Posts by Julius Kölzer
epss 2026 climate politics section panels
Are you coming to the @epssnet.bsky.social conference this year? The programme is live 👏
@antvalentim.bsky.social and I were in charge of constructing the Climate Politics section. Check out the 19 panels crossing fields and subdisciplines!
Details here: virtual.oxfordabstracts.com/event/75765/...
For months, Germany has been controversially debating the return of military conscription. But who actually supports it? And more importantly, why? Here are some insights based on a representative survey from last autumn. A thread 🧵
www.bbc.com/news/article...
Another day of gathering evidence that, of course, everyone here is clearly much nicer than on the other platform
Also consider checking out this cool paper by @kirareneekurz.bsky.social et al., which finds very similar patterns using different data.
journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
If you are further interested, @sicherheitspod.de (featuring @carlomasala1.bsky.social, @drfranksauer.bsky.social, @rikefranke.bsky.social, @wiegold.de ) has some great episodes on public debates about military conscription in Germany (in German).
tinyurl.com/maxaxb6c
Thanks for reading!
While accounting for political attitudes does not eliminate the age differences, the East West gap in conscription support shown above largely disappears once these variables are included. This suggests that lower support among respondents in East Germany largely reflects attitudinal differences.
Unfortunately, the data do not include suitable measures for other attitudes that might also help explain the remaining age differences, such as individuals’ own willingness to serve or whether they expect conscription to apply to them personally.
However, even these attitudinal differences do not fully account for the observed age gaps. When all of these mediating variables are included in the baseline regression model estimated at the beginning, the slope reflecting the age differences is somewhat reduced but remains clearly present.
But a stronger preference for the CDU, a more favorable evaluation of Friedrich Merz, and especially higher trust in the armed forces as an institution also help explain the age differences. By contrast, individual left right self placement and perceptions of fairness appear to be less relevant.
Especially foreign and security policy attitudes explain a substantial share of the higher support for conscription among older respondents aged 60+. In particular stronger support for higher defense spending and for a more coordinated foreign policy with allies in international crises.
To analyze more systematically which attitudes may explain age differences in conscription support, I estimate mediation models comparing respondents aged 60+ to those aged 18 to 30. The results suggest that these differences can at least partly be explained by some of the attitudes discussed above.
Finally, the age gap may also be explained by simple differences in party affiliation and left right positioning. Support for conscription is higher among CDU supporters and among respondents who place themselves in the center right, and lower among respondents who place themselves on the left.
The same may also apply to attitudes on foreign and security policy. In particular, support for higher defense spending and for a stronger role for Germany in international crises is closely associated with greater support for military conscription.
A stronger sense of national attachment, a more favorable view of Friedrich Merz, and higher satisfaction with democracy and the federal government are also correlated with greater support for military conscription (all of which are attitudes more commonly found among older voters).
3) A variety of attitudes may account for why older respondents may be more likely to support military conscription than younger ones.
For one, support for conscription increases markedly with higher levels of trust in political institutions (especially in the government & in the armed forces).
2) Unlike for many other attitudes, we do not observe a larger gender gap among younger respondents. Put differently, men and women aged 18 to 30 are similarly skeptical of military conscription. If anything, a gender gap appears to be somewhat more pronounced among older respondents.
However, these differences appear relatively small compared to the substantial age gap. So how can we explain differences in support for conscription across age groups?
1) The age differences are not driven by an extreme position in any one age group, but instead follow a more linear pattern.
In contrast, social class and place of residence along the urban rural continuum are not associated with support for military conscription. Beyond age and gender differences, support is also significantly higher among respondents in West Germany than among those in East Germany.
An initial regression model gives us a sense of what drives these differences. Unsurprisingly, there are very strong age differences: support for military conscription is much higher among older age groups than among younger ones. Men are also significantly more likely to support it than women.
For this, we use data from the German Longitudinal Election Study, a survey conducted in November 2025, shortly before the adoption of the new conscription law. The survey includes a question on whether Germany should have military conscription. Overall, support for conscription is rather mixed.
For months, Germany has been controversially debating the return of military conscription. But who actually supports it? And more importantly, why? Here are some insights based on a representative survey from last autumn. A thread 🧵
www.bbc.com/news/article...
Do citizens care who makes policy?
In Germany, some policies can be adopted either by federal or state governments. But do voters have preferences over which actor adopts a policy?
Turns out, they mostly do not.
New paper out @epsrjournal.bsky.social 🧵 1/8 www.cambridge.org/core/journal...
🚨New Paper in PNAS: "Refugee Labor Market Integration at Scale: Evidence from Germany’s Fast-Track Employment Program"
www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/... Ungated preprint osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/px9ew_v3
w/ J Hainmueller, D Hangartner, @niklas-harder.bsky.social & E Vallizadeh
#econtwitter #econsky
Noch ein Job: Für das Projekt "Knowledge, Epistemic Marginalization, and the Politics of Resentment" (Co-PI: Joachim Blatter) suche ich einen Postdoc an der Universität Bremen.
Vertragsdauer: 3,5 Jahre
Stelle: 100%
Bewerbung: Bis 05.05.
Stellenausschreibung: www.uni-bremen.de/universitaet...
Writing the obituary was painful, but also brought nice memories of your unique blend of extreme kindness, brutal honesty and very sharp wit.
Rest easy, we will not forget you, Leo!
Link to the German obituary for Leo:
voe-project.org/wp-content/u...
souverän ist wer über den ausnahmezustand entscheidet
Bodenständige gegen Weltoffene? In unserer neuen Studie prüfen wir, wie stark die Lebensführung mit politischen Einstellungen zusammenhängt. Befund: systematische Zusammenhänge, aber wenig Hinweise auf tiefe Spaltung. Unterschiede vor allem bei Klima und Migration.🧵
link.springer.com/article/10.1...