Forthcoming article "Tax Professionals and Tax Evasion” by @battaglini.bsky.social Luigi Guiso @chiaralac.bsky.social and Eleonora Patacchini
@eeanews.bsky.social
doi.org/10.1093/jeea...
Teaching materials available: www.eeassoc.org/teaching-mat...
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The result: evasion is not just an individual decision.
It is mediated by professional networks, with important implications for how audit policies should be designed and evaluated.
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Advisors differ in their willingness to play this role.
This heterogeneity creates a market for intermediated tax evasion, where taxpayers sort themselves based on how tolerant advisors are of evasion.
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Exploiting quasi-random variation in audit policy, we find that tax advisors act as information hubs.
They learn about audit intensity from experience and incorporate this information into their clients’ tax strategies.
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Using population-wide data on all Italian sole proprietors, matched with audits and tax advisors, we show that some advisors actively serve clients who intend to evade taxes.
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The traditional view: tax advisors mainly provide technical expertise, helping taxpayers interpret complex tax laws.
Our evidence shows that some advisors play a much broader role.
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My paper with @EleonoraPatacc2, @guiso_luigi, and @chiaralac, “Tax Professionals and Tax Evasion,” is finally out.
academic.oup.com/jeea/article...
If you are interested in social networks and fiscal policy, this one is for you. 🧵
In the Volunteer Dilemma, more players can reduce the chance of success—yet paradoxically, per capita utility still always rises. But inefficiency per person vanishes slower than 1/n, so aggregate inefficiency grows without bound!
In these examples they have 2 friends.
I definitely agree: do not insult the referees before you submit, wait after the reports! 😈
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So if you’ve got something in the works, consider submitting there.
We had a great experience!.
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Also — shoutout to JPubE!
The editor and the referees were great 🙏...and the entire process was fast and efficient.
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We study how welfare outcomes are shaped in strategic environments where individuals must decide whether to bear a cost for the public good — or hope someone else does. Classic dilemma, new insights. 😏
🧵 New paper drop!
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Free access to our new article:
"Welfare in the Volunteer's Dilemma"
Joint with T. Palfrey.
📖 Free access: authors.elsevier.com/c/1ktgWAlw9~...
Hours after the White House froze dozens of grants to Princeton, I sat down with its president.
I hope you’ll listen to our conversation about free speech, academic freedom, and cuts to research funding.
We also discussed Columbia’s concessions and the detention of Tufts student Rumeysa Öztürk.
Honestly, you should probably just read this fascinating interview while you wait for somebody to return your keys to you.
Post muto, post festivo.
Well you cite a number from the paper and apply it where it should note applied. If I misunderstood your statement, then good and sorry, I misunderstood it.
I was referring to the statement that you did not believe the results of the paper. The paper is not about presidential races.
Then, my friend, you should read the paper instead of writing an ignorant opinion.
Looking for a great political economy model? George Saunders offers you five, complete with reading comprehension questions and problem sets. Check it out:
I did it and it worked.
RT @m_battaglini: So Trump’s new Department of Government Efficiency has…
*wait for it*
Two co-chairs.
Yup, the satires write themselves.
FT book award winner Edmondson referring to the Gino debacle: "...lays out some possible paths for improvement, such as reducing pressure for academics to publish more studies." A masterclass on how to draw the wrong conclusions from the case. ft.com/content/0107...
Today, snow. Yes, it is Ithaca.
“I followed what I understood to be standard practice” says Alito, and you can see the lawyer in the “I understood “.
www.washingtonpost.com/media/2023/06/21/alito-w...
