or server can reconstruct who is talking to whom. Journalists, activists, and whistleblowers depend on that holding up. A relay that can be seized and its contents handed over erodes the very trust the system depends on. And that's a problem we want to solve. In this post we explore how a stateless, diskless operating system can improve relay security, from firmware to user space, with a focus on software integrity and physical attack resistance. This work comes from the experience of Osservatorio Nessuno running exit relays in Italy. Managing relays varies greatly depending on context, technical capability, budget, and jurisdiction. We hope to stimulate discussion rather than propose a single model. ## What stateless means A stateless system doesn't store anything between reboots. Every time it starts, it begins from a known, fixed image, just like Tails does. The idea of running a Tor relay entirely in RAM isn't new. Tor-ramdisk, a uClibc-based micro Linux distribution built for exactly this purpose, dates back to at least 2015. For relay operators, this approach raises the security bar by enforcing better behaviors by design: **Physical attack resistance.** If the machine is seized or cloned, there is nothing to analyze. Depending on the setup, the extraction of relay keys might become infeasible. **Declarative configuration.** The system is version controlled. A stateless system cannot drift from its declared configuration, since every boot is a fresh apply. **Immutable runtime.** The filesystem is read-only. Even if an attacker gains code execution, they cannot persist anything across a reboot. **Reproducibility.** A system that doesn't change between reboots is easier to verify and, eventually, to reproduce and audit. ## Why Tor relays are hard to make stateless Tor relays build reputation over time: a relay that has been running for months earns bandwidth flags that make it more useful to the network. That reputation is tied to a long-term cryptographic identity key. Lose those keys and the relay loses its identity, and as such is reputation in the network, starting from scratch. Thus, the relay's identity must survive reboots without being extractable. A key stored on disk can be seized and copied; a key stored in a security chip such as the TPM might be more challenging for attackers. Beyond the identity key, a relay accumulates a state file containing bandwidth history and other temporary information. Discarding it on every reboot degrades performance, and running entirely in RAM means the OS has to fit in memory, with no possibility of swapping to disk. Whenever processes exceed available memory, the kernel's OOM killer terminates them outright. In practice, replacing glibc's allocator with jemalloc or mimalloc reduces Tor's memory footprint significantly, from around 5.7 GB to under 1.2 GB on a busy guard relay, largely by avoiding fragmentation from high-churn directory cache objects. ## The TPM as the primary tool A TPM (Trusted Platform Module) is a dedicated hardware chip on the motherboard that stores cryptographic keys and performs operations with them without ever exposing the private key to the operating system. It can _seal_ a secret: bind it to a specific measured state of the machine, so the key can only be used if the TPM sees the exact same software stack it saw when the key was created. For a stateless relay, this means the identity key survives reboots, as it lives in the hardware, but can't be conventionally extracted even with physical access. TPMs also support _remote attestation_ : the chip can prove to an external system what software the machine was started with, backed by a hardware-rooted signature. This makes it possible to verify what a node is running without trusting the operator. The TPM doesn't solve everything. Tor's usage of ed25519-based keys are not supported by the TPM chips, so the key is encrypted by the TPM but still stored as a byte string in non-volatile memory, meaning it is still technically possible to export it. Sealing also requires deciding upfront what software state the TPM will trust. When you update the kernel or bootloader, the measured state changes, and you have to re-seal the TPM by predicting what the next boot will look like. ## Existing approaches Different operators have tackled this problem at different points on the trade-off curve between simplicity and depth of security. **Minimal ramdisk.** The simplest approach: run everything in RAM, manage keys manually. Tor-ramdisk has done this since 2015. Identity keys are exported and imported over SCP; rebooting without doing so means starting over. No TPM, no attestation, no verified boot — just the guarantee that RAM doesn't survive a power cut. It remains a meaningful improvement over a conventional disk-based setup. **VM-based ramdisk.