yes, if it's sequential the courts generally find no agreement. However, they may if the changes occur simultaneously.

Every industry has people viewing the same data and using the same analytic tools to draw conclusions about pricing. the hard question is how to get from that to an agreement. If you shout "fire" in a restaurant and 100 run out, that does not mean that they have agreed with each other to do so.

it actually dominates these cases, which are focused on what it means to "agree" on a price.

Hotels won another round on algorithmic price fixing. Segal v. Amadeus Group, 2026 WL 879583, dismissed a complaint against hoteliers who use software to compute "optimal" output and price. See the piece by Thibault Schrepel and myself. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Fairness and Redistribution in Antitrust Law - Network Law Review Many parts of the legal system pursue “fair” distributions of wealth or economic status. Antitrust law does not. The antitrust statutes target practices that reduce output or threaten monopoly—measure...

Is antitrust law about fairness? @sherman1890.bsky.social’s answer is clear: no, and it never was.
In this piece, Prof. Hovenkamp dismantles the growing assumption in competition debates that antitrust should correct inequality or redistribute economic power.
www.networklawreview.org/hovenkamp-fa...

Fairness and Redistribution in Antitrust Law - Network Law Review Many parts of the legal system pursue “fair” distributions of wealth or economic status. Antitrust law does not. The antitrust statutes target practices that reduce output or threaten monopoly (measur...

Many laws promote fairness or compel redistribution. Antitrust law is not among them. Its concern is limited to preserving market competition. One deviation was the Robinson-Patman Act, which subsidized obsolete business models at consumers' expense. www.networklawreview.org/hovenkamp-fa...

My article on the Google Search remedies decision is now in page proof in the Boston Univ. L. Rev. Lots still going on in this case. here: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

The DMA’s Case Against Seamlessness The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) does not just regulate competition—it redesigns how digital products work. The DMA is often framed as a pro-consumer reform—a necessary intervention to “...

Lazar Radic has a very good post in TOTM on the war against consumer preferences that has become the EU's Digital Markets Act. A good warning to those in the USA thinking about reviving any movement to pass something similar. truthonthemarket.com/2026/03/19/t...

I think we are getting into territory where there will be some disbarments if the Dems win the White House in 2028. No pardons for those.

interesting 3-20-2026 decision by J. Mehta, denying standing in a Google Search case, but also resisting the attempt to find an unlawful "tying arrangement" when a firm includes AI tools in its digital product. Helena World Chron. v. Google, 2026 WL 787882 (DDC).

The Philadelphia Citizen: Emphasizing Solutions to Make the City Better The Philadelphia Citizen emphasizes solutions in our government, school system, environment, businesses and more to make Philadelphia a better city.

The Philadelphia Citizen just published an interview with me about an important piece of local antitrust history -- the Philadelphia Bank merger decision. thephiladelphiacitizen.org

The shopping court was invented by Sylvan Goldman, whose Sun chain owned 55 stores by that time and later merged with others to become Piggly-Wiggly -- not as big as Kroger, but a large chain nonetheless.

In dealer discrimination cases Robinson-Patman does not require any price to be below cost. if it did, the statute would do much less damage than it currently does.

The Fed Cir held in Global Tubing v. Tenaris, 2026 WL 530911 (Feb 26, 2026) that a firm claimed to have a 26% market share could be guilty of attempted monopolization by intentionally withholding material documents in its patent application. Things are changing at the Fed. Cir.

Thibault Schrepel and I have a coming piece in Harv Bus. L. Rev. on collusion through digital management programs. US and EU decisions substantially agree. The most difficult issue is distinguishing innocent information exchanges and unlawful agreement. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

In a revised Facebook opinion, Dec. 2, 2025 WL 3458822, J. Boasberg removed redactions, concluding FB's market share was “almost certainly below 54%" and falling, in a market without YouTube -- too low for §2. Seems cautious to include YouTube, even though the substitution evidence would include it.

My article on the Google Search Remedies decision, focusing on remedies for digital market dominance, will appear in the Boston University Law Review. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

ANTICOMPETITIVE DIRECTORS - Columbia Law Review “The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws human and divine.” — Justice Louis Brandeis. Introduction Antitrust law prohibits competing corporations from shar...

Lanes Miles, Mark Lemley, and my new Wharton colleague Rory Van Loo have an interesting new article on interlocking directorates. They are more numerous, and also sometimes sit as senior directors at large institutional investors. "Anticompetitive Directors," columbialawreview.org/content/anti...

I don't disagree, but we also TM bananas (Chiquita and Del Monte). What is that signaling? I'm guessing no product differentiation whatsoever. quality? not unless there are inferior alternatives. And I don't think it's status.

okay, I'm convinced.

but does trademark have much to do with it? isn't it the same as Thorstein Veblen's big front yards of untilled ground? ("conspicuous consumption"). Probably easier to fake a Rolex than a big yard.

I'm not a good predictor, but I have doubts. I don't think that even this SCT wants to extend Trinko to remedies, and the less-restrictive alternative issue seems to be more words than substance.

Google v Epic Cert Petition + Appendix 10-27-25 Final

Google's cert. petition agnst Epic Games (10-27, 9th Cir.) asks whether rule of reason antitrust plaintiff has a burden to prove a less restrictive alternative; and also attacks the notion that Trinko's refusal to deal doctrine does not apply to remedies. www.documentcloud.org/documents/26...

In Academy of Allergy, 2025 WL 2886701 (6thCir. Oct. 10, 2025) the court held that the SCT’s indirect purchaser rule (in this case “indirect supplier”) precluded an antitrust action against a harmful cartel. A concurrence lamented that fact. It’s time to overrule Illinois Brick.

Vols 12, 13, 14 of Antitrust Law, 5th edition came out today—cartels, joint ventures, and Robinson-Patman Acr

Here is my draft of a relatively short but article-length assessment of Judge Mehta’s Google Search remedies decision. Still under revision and comments welcome. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

My piece on "Finding Monopoly: Antitrust Market Definition" is in the Sep. 2025 CPI Antitrust Chronicle, part of a symposium on market definition in antitrust. No longer paywalled. papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Self-Preferencing in Retail Digital Marketplaces: Evidence from Transaction Data The authors analyze retail transaction data to explore self-preferencing practices.

Good piece by Antonie, Gonzales & Shao: self-preferencing occurs less on digital markets than in the old economy; consistent with fact that online consumers have lower search costs, and indicates flaws in Biden admin targeting of online markets. www.cornerstone.com/insights/art...

CoStar, 2025 WL 2573045 (9thCir) refused to dismiss a complaint alleging that monopoly power for Sherman Act §2 purposes could be inferred simply from the fact that D persistently charged higher prices than its rivals for years, saying nothing about margins or output restrictions.

Yes, it's a win for Google, but I think a win for U.S. technology and its users as well, as well as appropriate recognition by the court that messing around with market structure in a market as dynamic as this one could spell disaster.