Great discussion! I almost felt like I was there.

Some comments from me on how international law has largely failed to restrain US foreign policy under Donald Trump, from tariffs and boat strikes to the Maduro operation in Venezuela and the ongoing war in Iran. www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/3/...

And the chapter by Benedict Kingsbury from the Cambridge Companion to International Law that inspired this year's workshop theme is accessible here: cdm21069.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/coll...

The call for abstracts is here: esil-sedi.eu/wp-content/u...

The ESIL Interest Group on International Courts and Tribunals invites abstract proposals for its pre-ESIL conference workshop in Malaga on 3 Sept 2026 on the theme of "Conflicts before Courts: Revisiting ‘Uneven Judicialization in Global Order’ Fifteen Years On". The deadline is 31 March 2026.

Very interesting to see an intervention aligned with the respondent state (which has not been typical in the so-called “mass intervention” cases so far).

Summer School on the International Criminal Court 2026 Welcome The 26th annual Summer School on the International Criminal Court which will be hosted online by the Irish Centre for Human Rights takes place from 8-11 June 2026. This is the premier summer s...

Applications currently being accepted for the Megan Fairlie Scholarships for the Summer School on the International Criminal Court.

Takes place online 8-11 June 2026 @uniofgalway.bsky.social

Deadline for application is 1 March 2026. see:

universityofgalwayichr.clr.events/event/139679

@mikebecker.bsky.social
@tcddublin.bsky.social
@tcdpoliticalsci.bsky.social
@poulholm.bsky.social
@historytcd.bsky.social

As always, great to have the chance to talk with the @asymmetricalh.bsky.social team and @janethanderson.bsky.social.

Round 1 of #TheGambia v #Myanmar saw a sustained attack by Myanmar on the credibility of UN fact-finding reports. The situation underscores the potential value in the ICJ hearing directly from the fact-finders, an issue I discussed on @ejiltalk.bsky.social in 2019. www.ejiltalk.org/the-challeng...

Before the ICJ began its public hearings in Gambia v. Myanmar, I planned to write a technical piece about the role of party presentation in the Court's genocide cases.

To my surprise, it turns out that the whole case may turn on it.

My latest @justsecurity.org

Many thanks to my colleague Professor Mark Bell for organizing this important and timely discussion on recent US actions in and around #Venezuela and their implications for human rights, accountability, and the rule-of-law. Thanks also to the @tlrhub.bsky.social for hosting this event.

It was a real privilege to serve as the discussant for a great talk by Rick Lorenz of the Public International Law & Policy Group yesterday at @tcddublin.bsky.social: "Murder on the High Seas:? The Legal and Ethical Implications of US Attacks on Alleged Drug Traffickers".

#Rohingya case: This afternoon's argument by Arsalan Suleman of @foleyhoag.bsky.social for #TheGambia has been a devastating presentation of hateful & genocidal rhetoric attributable to the leadership of Myanmar. Not easy to listen to, as intended. Important for anyone unfamiliar with the context.

Reichler: Giving weight to fact-finding reports is not a delegation of duty (as Myanmar argues) but in fact *is* how the ICJ can exercise its fact-finding responsibility. I think this turns on the Court's approach & reiterate my view that the ICJ could benefit from hearing directly from the FFM.

Reichler now dissecting Myanmar's (predictable) reasons to disregard the FFM reports: i.e. that Myanmar did not participate (but this was Myanmar's choice; it repeatedly refused to cooperate or engage). (You can probably think of other disputes where these types of arguments will be made.)

Reichler makes the key point: reports do not merit weight automatically because they are UN reports, but because they satisfy the indicia for reliability the Court has set out in its case law. (Not clear this is an issue the intervening states can properly weigh in on though!)

Yes, I believe they announced at the start that the written submissions would be made available on the website later today (including implementation reports on the provisional measures, which is something new).

Reichler also making the case that the UN FFM was a state-of-the-art inquiry body. In my view (having studied many inquiry bodies, this is not far-fetched. The FFM reports go out of their way to explain methodology & working methods. Doesn't mean they are unassailable but they reflect serious care.

Let's wait to see how Myanmar itself frames its position on third-party fact-finding reports.

Fascinating to learn that Myanmar's position (per The Gambia) is that UN reports carry ZERO weight & the Court could only rely on (non-existent) findings by other courts. This is an untenable position and not consistent at all with the Court's case law (as Reichler is making clear).

UN Human Rights Office Protecting family unity through safe, regular migration builds stronger, more cohesive societies.Read the story

For anyone interested in the UN FFM: ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies....
As Reichler explains, the FFM's work makes up just part of the many reports from UN bodies and NGOs that The Gambia has put into the record. Plus signed witness statements (something the ICJ is often not wild about).

#Rohingya case: At the start of the afternoon session (12 Jan), Paul Reichler for The Gambia to address a topic near-and-dear to me: the evidentiary weight to be accorded to third-party fact-finding reports (in this case, the UN FFM on Myanmar). t.co/pnoaDaigRs

But I think his effort to show key differences with facts in Bosnia was more effective than w/Croatia, where ICJ found controversially that Serb policy of ethnic cleansing actually undermined genocidal intent. The Gambia likely needs to do more to explain how Tatmadaw policy/actions were different.

Making extensive use of the FFM report, Paul Reichler is handing the ICJ several ways to distinguish situation in Myanmar from those in Bosnia & Croatia. These are necessary building blocks for the ICJ to adhere to its demanding standard while getting to a different outcome.

This is a prudent strategy in many ways. I've said before that The Gambia's main task is to show the ICJ how its own test can be met here. But doubling-down on the Court's past approach depends on a shared understanding of what that test means (namely re the 'only reasonable inference' test).

#Rohingya case: Paul Reichler making clear that #TheGambia is not asking #ICJ to repudiate its past approach to establishing genocidal intent and will show that the facts here (in support of genocidal intent) are stronger than in the Bosnia and Croatia cases (where the ICJ did not find such intent).

Interesting. Do you have work on this that you could point me to?

Understood, but I disagree that this legitimizes the junta. A scenario where the case cannot proceed seems like a worse outcome (I've also written about this before, in the comments section here: www.ejiltalk.org/is-the-icj-a...).

Also remarkable that #Myanmar has shown up in the Great Hall of Justice at all. At a moment when states, big & small, seem willing to treat 'international niceties' as totally dispensable, it is at least something that the junta is continuing to participate in a legal process at the highest level.