This includes profiles of the main actors and the various pieces of analysis that I have produced.
In the meantime, keep the salt handy when dealing with Novaya Gazeta Europe reporting on Chechnya.
I've written a lot about the succession process, including in my weekly newsletter. When I launch the Russian Security Research Lab at the end of the month, there will be plenty of material that will allow for a more rigorous analysis of the Chechen elite
www.threatologist.com/rsrl-waiting...
On the other hand, they overlook the fact that, in the short-term, the candidates within the regime are largely interchangeable.
The problem with the speculation is two-fold. On the one hand, the sourcing is always week - usually combining Kremlinology and sources whose credentials can't possibly be checked.
Novaya Gazeta have produced quite a few articles of this sort, nominating Adam, Akhmat, and Apti Alaudinov as potential heirs to the throne.
Based on videos of public meetings and their own anonymous sources, they claim that Adam Kadyrov, son of current leader Ramzan, has fallen out of favour as preferred successor. Instead, his brother and earlier favourite is back in the running as heir #1.
Novaya Gazeta Europe have another article on Chechen succession planning that can be filed under "distinctly dubious".
novayagazeta.eu/articles/202...
If that were applied to these cases mentioning Crocus City, my intuition is that sentencing would fall in line with wider trends of relatively harsh sentences for things like “justifying terrorism”. In other words, these cases would show more continuity than change in the practice of the courts
What would be useful in the future is an investigation into how the severity of terrorism-related sentences has increased over time. I strongly suspect they have, but I don’t recall seeing a systematic study of it — particularly over a longer duration.
At the end of the month, I’ll be launching the Russian Security Research Lab. One of the many things in it is a round-up of the attack and the subsequent investigation — useful reference material when considering articles like this.
www.threatologist.com/rsrl-waiting...
The attack forms the backdrop and the excuse, but it didn’t create the underlying issues — it simply made them worse. It didn’t transform legal practice in the way that headline suggests.
Indeed, for this reason, I’m not sure I agree with the headline conclusion that the attack “had a profound effect on many individual cases”.
There are some parallels to the apartment bombings in 1999, where the wave of attacks that preceded the Second Chechen War led people to become deeply suspicious and overact to any suspicious people seen hanging round their apartment blocks.
These cases point to underlying social tensions and fears, with people taking action or interpreting the actions of others through the lens of what happened at Crocus.
Numerous cases involve administrative fines for xenophobic comments online in the aftermath of the attack, but there are also official measures taken against migrants for breaking (complex and often contradictory) immigration laws.
Another couple of cases involved pub brawls, where Central Asian men get involved in conversations with strangers, insults are exchanged, and it escalates into a fight.
One of the cases concerns two Uzbek men wandering round with a toy gun on the national day of mourning declared after Crocus. Eyewitness testimony featured in the trial speaks of disrespecting that day and creating fear of another attack.
Their analysis is based on mentions of Crocus City Hall in court decisions over the previous two years.
Interesting article from Mediazona, using evidence from court cases to claim that the Crocus City Hall attack in March 2024 has had a major impact on terrorism-related prosecutions across the country.
en.zona.media/article/2026...
Detailed report here on Russian recruitment in Africa for its war on Ukraine. Kenya and Cameroon lead the way as a source of recruits, and financial incentives are a key driver. Recruitment agencies and local officials facilitate the process
lansinginstitute.org/2026/02/23/a...
Want to learn more? Next week’s Tracing Patterns newsletter will offer more details on the groups, their agendas, and their limitations. Sign up at www.threatologist.com/newsletter
There isn’t a great deal of in-depth research into either group — just one scholarly paper. This in many ways reflects the limits of the groups themselves: they are narrative-focused but have limited operational capabilities. This makes it harder for anyone to take them seriously.
The Freedom of Russia Legion, by contrast, portrays itself as a broader church, encompassing views from the far-right to the far-left. It wants to see a democratic Russia, similar in form to the current federation but reintegrated into the international community.
Yet they are clearly divided by ideology: The Russian Volunteer Corps is an ethnonationalist conservative outfit with links to neo-Nazism. It wants to see an ethnic Russian state and views the collapse of the current Russian Federation as inevitable.
Both groups have a lot in common: They were both created in 2022; seek the downfall of Vladimir Putin; recruit Russian citizens; and are closely integrated into the Ukrainian Armed Forces. They have operated on the frontline and in Russia itself.
These two groups are the clearest manifestation of a relatively new phenomenon brought about by Russia’s war on Ukraine: non-trivial, non-Islamist groups using the war as a platform to advocate armed struggle within Russia itself.
Who are Russia’s non-Islamist insurgents?
Over the last week, I’ve been building out profiles of two groups — the Russian Volunteer Corps and the Freedom of Russia Legion — and associated individuals.
Despite all this, Kolokoltsev claims his ministry is performing well, with a 3% reduction in crime and growing public confidence in the police. His statement is, in essence, a standard call for more resources.
Large-scale recruitment for the war has exacerbated existing recruitment problems: People who are willing to serve in the security services can get a much better package elsewhere.
Kolokoltsev’s comments reflect long-standing problems at the Interior Ministry: It has always been the ugly duckling of the security services, enjoying less prestige and resources compared to organisations like the FSB.