The UAV-Enabled Anti-Air Defense Campaign in the Third Gulf War Should SAMs Fear the Reaper?

Anyway, read more about the counter air-defense campaign the U.S. is conducting from myself and @aaronstein1.bsky.social here: open.substack.com/pub/behindth...

I really doubt we will be able to park MQ-9s over China to plink TELs during a war...

Two things can be true at once! The TEL hunting campaign in OEF can be the most successful so far in history, which it is imo, and not super applicable to high-level fights in other contexts!

It Really Looks Like A PrSM The New York Times has a second story by Christiaan Triebert, John Ismay, Alexander Cardia, Leanne Abraham and Azmat Khanout that concludes … well, [...]

I told @trbrtc.bsky.social & @johnismay.bsky.social the missile involved in the strike that killed 21 civilians, including at least 5 children, appears to be ~15 feet long--closer to a PrSM than an Iranian cruise missile. This is how I made that estimate.
www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1221...

So good to see you, as always!

Disperse to Survive: The Logic of French Forward Deterrence In his long-awaited nuclear deterrence speech, French President Emmanuel Macron laid out his new doctrine of “forward deterrence” (dissuasion avancée) and

Just in time for your weekend, I have a fresh piece out with @warontherocks.bsky.social on the new 🇫🇷 French nuclear doctrine of “forward deterrence” and why dispersed air operations are a better comparison to it than 🇺🇸 U.S. forward nuclear deployments and nuclear sharing arrangements in 🇪🇺 Europe.

The *actual* reason Truman reserved this power for himself, and refused to allow it to be delegated or shared by the military, is because he believed that this was the only way to *prevent* nuclear weapons from being used again. Full stop.

Time for a real-time case study in how predelegation of launch authority creates problems for establishing and maintaining cease-fires

The UAV-Enabled Anti-Air Defense Campaign in the Third Gulf War Should SAMs Fear the Reaper?

Me and my colleague @slair.bsky.social looked at the drone counter-IAD campaign in Iran for @fpri.bsky.social :: The UAV-Enabled Anti-Air Defense Campaign in the Third Gulf War open.substack.com/pub/behindth...

South Korea’s Ominous Missile Deployments By placing more than 300 fixed, short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles on permanent alert at several above-ground sites close to the Demilitarised Zone, South Korean Strategic Command ha...

@dexeve.bsky.social & I have a new piece out in Survival. In 2024, South Korea secretly deployed more than 300 KTSSM missiles at soft, fixed sites--suggesting that, in a crisis, Seoul may strike first & giving Pyongyang 300 reasons to beat them to it.
doi.org/10.1080/0039...

Big "movie summary longer than movie" enjoyer

Looks like one of my slides made it into this Space Force brief on how to annotate imagery! Glad to see they liked it as much as I did

Also seems like the slides just endorse careful language for photo interpretation fwiw. Gotta respect analytic tradecraft

Analysis of Patriot Incident in Bahrain This is the longer analysis of a news story (“Patriot Missile Involved in Bahrain Blast Likely U.S. Operated, Analysis Finds,”) we did with [...]

We also have a write-up online. Absent debris from an Iranian drone, it looks very much like a Patriot misfire. If it was deliberate, the intercept attempt looks rather irresponsible and out of character with what we know about how CENTCOM operates.
www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/1221...

Patriot missile involved in Bahrain blast likely US-operated, analysis finds An American-operated Patriot air defense battery likely fired the interceptor missile involved in a pre-dawn explosion that injured dozens of civilians and tore through homes in U.S.-ally Bahrain 10 d...

Our findings are discussed in this @reuters.com story by
@jonathanlanday.bsky.social, MB Pell and Travis Hartman, with some incredible graphics from @sarahcahlan.bsky.social.
www.reuters.com/investigatio...

The team(slair.bsky.social, @duitsmanms.bsky.social others) spent the last few weeks examining this video showing a U.S. Patriot launch in Bahrain. We're confident this interceptor was involved in the explosion over Sitra that damaged 60 residences and injured more than 30 people.

Aid to Ukraine from 2022-2026 was a rounding error. We used more in the first two weeks of the Iran war than we provided in the 4 years of aid to Ukraine.

Satellite imagery (Google Earth) of Sunan Airport, Pyongyang, overlaid with KCNA aerial and ground photos aligning the 600mm MLRS launch site to the airport runway area. Coordinates 39.26°N, 125.68°E.

North Korea claims it test-fired 12 nuclear-capable 600mm MLRS Salvo rockets on March 14, striking a target island in the East Sea at 364.4 km range with 100% accuracy.

Launch site geolocated to Sunan Airport (순안국제공항), Pyongyang, at 39.26°N, 125.68°E

Thank you to @slair.bsky.social and @bcfinucane.bsky.social for taking the time to provide their expertise for this piece.

The damage to Shahroud is extensive

More or less every building in the solid motor production lines was damaged, many destroyed. Several mixing & casting buildings, along with what might be non-destructive testing & premix buildings.

Thanks to our partners @airbus.com for the image

More strikes at Kashan

Tunnel entrances hit, along with more support buildings. Looks like the base has been pretty extensively damaged.

Thanks as always to our friends @planet.com for the imagery.

Shiraz north missile base struck.

Tunnel entrances extensively targeted, and scorch marks along the roads indicate damaged vehicles, probably more TEL plinking. No real damage to support buildings.

Thanks to our friends @planet.com for the imagery!

Confirmed first damage to the Iranian solid propellant missile plant at Shahroud

Casting and mixing buildings were damaged, along with parts of what the IDF alleges is a warhead production line.

Thanks to our friends @planet.com for the imagery!

More damage at Garmdareh

Lots of support buildings hit, with some big explosions. More scorch marks indicative of TEL plinking.

Thanks to our friends @planet.com for the images.

More damage to Shiraz west

Two tunnel entrances attacked, covers destroyed.
Additional support buildings destroyed as well.

Thanks to our friends @planet.com for the images.

Lar missile base struck

Ejecta from targeted tunnel entrances visible. Many support buildings damaged or destroyed. Scorch marks in the roads are further evidence the TEL plinking campaign continues

Thanks to our friends @planet for the imagery!

Worth noting that according to that DEFA article citing a biography of Tehrani Moghaddam, the silo project was conducted by the commander of the IRGC-AF Engineering Department, Ali Hajizadeh

Other aboveground infrastructure for mobile launchers at the base was hit as well. Checkout buildings and more tunnel entrances targeted.

This base got a lot of bunker buster attention.

Wondering why Iran didn't build more silos? There are many reasons, but one is silos are much more technically complex than people often believe. Here is an Iranian article discussing the difficulties they had in making their first silos: dnws.ir/003CCU

First, Jam is one of the few Iranian missile bases with silos. The tunnel entrances to those silos have been destroyed, thought the portals themselves are still open. Doesn't preclude them being damaged, I just can't see it.

More craters on roads too. More TEL plinking?

Our friends @planet.com got an excellent image of the missile base at Jam

Lots of damage across the site, but a few things are worth looking at closer

We are watching in real time the destruction of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. Two things can be true at the same time. This remains an incredibly challenging thing for pilots to do. It is also being done incredibly well.