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Book Symposium on The Brain Abstracted Book Symposium on The Brain Abstracted in Philosophy of the Mind Sciences Philipp Haueis, Department of Philosophy and Institute for Studies of Science (ISOS), Bielefeld University, Germany The journal Philosophy of the Mind Sciences has just published a book symposium (LINK) of The Brain Abstracted: Simplification in the History and Philosophy of Neuroscience, by Mazviita Chirimuuta. The book has received both the 2024…

Book Symposium on The Brain Abstracted

Book Symposium on The Brain Abstracted in Philosophy of the Mind Sciences Philipp Haueis, Department of Philosophy and Institute for Studies of Science (ISOS), Bielefeld University, Germany The journal Philosophy of the Mind Sciences has just published a book…

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Introducing: Brains and Philosophy and the Mind Sciences Hi Everyone, I'm very happy to announce that we will be collaborating on a number of posts with Philosophy and the Mind Sciences! PhilMindSci is an open access journal; you can read everything we discuss in full here: Our first post, today, will be by Philipp Haueis, describing the special issue just published on Mazviita Chirimuuta's The Brain Abstracted…

Introducing: Brains and Philosophy and the Mind Sciences

Hi Everyone, I'm very happy to announce that we will be collaborating on a number of posts with Philosophy and the Mind Sciences! PhilMindSci is an open access journal; you can read everything we discuss in full here: Our first post, today,…

3 weeks ago 1 0 0 0

Introductory Conference: Purdue Cognition, Agency, & Intelligence Center. Hi All, We're happy to help announce the launch of the Cognition, Agency, & Intelligence Center. Please see information about their introductory conference below! Description: We are thrilled to invite you to attend the Interdisciplinary Conference in Cognitive Science, hosted by the Cognition, Agency, and Intelligence Center (CAIC) at Purdue University. The conference will take place April 2nd-3rd…

Introductory Conference: Purdue Cognition, Agency, & Intelligence Center.

Hi All, We're happy to help announce the launch of the Cognition, Agency, & Intelligence Center. Please see information about their introductory conference below! Description: We are thrilled to invite you to attend the…

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A Global Approach to Cognitive Dysfunction as a Framework for Neurodivergence A Global Approach to Cognitive Dysfunction as a Framework for Neurodivergence Abel Wajnerman Pas and Jorge I. Fuentes We propose a global approach to distinguishing between cognitive function and dysfunction as an appropriate framework for thinking about neurodivergence. It has been a commonplace in philosophy of psychiatry, at least since Wakefield (1992), to define mental disorders in terms of a descriptive element and an evaluative element.

A Global Approach to Cognitive Dysfunction as a Framework for Neurodivergence

A Global Approach to Cognitive Dysfunction as a Framework for Neurodivergence Abel Wajnerman Pas and Jorge I. Fuentes We propose a global approach to distinguishing between cognitive function and dysfunction as an…

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Mnemonic agency? Mnemonic agency?Marina Trakas You forget your mother’s birthday. You remember telling your partner to pick up your child from school, but he insists you did not (and in fact, you didn’t). You are considering promoting an employee, and all the mistakes made by the default male candidate fade away, along with the accomplishments of women, Black employees, and other minorities.

Mnemonic agency?

Mnemonic agency?Marina Trakas You forget your mother’s birthday. You remember telling your partner to pick up your child from school, but he insists you did not (and in fact, you didn’t). You are considering promoting an employee, and all the mistakes made by the default male…

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The role of attentional biases in addictive decision-making The role of attentional biases in addictive decision-making Federico Burdman Addiction is of interest to philosophers, among other things, because it raises a puzzle about rationality in practical agency. A common way to lay out the puzzle takes its cue from the standard definition of addiction as persistent drug use despite harmful consequences. Some people with addiction experience insight deficits and are unaware that they have an addiction or of its serious negative consequences (for a review of the evidence, see Raftery et al.

