CATA (Covid Airborne Transmission Alliance) has today issued this press release ahead of next Thursday's publication of the Inquiry's module 3 report:

tinyurl.com/CATA-press-r...

Separate from the need to retract the study, please also look into why the poor quality of review #1 wasn't caught. It seems to have been written by an LLM, and if it's not then it's someone totally unqualified to review.

Either way, not something you want the Springer-Nature brand associated with.

Looking forward to seeing some action on it. The one good thing about this example is that there really is no way to justify how unserious it is.

Particularly as the misinformation is a direct danger to human health, there's significant public interest in a thorough review and urgent retraction.

Hi, I have an important article out tomorrow, please stay tuned. Just getting my profile going on blue sky. Can you help amplify?
@mark-ungrin.bsky.social @amandalhu.bsky.social @realnosferatu.bsky.social @dfisman.bsky.social @davidjoffe64.bsky.social @jvipondmd.bsky.social @barryhunt008.bsky.social

We can look back and say this is obvious now, but what would a multi-discipline team have come up with if dedicated to it from Feb 2020. e.g. diverse-skilled people pulled off day jobs, Zoom collaborating (or co-located in N95s) and told to aim for cheap mass producible without a dependence on China

Also C-R box innovations that would kick off later - ADDED to diagram

its-airborne.org/2020/March was updated to refer to the Petri dish visualizaion of droplet transmission of bacterial infections (@1goodtern.bsky.social insight)

Yep, it is annoying that the A or B narrative today EXCLUDES keep schools open but urgently do improvised fresh air and air cleaning/filtration tricks until more permanent installations can make them safe long term.

We also didn't chart Corsi-Rosenthal boxes. That garage industry kicked off in 2022. It is reasonable to expect that engineer-involved think-tanks would have invented them in 2020 if asked to by government

We also didn't chart commercial or retain free-standing air cleaning devices, which did exist

We got the MDs not taught airborne transmission (they focus on fomites and droplets (we're labeling these as THEIR primary and secondary routes).

We didn't know of the petri-dish easy visualization of droplets.

Tern had insights that were new to me - on modern MD education.

Back in 2021, multiple people contributed to its-airborne.org/2020/March. This reality tree tried to back-create a March 2020 rationale, but missed "WHO is stacked with MDs with other sciences and engineering missing"

Using Tern's chain of logic again, Claude ai can come up with a reality tree that would have been if IPC/WHO and others had not messed up and stopped it like SARS-1 mermaid.live/edit#pako:eN...

I asked Claude to simplify a little, which leads to: mermaid.live/edit#pako:eN...

Reducing the number of nodes, is one activity toward a diagram that better represents the problematic situation. As would be adding nodes, or changing descriptions.

The science explained: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Current.... Teams would use this process to surface something that indicated a root cause they maybe don't realize yet, and possibly something to address.

Tern's thread: threadreaderapp.com/thread/18907...

I asked claude.ai to come up with an reality tree for Tern's insightful understanding as to how pandemic handling went wrong and got this mermaid.live/edit#pako:eN...

The Central Error of the Pandemic…

Is that of running pandemic management by laissez-faire socioeconomic principles.

If you grasp this, all the other errors fall into place as the inevitable consequence of following that line of thought. 🧵 1/x

... Consultant Neck ties 2.0

Resource and Policy Implications: Acknowledging that SARS-CoV-2 is airborne would have necessitated significant changes in policy, especially in resource-poor settings where implementing advanced air filtration systems or providing adequate PPE could be challenging. The WHO's hesitance might have been influenced by an awareness of these global disparities in healthcare infrastructure. In summary, the WHO's initial stance on the airborne nature of COVID-19 was likely influenced by a combination of historical scientific paradigms, the need for conclusive evidence, bureaucratic processes, public health communication strategies, external pressures, and the global implications of changing infection control standards. While not necessarily intentional "lying," these factors contributed to a perception of misinformation or delay in acknowledging the airborne transmission of the virus.

Bureaucracy and Decision-Making Process: The WHO's decision-making process involves reviewing vast amounts of research, which can be slow. There were criticisms that the organization might have been overly cautious or bureaucratic in its approach, potentially influenced by the need to coordinate advice with member states and manage public perception. This reluctance to quickly update guidance might have been perceived as misleading. Public Health Communication and Impact: Early on, the WHO's communication emphasized droplet and contact transmission, focusing on hand hygiene and surface cleaning. This was partly because these measures were seen as practical and actionable for the general public. The shift to acknowledging airborne transmission required a change in public health messaging, which could have been disruptive to existing guidelines and might have led to confusion or panic. Pressure from Scientists and Public: The WHO faced pressure from a coalition of scientists who argued for the recognition of airborne transmission early in the pandemic. Despite these efforts, it took time for the organization to adjust its stance officially, leading to accusations of denial or misinformation. The narrative on social media and in public discourse highlighted this perceived delay, contributing to the notion that the WHO "lied."