** Emerald Onion runs per-relay Alpine Linux images (66 MB each) on a Proxmox hypervisor. The VMs boot entirely into RAM with no persistent storage attached. Identity is managed with Tor's OfflineMasterKey feature: the long-term master key is generated offline and never touches the relay. Updates are image rebuilds, rollback is trivial, and no special hardware is required. **Bare metal with TPM-backed identity.** Patela, our tool, takes a more hardware-focused approach. The relay boots via stboot, a bootloader that fetches and cryptographically verifies a signed OS image before handing off control. Once running, the node pulls its configuration from a central server over mTLS, though a potentially compromised server can deny service but cannot push credentials or extract keys from the node. The relay's identity key lives in TPM non-volatile memory, bound to the measured boot state. It survives reboots but can't be extracted even with physical access. The trade-off is operational complexity: bare metal is required and re-sealing is needed after updates. ## Open problems Some of these problems are specific to our setup; others affect any stateless relay deployment. **Re-sealing after updates.** When the software stack changes, the TPM's measured state changes too. Automating this, which implies predicting what the boot measurements will look like after an update, is one of the harder unsolved problems. Tooling like systemd-pcrlock is moving in this direction, but it's not turnkey yet. **Stateless reboots versus upgrades.** We use standard unattended upgrades for the Tor binary. But a reboot reverts to the OS image, which contains the previous version, a causing an involuntary downgrade. Reconciling automatic security updates with stateless images is something we haven't fully solved. **Memory constraints.** No swap means processes that exceed available memory are killed without warning. Tor's memory usage is hard to predict at runtime. The allocator replacement described above helps enormously, but the fundamental constraint remains. **Network stability.** Persistent updates can only be applied rebuilding the images and booting it again. A relay that restarts frequently risks losing its Stable flag, which affects how much traffic the network sends to it. ## Future directions **Remote attestation.** Sealing binds a key to a machine state. Attestation lets the node _prove_ that state to an external party. A verifier, suach as a configuration server or eventually the Tor directory authorities, can issue a cryptographic challenge that only a node running the expected software stack can answer correctly. This turns boot integrity from a local property into something verifiable remotely, reducing operator trust. **Transparency logs.** Once you have a measured boot chain, you can publish it. A relay operator provides a recipe for a reproducible build; anyone can recompute the expected hash and verify it matches what the TPM reports. An append-only transparency log can make these attestations publicly auditable. The Tor community could run an independent monitor to track this across the relay fleet. **Confidential computing.** The VM-based approach can be extended with technologies like AMD SEV-SNP, which isolate a guest VM's memory from the hypervisor itself. This too, is useful to reduce operator trust, and can reduce the security gap between the VM and bare-metal approaches. **Smaller hardware.** Walking onions, a proposed Tor protocol extension, would remove the need for nodes to hold an entire view of the network locally. Getting arti and related tools to run on smaller hardware would open up possibilities for devices that currently can't afford the resource cost. ## Conclusion For applications like Tor, being stateless can bring multiple benefits: helps both prevent attacks and operator errors, and with further research and work could improve the overall network trustworthiness. Stateless systems come with real operational costs and genuinely hard unsolved problems, even for project and organizations with more resources. But they can serve as a foundation for improving privacy infrastructure, and similar concepts and frameworks could be applied to other parts of the stack. This work started at the Tor Community Gathering in 2025, and it's ongoing. If you run relays, work on Tor tooling, or have thought about any of these open problems, we'd like to hear from you. ## References * Stateless Tor Relay – Tor Community Gathering 2025 * Patela v1: A Basement Full of Amnesic Servers * Patela v2: From Certificates to Hardware * stboot System Documentation – System Transparency * Tor-ramdisk 20150714 Release Announcement * Evolving Our Tor Relay Security Architecture – Emerald Onion * Tor Memory Optimizations: What Actually Works – 1AEO * network * relays