The role of attentional biases in addictive decision-making

The role of attentional biases in addictive decision-making Federico Burdman Addiction is of interest to philosophers, among other things, because it raises a puzzle about rationality in practical agency. A common way to lay out the…

2 months ago 1 0 0 0

Rethinking autonomy in Alzheimer’s disease Rethinking autonomy in Alzheimer’s diseaseDominique Waissbluth Usually, people with Alzheimer’s disease are considered no longer capable of performing autonomous acts. This claim is not only common among loved ones, but also among carers. It is usually taken to be established after medical and legal assessments that state this inability. However, this all rests on a very restrictive idea of autonomy, which leaves no room for rethinking the various forms for patients to take part in various decision-making processes.

Rethinking autonomy in Alzheimer’s disease

Rethinking autonomy in Alzheimer’s diseaseDominique Waissbluth Usually, people with Alzheimer’s disease are considered no longer capable of performing autonomous acts. This claim is not only common among loved ones, but also among carers. It is usually…

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Are Psychopaths Responsible? Are Psychopaths Responsible? Walter Sinnott-Armstrong I will examine a question that sits at the intersection of moral psychology, philosophy, and criminal law: are psychopaths morally and legally responsible for what they do, and if not, what should we do with them? This is not only a theoretical problem about moral judgment, but also a deeply practical problem, because psychopaths are few in number yet responsible for a strikingly large proportion of serious crime.

Are Psychopaths Responsible?

Are Psychopaths Responsible? Walter Sinnott-Armstrong I will examine a question that sits at the intersection of moral psychology, philosophy, and criminal law: are psychopaths morally and legally responsible for what they do, and if not, what should we do with them?…

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This week: Agency and Mental Disorder A workshop Cognition and Agency in Mental Disorder was held on November 18th and 19th 2025, in Santiago de Chile at Universidad Alberto Hurtado. It was organized by Federico Burdman and the Santiago Mind and Cognition group. As an international guest, the workshop featured Walter Sinnott-Armstrong from Duke University. This week, we will have posts featuring some of the works presented there.

This week: Agency and Mental Disorder

A workshop Cognition and Agency in Mental Disorder was held on November 18th and 19th 2025, in Santiago de Chile at Universidad Alberto Hurtado. It was organized by Federico Burdman and the Santiago Mind and Cognition group. As an international guest, the…

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Introducing: New Associate Editor, Alison Springle We are excited to announce that Alison Springle will be joining us as one of our new associate editors! Alison is an Assistant Professor at University of Miami, and works on a wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and science. For the blog, Alison will be working on promoting new collaborations and content-types for the blog, as well as contributing to our book symposia series.

Introducing: New Associate Editor, Alison Springle

We are excited to announce that Alison Springle will be joining us as one of our new associate editors! Alison is an Assistant Professor at University of Miami, and works on a wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and science. For the blog,…

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Introducing: New Associate Editor, Jorge Ignacio Fuentes Muñoz We are thrilled to announce that Jorge Ignacio Fuentes Muñoz will be joining us at Brains as an Associate Editor. Jorge is an assistant professor at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and will be overseeing content in philosophy of mind and neuroscience, as well as keeping us updated on philosophical happenings in South America. Please see below for a brief introduction from Jorge!

Introducing: New Associate Editor, Jorge Ignacio Fuentes Muñoz

We are thrilled to announce that Jorge Ignacio Fuentes Muñoz will be joining us at Brains as an Associate Editor. Jorge is an assistant professor at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, and will be overseeing content in philosophy…

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Editorial Team Updates Hi All, In the next weeks and months, we'll be making some exciting new additions to the editorial team at Brains. Two new Associate Editors will be introduced this week! I want to take the chance to give a huge thanks to two of our recent Associate Editors who will be stepping down. Majid Beni and Trey Boone both did incredible work with Brains over the past couple of years.

Editorial Team Updates

Hi All, In the next weeks and months, we'll be making some exciting new additions to the editorial team at Brains. Two new Associate Editors will be introduced this week! I want to take the chance to give a huge thanks to two of our recent Associate Editors who will be…

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Author’s Reply to Mazviita Chirimuuta Reply to Chirimuuta Mazviita Chirimuuta is sympathetic to my deflationary construal of scientists’ representational talk when they characterize their models, but she sees objectionable elements of eliminativism in my discussion of representation outside the domain of science. She says of me: “If she has to choose between the ontology of the manifest image, and that of the scientific image, it’s the manifest that will have to go.” But we don’t have to choose.