why did the WHO lie about the airborne nature of covid19? 15 posts 15 web pages The World Health Organization (WHO) faced significant criticism and scrutiny regarding its initial stance on the transmission of SARS-CoV-2, particularly with respect to the airborne nature of the virus. Here are several key points that explain why the WHO's response might have been perceived as misleading or slow: Historical Precedents and Paradigms: The reluctance to acknowledge airborne transmission can be traced back to historical paradigms in medicine. For much of the 20th century, there was resistance to the idea of airborne transmission due to the dominance of the droplet model, which was influenced by early 20th-century public health official Charles Chapin's views against miasma theory. This historical skepticism towards airborne pathogens as a primary transmission route led to a bias in how diseases were studied and understood. Scientific Rigor and Evidence Gathering: The WHO initially required what they considered robust scientific evidence before officially recognizing a transmission mode like airborne transmission. This was partly because labeling a disease as "airborne" has specific implications for infection control, including the need for high-grade personal protective equipment (PPE) and specialized ventilation systems in healthcare settings. The lack of definitive evidence at the early stages of the pandemic, particularly in terms of viable virus detection in aerosols, contributed to the delay in acknowledgment.

Grok2 on why the WHO lied

Denial or Minimization of Long-Term Health Impacts: Long-Term Health vs. Short-Term Gains: There's an argument that the economic model prioritizes short-term gains over long-term health. The preference for not investing in mitigations might reflect a broader societal or corporate acceptance of certain levels of illness and disability as an economic externality rather than a direct cost to be mitigated through infrastructure changes. This can be linked to broader issues of profit maximization where the health costs are externalized, not borne by the businesses directly. Political and Cultural Factors: Ideological Resistance: There's also an ideological component where some might resist government or health authority interventions in business operations, viewing such measures as overreach or economically harmful regulations. This resistance can be influenced by political views that prioritize deregulation and business autonomy over public health mandates. In summary, the preference for not implementing these measures could be seen as an interplay of economic rationale, operational considerations, public health communication failures, and ideological resistance. However, this decision-making process also reflects broader societal values where economic considerations sometimes overshadow public health concerns.

Operational Disruption: Business Continuity Concerns: Implementing such changes might disrupt business operations. For instance, closing down parts of a building for renovation could affect business activities, leading to temporary loss of revenue or productivity. There's also a reluctance to alter established building infrastructure which might be seen as functioning adequately without such changes. Perceived Necessity and Public Perception: Public Health Messaging: Early in the COVID-19 crisis, there was significant confusion and debate about the primary modes of transmission, with less emphasis initially placed on airborne spread. This confusion might have led to a slower adoption of airborne mitigation strategies. Even after the recognition of airborne transmission, some might argue that the public's focus on masks and surface cleaning overshadowed the importance of ventilation and filtration. Resistance to Acknowledgment: There might be resistance or skepticism towards acknowledging the severity of airborne transmission due to the implications it has on business practices and public health policies. Acknowledging this would mean not only financial costs but also admitting that past measures might have been insufficient, which could be damaging to reputations or lead to legal liabilities

What is the billionaire rationale for not doing airborne mitigations to greatly slow covid transmission? Why is mass disability and illness preferable to ventilation work and the additional air-filters/cleaners in businesses? 1 post 15 web pages The rationale behind not implementing extensive airborne mitigations in commercial spaces by billionaires and corporations involves multiple economic, operational, and ideological considerations: Economic Impact: Cost-Benefit Analysis: The primary rationale often cited involves the cost of upgrading ventilation systems or installing advanced air filtration systems. These upgrades can be expensive, and some businesses might see the return on investment as low, especially if they perceive the direct threat of illness to their operations as diminished or under control. The financial burden of retrofitting existing buildings with better ventilation systems might not seem justified when weighed against perceived benefits, especially post-acute phases of pandemics.

I asked grok2 about billionaire motivations for not doing ventilation and air-filter work

Any formula for average per infection QALY losses yet?

Say, 1.5% loss at age 20 per infection rising to 8% at age 70?

Is it QALYs or DALYS of something that conveys the message to ordinatly people? - including earlier death for some.

ChatGPT - Polarized Pandemic Positions Shared via ChatGPT

Transcript: chatgpt.com/share/6742ca.... I think the summary at the end nails it.

There's more nuances as to why Dr Tedros and De Ryan u-turned airborne transmission (Feb 11, 2020 and other moments). Fear of panic around the world? Commerce & consumption taking a dip and donors becoming upset?

Follow up Q: Are there polarized positions around airborne (fills a room like smoke) vs droplets (arc under gravity, make surfaces dirty, those then at risk of being smeared into mouths) in the current year. And were the same polarized positions there from the outset in 2020?