7. I didn’t see the UAE-linked Russian plane registered to a company in Burkina. But it seems no doubt that UAE-supplies continue via Chad though perhaps the country is no longer the main gateway (Libya, Ethiopia, CAR etc
6. But a cooperation on anything else from trade to development and even security (intel sharing ?) seems possible. Apparently French business delegations are expected …. Lots of French entrepreneurs are still in Chad. It’s the only place in Sahel where you see French flags
5. The UN faces major funding shortfalls but got bit of relief due to a US contribution. USAID is gone but the US made a contribution. Otherwise the European Union funds now half of the UN ops (the rest also mainly comes from EU members
4. Total number of refugees including Chadian returnees ? Maybe 1.5 million. Given the lack of solution in sight very few have the option of going back. There are some Arab refugees who fled after the army retook Khartoum but 90% + are victims of the RSF backed by the UAE
3. When I visited Tine in February hundreds of Sudanese were arriving every day - mainly survivors from the RSF El-Fashir massacre who had been hiding first in villages. Now the flow is down to tens per day
2. The situation in the east at the Tine has calmed a bit since the incursions by the Rapid Support Force. Chad has reinforced its military presence in the borderland. Apparently the RSF tried surrounding both Tine towns (on Sudan and Chadian side), hence there incursion
1 N’Djamena always looks so peaceful. The principal road lining the presidential palace, which had been partially closed after the attack last year, is now fully back open. The tranquilite in N’Djamena is often deceptive
Posting a few thoughts about my latest trip to Chad. Our trip to Faya up in the north didn’t work out as the UN flight was cancelled due to low visibility. But it was good to be back in N’Djamena…. #chad #sudan
Morocco has invested for years in boosting relations with Mali by offering investments, flight connections and future Atlantic port access, which explains why Bamako has adopted the kingdom’s position in the West Sahara conflict, I told Le Monde.
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Burkina Faso has hired some 50000 volunteers to fight jihadists, a force with little training that gets blamed for many killings of civilians, I told The Economist
lnkd.in/e26BSyBk
Die neuen Russland-Analysen 479 sind online: Angelina Davydova & Aleksej Martow analysieren, wie der Naturschutz geschwächt wird. Dazu Kommentare von @marknkatz.bsky.social, @ulflaessing.bsky.social und @jkleinschmidt.bsky.social zu außenpolitischen Fragen. 👇
laender-analysen.de/russland-ana...
Say what you want about the US Sahel engagement - in contrast to the EU they at least have a plan on how to deal with Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso #Sahel
On the road with @unhcr.org in eastern Chad
10. I also can understand those who do not want to engage with the AES. But the US, Russia, China and Turkey do, and through the Sahel pass two migration routes to Europe. The aid package was meant to ease poverty and migration pressures, so...
9. think the way forward would be transparency. The vote had been scheduled by a little-known technical EU body called NDICI - Global Europe - you needed to be a EU expert to spot the agenda. I was tipped of by someone so I followed it, and so was @TableBr
8. This is all speculation if another EU member voiced concerns. But fact is that the non-vote and last minute agenda change created a lot of friction in Brussels. And the EU gave another time the impression getting bogged down in details without seeing the big global picture
7. Have France or other members voiced opposition ? @TableBriefings said ahead of Wednesday that it hadn't been clear whether Paris would agree and that the EU wanted to avoid a public spat table.media/en/africa/fe...
6. I also don't know what happened but some questions got me thinking . How much of a stumbling bloc has been the jailing (since August) of a French officer accredited as diplomat in Mali. Diplomats can be expelled but should not be jailed, this is not just for France a grievance
5. Some EU members had on Wednesday sent senior staff to Brussels who found out upon arriving that the vote about the aid package would not take place. "I am very angry," one EU diplomat texted me. Nobody seems to know why...
4. The EU Sahel envoy, Portugal's @joaocravinho.bsky.social , has tried hard to get the 27 members behind a 195 million fund for development/aid projects (it was meant to happen by end-2025). Brussels had planned for Wednesday a vote that was mysteriously removed the last minute from the agenda
3. Italy and to a lesser extent Spain, Germany and the Durch want to engage pragmatically with AES but not upset France which is not keen on engaging more. The rest of the EU doesn't care much. That means that like in other regions the EU does very little
2. EU Sahel policy has been historically dominated by France with the rest following the former colonial power for a lack of interest. But since Paris has fallen out with the AES, the EU has been unable to offer a new approach
1. The EU has struggled to formulate a new strategy on how to deal pragmatically with the three military-run Sahel countries. It adopted after some 18 months of debate in November a new strategy replacing the last one from 2021 with a two-page paper that says little concrete
Last week, the EU showed it still hasn't grasped the geopolitical game in a changing world - by failing to approve again an aid package for Mali, Niger and Burkina - just after the Mercosur fiasco and as the US reached out to the military-run Sahel countries. #sahel
Jihadists likely targeted with their attack on Niamey airport Niger’s newly-acquired Turkish drones, I tell AP apnews.com/article/nige...
7. For many French officers, diplomats and even aid workers Chad is about nostalgy. Everyone has relatives who lived there in colonial times. Otherwise it’s hard to explain why France invested much with its expensive military ops and development in this Central African count
6. Mauritania is the other Sahel country with good Paris ties but there the French have traditionally kept a low profile. Mauritania quit ages ago the CFA demonstrating its independence and the territory was never as important during colonial times as Chad.
5. The ending of the French mil cooperation was hugely popular with many in Chad. But non-military ties continued. AFD development work, French biz people. There’s even a French run casino in N’Djamena (lovely bar) Chad is the only Sahel country where you still see French flags
4. Deby has shown his will to diversify partnerships by ending the French cooperation. I remember the French FM was in the air when the statement came out. Having made the point Deby can now renegotiate bilateral ties with Paris understanding they are no longer the sole partner.
3. I don’t think there will be a return of French soldiers anytime soon. But maybe some training or intelligence sharing ? I imagine the UAE might show less interest in Chad as RSF supply routes could move to Ethiopia, South Sudan ? Most recently they already gone through Libya.