Author’s Reply to Mazviita Chirimuuta

Reply to Chirimuuta Mazviita Chirimuuta is sympathetic to my deflationary construal of scientists’ representational talk when they characterize their models, but she sees objectionable elements of eliminativism in my discussion of representation outside the…

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Mazviita Chirimuuta: A “Left Sellarsian” Response to a “Right Sellarsian” Proposal Comment on Deflating Mental Representation by Frances Egan A “Left Sellarsian” Response to a “Right Sellarsian” Proposal “Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analysed without remainder—even ‘in principle’—into non-epistemic facts, whether phenomenal or behavioural, public or private, with no matter how lavish a sprinkling of subjunctives and hypotheticals is, I believe, a radical mistake—a mistake of a piece with the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ in ethics” …

Mazviita Chirimuuta: A “Left Sellarsian” Response to a “Right Sellarsian” Proposal

Comment on Deflating Mental Representation by Frances Egan A “Left Sellarsian” Response to a “Right Sellarsian” Proposal “Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analysed without remainder—even ‘in…

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Author’s Reply to Mace and Roskies Reply to Mace and Roskies Caitlin Mace and Adina Roskies (hereafter, M&R) argue that the identification of vehicles in neuroscience depends intimately on the prior assignment of content, and so content cannot be relegated to an extra-theoretical gloss. Identifying neural vehicles is notoriously difficult and, they claim, subject to indeterminacy. To identify computational vehicles, experimenters look for neural signals whose activity appears to be correlated with some experimental variable taken to be the representational content, such as the onset of a cue, a stimulus feature, or some aspect of behavior.

Author’s Reply to Mace and Roskies

Reply to Mace and Roskies Caitlin Mace and Adina Roskies (hereafter, M&R) argue that the identification of vehicles in neuroscience depends intimately on the prior assignment of content, and so content cannot be relegated to an extra-theoretical gloss.…

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Caitlin Mace & Adina L. Roskies: Vehicle realism, content pragmatism – Uneasy bedfellows Title: Vehicle realism, content pragmatism: Uneasy bedfellows Caitlin Mace and Adina L. Roskies Frances Egan’s (2025) “Deflating Mental Representation” poses an interesting challenge to both realists and fictionalists about mental representation. In the book she argues for a pragmatic view of representational content and realism about representational vehicles.  The book as a whole is a deflationary take on the primary ways in which the concept of representation enters into cognitive science: in scientific theorizing about the brain, in folk psychological discourse, and in perception.

Caitlin Mace & Adina L. Roskies: Vehicle realism, content pragmatism – Uneasy bedfellows

Title: Vehicle realism, content pragmatism: Uneasy bedfellows Caitlin Mace and Adina L. Roskies Frances Egan’s (2025) “Deflating Mental Representation” poses an interesting challenge to both realists and…

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Author’s Reply to Oron Shagrir Reply to Oron Shagrir Oron Shagrir argues that computation and content are more interconnected than my account allows. Computational individuation, he claims, is subject to indeterminacy, and at least in some cases the indeterminacy is resolved by appeal to content. If content is a gloss, as I argue, then according to Shagrir computational characterization is partly a gloss too. Shagrir deploys an example to make the case for computational indeterminacy.

Author’s Reply to Oron Shagrir

Reply to Oron Shagrir Oron Shagrir argues that computation and content are more interconnected than my account allows. Computational individuation, he claims, is subject to indeterminacy, and at least in some cases the indeterminacy is resolved by appeal to…

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Oron Shagrir: On Egan’s Conception of Computation On Egan's Conception of Computation Oron Shagrir In Deflating Mental Representation, Frances Egan advances an exemplary account that combines realism about the computational vehicles of mental representations with anti-realism regarding their content. While the more contentious thesis concerns content, my focus is on Egan's conception of computation, which has shaped much of the ongoing debate on physical computation in recent decades.