#Tor: "A Server That Forgets: Exploring Stateless Relays"

https://blog.torproject.org/exploring-stateless-relays/

#privacy #cybersecurity #anonymity #FOSS

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#Drone #Tor #Zelenskyy #ZelenskyyForPeaceNobelPrice

A Server That Forgets: Exploring Stateless Relays | Tor Project In this post we explore how a stateless, diskless operating system can improve relay security with a focus on software integrity and physical attack resistance. This work and guest post is by Osservatorio Nessuno who run exit relays in Italy.

Check out our latest guest post by @osservatorionessuno.org who explore how a stateless, diskless operating system can improve #Tor #relay security and improve physical attack resistance. blog.torproject.org/exploring-st...

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#Donetsk #Drone #Shield #target #Tor

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#Artillery #Crimea #Luhansk #Radar #Tor

New ClickFix Attack Uses Node.js Malware via Tor to Steal Crypto Netskope Threat Labs report a new ClickFix attack using fake CAPTCHAs to deploy Tor-backed NodeJS malware and drain crypto wallets on Windows.

That “I’m not a robot” click could drain your crypto. A new ClickFix attack uses #Node.js malware and Tor to quietly take over Windows systems and steal wallets, all triggered by a fake CAPTCHA.

Read: hackread.com/clickfix-att...

#CyberSecurity #Crypto #Malware #ClickFix #Windows #Tor

The danger zones of the dark web - Negative PID The dark web has been a part of public discourse for several decades. Known for its illicit activities and for hosting hackers and criminals of all kinds, it

The danger zones of the dark web

negativepid.blog/the...

#tor #torBrowser #anonymity #cyberCrime #darkMarkets #crypto #Cybersecurity #cyberThreats #onlineSecurity #digitalInvestigations #OSINT #socialEngineering #cyberInvestigations #intelligence #darkWeb #negativepid

How to be Invisible Online (and the hard truth about it)...

#OccupyTheWeb #OTW #anonymous #online #wifi #NSA #Google #Tor #ProxyChains #Android #iPhone #Windows #macOS #Linux

www.youtube.com/watch?v=LEbA...

Tor Browser Bundle 15.0.8 Най-големият технологичен портал в България. Новини за компютри, телефони, игри, хардуер, фото техника. Форуми, ревюта, тестове на компютри. kaldata.com

Tor Browser Bundle 15.0.9 В свят на засилен мрежов надзор и масирано събиране на данни, Tor Browser (The Onion Router) остава най-мощн...

#Софтуер #Browser #Bundle #Tor #анонимно #сърфиране #браузър #браузъри #интернет #браузър #сърфиране

Origin | Interest | Match

Spencer Miles In play, run(s) to Dalton Rushing | 04/06/2026 Spencer Miles In play, run(s) to Dalton Rushing

HOME RUN Dalton Rushing (3)

413 ft (23°, 109.0 mph)
off Spencer Miles (79.8 mph Curve, 2880 rpm)
LAD 14-TOR 1 (T8, 1-1, 1 out)

Dalton Rushing homers (2) on a fly ball to right center field. | 04/06/2026 Dalton Rushing homers (2) on a fly ball to right center field.

HOME RUN Dalton Rushing (2)

415 ft (28°, 107.4 mph)
off Tommy Nance (86.5 mph Slider, 2543 rpm)
LAD 10-TOR 1 (T7, 0-0, 0 outs)

Shohei Ohtani homers (3) on a fly ball to center field. | 04/06/2026 Shohei Ohtani homers (3) on a fly ball to center field.

HOME RUN Shohei Ohtani (3)

414 ft (25°, 107.8 mph)
off Joe Mantiply (87.0 mph Sinker, 2110 rpm)
LAD 7-TOR 1 (T6, 2-1, 0 outs)

Freddie Freeman homers (3) on a fly ball to right center field. Shohei Ohtani scores. | 04/06/2026 Freddie Freeman homers (3) on a fly ball to right center field. Shohei Ohtani scores.

HOME RUN Freddie Freeman (3)

438 ft (35°, 108.5 mph)
off Josh Fleming (90.5 mph Sinker, 1754 rpm)
LAD 4-TOR 1 (T3, 3-2, 1 out)

Teoscar Hernández homers (2) on a fly ball to left field. Kyle Tucker scores. | 04/06/2026 Teoscar Hernández homers (2) on a fly ball to left field. Kyle Tucker scores.

HOME RUN Teoscar Hernández (2)

371 ft (29°, 102.2 mph)
off Max Scherzer (83.3 mph Slider, 2200 rpm)
LAD 2-TOR 0 (T1, 1-0, 2 outs)

Ein Fußballspieler in rotem Trikot mit der Nummer 10 schießt den Ball in Richtung Tor, während zwei Verteidiger in weißen Trikots, einer mit der Nummer 16, versuchen, ihn zu erreichen. Im Hintergrund ist ein Tor sichtbar, und im Tor steht ein Torwart in gelben und schwarzen Trikots. Der Spielplatz ist grün mit einer klaren Sichtlinie.

In den 40er Jahren zerplatzte in #Brasilien bei einem #Elfmeter der Ball in 2 Hälften. Eine flog ins #Tor, die andere nicht. Der Schiedsrichter war ratlos. Schließlich gab er ein halbes Tor. Das Spiel endete 0,5 : 0!

Control+Alt+Autonomy: Rights under pressure, Tor updates, and smarter ways to hold the line Privacy fights, Tor updates, Linux debates, and self-hosting ideas: this week’s map of digital freedom, autonomy, control, and resistance online.

