Rethinking Metaphysics has now arrived in print (discount code below). The trilogy is complete.

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Some arguments and evidence suggests that intuitions about some philosophical thought experiments are remarkably stable.

Wu et al replicate this for one case (Exp 1), but find arguments changed people's conclusions about 10 cases (Exp 2).

doi.org/10.1080/0951...

#xPhi #CogSci

Since undergrad I've been convinced that persistent pretending is impossible. If you act a certain way regularly, that’s just who you are. But that's unintuitive. People think behavior is more "real" in *natural*, in-person environment than online. My less-true-online self recommends this cool study

Conceptual engineering is old news Abstract. According to a prevailing view, conceptual engineering introduces a revolutionary philosophical methodology, challenging traditional conceptual a

Finally, a co-authored paper exploring various ways in which we can think that conceptual engineering is nothing new. In particular, we argue that many past papers can justifiably be seen as part of conceptual engineering, among others on the examples of the use of thought experiments. 11/11

Krzysztof Sękowski, Overcoming Modal Skepticism via Conceptual Engineering - PhilPapers The paper defends the view that that a significant part of metaphysics should be understood as conceptual engineering, and explores its epistemological advantages and metaphysical implications. It dis...

A short piece where I discuss how adopting the conceptual engineering view (here tied to a neo-pragmatic approach) for thought experiments helps avoid modal skepticism, and why we don't have to be afraid of becoming anti-realists after adopting this approach. 10/11

Reference the untouchable. On the limits of revising concepts using the method of cases - Synthese The paper investigates to what extent the method of cases can be interpreted as either a descriptive or a normative enterprise. I demonstrate that although most instances of the method of cases in mos...

Here I argue that while interpreting thought experiments through conceptual engineering applies to most philosophical methodology, the theory of reference is an exception due to its unique view on intuitions, where they serve as data to be explained. 9/11

First paper: Using Gettier case, I show that thought experiments are justified by arguments which in turn are justified by intuitions on concepts' general features. Moreover, if we interpret them as normative arguments, we can address concerns about the reliability raised by the negative x-phi. 8/11

This is part of my bigger project on the role of intuitions in thought experiments and conceptual engineering. If you're interested in other works, I'd take the opportunity, and I post links below to relevant papers with short descriptions. 7/11

Additionally, the paper provides more data for those interested in intuition-talk in the theory of reference and corpus studies. I raise issues with selecting intuition-talk indicators, analyse what philosophers usually call intuitive, and discuss further corpus studies methodological problems. 6/11

Ad 2. The paper is a case study of how studying original texts can support "unpopular" readings of philosophical methods. It contributes to the debate on whether we should focus on original texts in philosophical methodology or just their reception, as suggested by @ethanlandes.bsky.social. 5/11

These results might simply suggest that thought experiments are justified by arguments, not intuitions. However, building on my other work, I argue that this also opens the way to viewing TEs as a method of conceptual engineering, addressing concerns about their reliability. 4/11

In the paper, I present data supporting this view. First, intuition-talk in the studied literature more often concerns general features of concepts than judgments about cases (or uses). Second, in about half of the studied examples, intuitive claims were justified by further arguments. 3/11

Ad 1. Do intuitions justify philosophers' claims? In several papers (see later posts), I argue that in thought experiments, intuitions about cases aren’t crucial since they’re justified by arguments. However, these arguments stem from intuitions about general features of concepts. 2/11

Metaphilosophy Armed with Original Texts: A Corpus Study on the Intuition-talk in Theory of Reference - Philosophia The paper engages in two metaphilosophical disputes. The first concerns the importance of studying original texts to establish the methods used by philosophers. The second addresses the role of intuit...

Officially out! A corpus study on intuition-talk in the theory of reference. 1. It provides empirical evidence for the arguments & conceptual-engineering-oriented take on thought experiments that I’ve been developing. 2. It argues for studying original texts in metaphilosophy. 1/11

Conceptual Engineering Should be Empirical - Erkenntnis Conceptual engineering is a philosophical method that aims to design and spread conceptual and linguistic devices to cause meaningful changes in the world. So far, however, conceptual engineers have s...

I like the fact that the rise of conceptual engineering is methodologically very self-aware. Despite the name, it's not just about why CE should be empirical (I’d disagree that it should be exclusively, but hey), but also about actual hints for specific methods that help make CE’s aim more doable

If it’s an accept or RR, it feels like a good move. But sometimes, you draw the 'query → looking for 2nd reviewer → query → still looking → query → screw the 2nd, reject' loop in the review lottery. So be careful.

Hope you’ve got the better one

Does anyone know of papers in the field of conceptual engineering where thought experiments are used? Self-promotions highly welcome!

After more than 80 EXTRA talks, the series comes to an (happy) end this Wednesday 🥲
Everyone welcome, just send me a DM/Email.

Went off Twitter a while ago, but let’s give Bluesky a shot!