Oron Shagrir: On Egan’s Conception of Computation

On Egan's Conception of Computation Oron Shagrir In Deflating Mental Representation, Frances Egan advances an exemplary account that combines realism about the computational vehicles of mental representations with anti-realism regarding their…

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Frankie Egan: Brains Blog precis of Deflating Mental Representation Brains Blog precis of Deflating Mental Representation In the book I propose what I call a deflationary account of mental representation, characterized by three claims: (1) Construing a mental (or neural) state as a representation does not presuppose a special, substantive relation (or relations) – what we can call a representation relation – holding between the state and what the representation is about,

Frankie Egan: Brains Blog precis of Deflating Mental Representation

Brains Blog precis of Deflating Mental Representation In the book I propose what I call a deflationary account of mental representation, characterized by three claims: (1) Construing a mental (or neural) state as a…

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Symposium: Deflating Mental Representation Join us this week for our first event of the year, another fantastic book symposium! This time, we have Frankie Egan discussing her new book, Deflating Mental Representation. We have three great commentaries from Oron Shagrir, Caitlin Mace and Adina Roskies, and Mazviita Chirimuuta, along with responses from Frankie. Feel free to hop into the comments to discuss!

Symposium: Deflating Mental Representation

Join us this week for our first event of the year, another fantastic book symposium! This time, we have Frankie Egan discussing her new book, Deflating Mental Representation. We have three great commentaries from Oron Shagrir, Caitlin Mace and Adina…

3 months ago 1 0 0 0

Upcoming Events for Neural Mechanisms Online See below for upcoming events at Neural Mechanisms Online. You can join the events by joining the mailing list; to do so email neuralmechanisms@gmail.com. Neural Mechanisms Online 2026 Monday 19 January 2026 (4.30-7PM CET*) : Online book Symposium on Neurocognitive Foundations of Mind (H 4-6PM CET*)Monday 16 February 2026 Denny Borsboom (University of Amsterdam)Monday 2 March 2026 Marcello Ienca (Technical University of Munich)

Upcoming Events for Neural Mechanisms Online

See below for upcoming events at Neural Mechanisms Online. You can join the events by joining the mailing list; to do so email neuralmechanisms@gmail.com. Neural Mechanisms Online 2026 Monday 19 January 2026 (4.30-7PM CET*) : Online book Symposium on…

3 months ago 1 0 0 0

The Brains Blog 20th Anniversary Please join us as we wrap up the year with a special roundtable. The Brains Blog recently passed it's 20th anniversary! The managing editors from all 20 years of the blog got together for a brief chat about the history of the blog and where it's going.

The Brains Blog 20th Anniversary

Please join us as we wrap up the year with a special roundtable. The Brains Blog recently passed it's 20th anniversary! The managing editors from all 20 years of the blog got together for a brief chat about the history of the blog and where it's going.

4 months ago 1 0 0 0

Response to Karl Friston: Pay Attention to Spherical Cows The Idealized Mind (2025) suggests that the free energy principle (FEP) in theoretical neuroscience unifies all the different arguments covered in the book. The FEP is a GUT in more than one way. Friston’s commentary opens with the physicists’ spherical cow. In The Idealized Mind, chapter 9 seeks to establish that the possibility of explaining the brain and cognition by appeal to generative models and probabilistic inference requires idealizing the mind and brain.

Response to Karl Friston: Pay Attention to Spherical Cows

The Idealized Mind (2025) suggests that the free energy principle (FEP) in theoretical neuroscience unifies all the different arguments covered in the book. The FEP is a GUT in more than one way. Friston’s commentary opens with the…

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Karl Friston: The Physics of ‘As If’ The Physics of ‘As If’ Karl Friston11 Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University of College London Milk production at a dairy farm was low, so the farmer wrote to the local university, asking for help. A multidisciplinary team of professors was assembled, headed by a theoretical physicist, and two weeks of intensive on-site investigation took place. The scholars then returned to the university, where the task of writing the report was left to the team leader.

Karl Friston: The Physics of ‘As If’

The Physics of ‘As If’ Karl Friston11 Queen Square Institute of Neurology, University of College London Milk production at a dairy farm was low, so the farmer wrote to the local university, asking for help. A multidisciplinary team of professors was assembled,…

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Author’s Reply to Corey Maley: No Literal (Exact Mathematical) Computation The Idealized Mind (2025) distinguishes between computational modeling, where computational models are used to study target systems, and the additional practice of showing that neural systems literally perform computations. The former is a legitimate scientific practice. The latter is problematic. Because computational neuroscientists take neural systems to be computational systems, Maley thinks that a core task for philosophers of neuroscience is to figure out what it might mean for a neural system to compute.