The first issue of Control+Alt+Autonomy is out now. Rights under pressure, Tor updates, smarter ways to hold the line.

What feels most under threat right now? beitmenotyou.online/controlaltau...

#Privacy #Tor #DigitalRights

Colson Montgomery homers (2) on a fly ball to right field. | 04/04/2026 Colson Montgomery homers (2) on a fly ball to right field.

HOME RUN Colson Montgomery (2)

348 ft (25°, 92.9 mph)
off Brendon Little (93.6 mph Sinker, 2053 rpm)
TOR 2-CWS 4 (B6, 3-1, 1 out)

Field View: Vladimir Guerrero Jr.'s first HR of 2026 | 04/04/2026 Check out this unique view of Vladimir Guerrero Jr.'s first homer of the 2026 season

HOME RUN Vladimir Guerrero Jr. (1)

437 ft (25°, 108.5 mph)
90.6 mph Slider, 2338 rpm
TOR 2-CWS 1 (T6, 0-0, 0 outs)

Colson Montgomery's solo home run (2) | 04/04/2026 Colson Montgomery hits a solo home run to increase the White Sox lead to 4-2 in the bottom of the 6th inning

HOME RUN Colson Montgomery (2)

348 ft (25°, 92.9 mph)
93.6 mph Sinker, 2053 rpm
TOR 2-CWS 4 (B6, 3-1, 1 out)

Munetaka Murakami's two-run home run (4) | 04/04/2026 Munetaka Murakami's two-run home run (4)

HOME RUN Munetaka Murakami (4)

431 ft (24°, 111.1 mph)
off Brendon Little (93.9 mph Sinker, 2163 rpm)
TOR 2-CWS 3 (B6, 1-0, 0 outs)

Vladimir Guerrero Jr. homers (1) on a fly ball to left center field. Davis Schneider scores. | 04... Vladimir Guerrero Jr. homers (1) on a fly ball to left center field. Davis Schneider scores.

HOME RUN Vladimir Guerrero Jr. (1)

437 ft (25°, 108.5 mph)
off Anthony Kay (90.6 mph Slider, 2338 rpm)
TOR 2-CWS 1 (T6, 0-0, 0 outs)

" #SBS_birds destroyed the radar from the #-400 air defense system in #Feodosia, the #Tor air defense system, and a dozen more military facilities, KSPs, TPDs, warehouses, and 2 #Shahed hubs in the swamps of the #Kursk and #Bryansk regions." [1/3]

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#Crimea #Donetsk #Luhansk #Missile #Radar #Surface-to-air missile #Tor

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#Crimea #Donetsk #Drone #Missile #Radar #S-400 #Tor

#414th #Madiars_Birds brigade destroyed a radar station from the #S_400 air defence system in #Feodosia, a #Tor air defence system, and many other military facilities, command posts, power distribution stations, warehouses, and two #Shahed hubs in the swamps of #Kursk and #Bryansk regions, reported

Andrés Giménez's two-run home run | 04/03/2026 Andrés Giménez homers (2) on a fly ball to right field. Ernie Clement scores.

HOME RUN Andrés Giménez (2)

361 ft (35°, 105.3 mph)
off Jordan Leasure (94.8 mph 4-seam, 2165 rpm)
TOR 3-CWS 3 (T8, 0-0, 0 outs)

Properties

History

我的Tor Relay增加了好几个小徽章 :tor:

Flags：
Guard：守卫节点，成为Tor用户的入口节点，一般需要节点带宽高，运行稳定，以及持续运行至少8天左右的时间
Fast：拥有不错的带宽
Stable：节点掉线率低
Valid：节点配置正确，已被Tor网络目录权威节点认可
ReachableIPv6：配置了IPv6，可以被外界通关IPv6访问

1 Month graph：
written bytes per second 写速度
read bytes per second 读速度
co […]

[Original post on mstdn.feddit.social]

No April Fool's joke #darkhumour #iran #internet #tor #proxy Can you guess who made the internet more expensive for iranians? 🐾 youtube.com/shorts/gNjQ7... 🐾 (I had to reupload, forgot the user side.)

Dans 6 mois, c'est la fin d'Internet LIBRE tel qu'on connaît

Etes vous prêt•e a surfer dans l'illégalité ? A aller bous renseigner chez nos camarades russes pour apprendre a éviter la censure ?

#vpn #tor #i2p #freenet #hyphanet #briar #crypto #nostr #p2p #tailscale