He saying what (he says) the FCDO security director told him.

He’d be very foolish to lie.

We can all agree that no one should ever have been put in this position.

The PM made a serious error.

But: the PM is the PM.

He has no say in NSV/DV and shouldn’t be permitted to pry into any vetting case in any way.

Nonetheless, if he wants an ambassador, officials must do their best. /11. End

Anything is possible.

What’s probable?

UKSV, FCDO security, FCDO PUS all did a good job under difficult circumstances and handled a very tricky case in a way which protected UK national security to the appropriate standard, in line with their obligations under the law & official guidance. /10.

Of course, it’s possible that UKSV did a bad job, or that the FCDO security director did, or that the PUS behaved improperly or unwisely, and that as a result of any or all of these things a bad judgment was made. We don’t know. None of us have seen the UKSV report. None should. /9.

Whether the national security risks which might arise can be adequately managed is something on which UKSV is allowed (indeed required) to provide advice to the FCDO, but it’s for the FCDO security director (decision maker) to decide, sometimes checking in with the PUS (SRO) as in this case. /8.

That seems to be what happened here.

On the latter, the FCDO can’t disagree with UKSV’s evidence. It can discuss it, if necessary iteratively, with them, so both sides agree on its meaning.

That also seems to have happened here. /7.

The interesting point would be if PUS & FCDO security director disagreed. Or, of course, if FCDO security director & UKSV disagreed.

On the former, it isn’t the job of the PUS (SRO) to overrule the security director (decision maker). It’s to help him, if needed, come to a sound decision. /6.

When a case needs (as Sir Olly put it today) a “sense check” from the PUS, the FCDO security director brings it to his attention, by briefing him & discussing it with him. (That must be done securely. All notes resulting from the discussion must be on FCDO’s security directorate system only). /5.

The FCDO security director, as officially designated decision maker, decides cases, using relevant, extremely tightly held documentation, and the expert input of his team. Key among the documentation is the UKSV report. /4.

He doesn’t (and mustn’t) delve into the UKSV documentation. That would compromise his crucial independent supervisory role, and the integrity and independence of his appeals adjudication. /3.

The PUS is the FCDO SRO for NSV/DV, and is the adjudicator of FCDO DV (withdrawal) appeals.

In that role, which is rather like a combination of independent, supervisory board chair and final appeals judge, he doesn’t (and mustn’t) interfere in the work of UKSV or (even) the FCDO vetting team. /2.

I think a key missing point in this line of argument (in which you’re far from alone, certainly) is that, as one would expect in the very long standing NSV/DV arrangements in the FCDO and several other depts, is that the decision maker in FCDO/DS cases is the FCDO security director. /1.

Respectfully, watch Sir Olly’s evidence. Listen to Peter Ricketts’ and others’ well-informed interviews, read Gus O’Donnell’s article.

Everything I’ve said is +/- what they say.

I made my comments independently of them.

(My background: DS, starting 1980s, ending 2020s).

AI will soon be drinking virtual coffee on our behalf. Only a web address required.

Interesting.

A national security department?

It does.

And civil servants are responsible for NSV.

Ministers not.

The FCDO minister knew that in Sept (at the latest). The PM/minister for the civil service apparently didn’t know it even yesterday.

National security risks must be managed within those parameters. Or, Parliament must legislate.

Olly Robbins seems to have done precisely what the law, official guidance, and long-established convention demanded, in order to protect national security while doing everything possible, within reason and the law and associated requirements, to expedite the government’s business.

Unforgivable.

Mandelson didn’t fail.

Ed Llewellyn isn’t “one out of two”. He’s just one who comes to mind.

And, BTW, we have no idea, nor does the PM, and nor should any of us, what’s in the UKSV report(s) on EL. Nor even if they exist/ whether he has DV (I’m saying he must do/have had, that’s another matter).

I thought I’d have a go at sharing it with an expectant world 🙃

It’s embarrassing and dangerous that the most senior minister in the land appears not to have understood that, acted on a misunderstanding when attacking and sacking the head of the diplomatic service, and has not yet (publicly anyway) acknowledged still less repaired his very serious error. /3. End

… PM and cabinet, reflects (as it must) that law. It is clear, as the foreign office minister stated unequivocally to the House of Commons in September (as a recent example), and has been the case for decades, that ministers are only informed of the vetting outcome, nothing else. /2.

Of course.

And, by statute - from Parliament - ministers are excluded from national security vetting (including DV) of members of the civil service and the diplomatic service. Civil servants alone are responsible.

The detailed official guidance for NSV, issued under the authority of the … /1.

Thought provoking reflections on Starmer-Mandelson-Robbins from @stephenkb.bsky.social ⬇️

You make it difficult to be reasonable. But I’ll try.

Parliament decided that ministers have no power(s) over national security vetting (see attached).

Every British ambassador (there may be v rare exceptions) has to hold DV.

Political appointees such as Ed Llewelyn will certainly have been DV’d.

Olly Robbins seems to have done precisely what the law, official guidance, and long-established convention demanded, in order to protect national security while doing everything possible, within reason and the law and associated requirements, to expedite the government’s business.

Unforgivable.

(Worse (🙃), you didn’t read my 🧵 which explained all this (although Robbins’ evidence clears up a few points which were, necessarily, a little speculative at the time)).

You didn’t watch the FAC session today.

Olly Robbins seems to have done precisely what the law, official guidance, and long-established convention demanded, in order to protect national security while doing everything possible, within reason and the law and associated requirements, to expedite the government’s business.

Unforgivable.

That isn’t “the” issue.

Sir O Robbin’s evidence is clear: the system which operated until the PM chose to suspend it, has always been that UKSV recommends, it doesn’t decide. The recommendation presented to Sir Olly, wasn’t “fail”. On DV, civil servants recommend and decide. Ministers are excluded.

Why did he choose Mandelson?