Author’s Reply to Corey Maley: No Literal (Exact Mathematical) Computation

The Idealized Mind (2025) distinguishes between computational modeling, where computational models are used to study target systems, and the additional practice of showing that neural systems literally perform computations.…

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Corey Maley: Comments on The Idealized Mind COMMENTS ON THE IDEALIZED MIND, BY MICHAEL D. KIRCHHOFFCorey J. Maley Purdue University cjmaley@purdue.edu Michael Kirchhoff’s book The Idealized Mind has many original and thought-provoking ideas, touching on a number of subjects relevant to contemporary discussions in the theory and philosophy of cognitive science. Here, I will focus my comments on Chapters 6 and 7, where Kirchhoff critiques views that characterize neural systems as performing computations in some literal sense.

Corey Maley: Comments on The Idealized Mind

COMMENTS ON THE IDEALIZED MIND, BY MICHAEL D. KIRCHHOFFCorey J. Maley Purdue University cjmaley@purdue.edu Michael Kirchhoff’s book The Idealized Mind has many original and thought-provoking ideas, touching on a number of subjects relevant to…

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Author’s Reply to Frances Egan: The Proof is in the LoGs The Idealized Mind (2025) argues that discussion about neural representation and neural computation is based on idealized models. This has serious implications for defending realism about neural representation and neural computation. Egan is right to think that my critique of computational models applies more widely than to her own account of computational models (2018, 2025). Indeed, chapter 7 is devoted to a critique of Piccinini’s (2020) mechanistic account of computation (see also my response to Maley’s commentary).

Author’s Reply to Frances Egan: The Proof is in the LoGs

The Idealized Mind (2025) argues that discussion about neural representation and neural computation is based on idealized models. This has serious implications for defending realism about neural representation and neural computation. Egan…

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Frances Egan: Some Physical Systems (Literally) Compute Some Physical Systems (Literally) ComputeFrances Egan Rutgers University In his ambitious new book, Michael Kirchhoff argues that computational models cannot be literally true of the real-world systems they purport to describe. In chapter 6 he aims his critique at my account of computational models (Egan 2018, 2020), but, as I understand it, the critique is intended to apply widely to any account of physical computation and has implications for scientific theorizing in general.

Frances Egan: Some Physical Systems (Literally) Compute

Some Physical Systems (Literally) ComputeFrances Egan Rutgers University In his ambitious new book, Michael Kirchhoff argues that computational models cannot be literally true of the real-world systems they purport to describe. In chapter 6…

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Author’s Reply to Zoe Drayson: Infinity Functions and No Logical Empiricism The Idealized Mind (2025) examines how idealized models are used to interpret the nature and function of the mind and brain, whilst defending a version of scientific realism. Drayson presents several challenges to this project. She says that The Idealized Mind claims that “some scientific theories are neither true nor false” and that this makes me “one of the very few philosophers since the logical empiricists to deny semantic realism.” That’s a misreading of the book’s position.

Author’s Reply to Zoe Drayson: Infinity Functions and No Logical Empiricism

The Idealized Mind (2025) examines how idealized models are used to interpret the nature and function of the mind and brain, whilst defending a version of scientific realism. Drayson presents several challenges to this…

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Challenging Kirchhoff on the Semantics of Models and Theories Challenging Kirchhoff on the Semantics of Models and TheoriesZoe DraysonThe bold claim at the heart of Kirchhoff’s (2025) The Idealized Mind is that some scientific theories are neither true nor false. This makes Kirchhoff one of the very few philosophers since the logical empiricists to deny semantic realism: the view that all scientific theories, including those which posit unobservables, have truth conditions.

Challenging Kirchhoff on the Semantics of Models and Theories

Challenging Kirchhoff on the Semantics of Models and TheoriesZoe DraysonThe bold claim at the heart of Kirchhoff’s (2025) The Idealized Mind is that some scientific theories are neither true nor false. This makes Kirchhoff one of the…

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