great post

Thanks Kevin, have seen Ken’s post, but not had a chance to read yet.

Where? I’m reading the wrong blogs it seems (or perhaps the right ones?).

I flesh this out a bit more here, p 237 onwards: academic.oup.com/jcsl/article...

API and which are of an insufficiently discriminate nature, striking civilians and military objectives without distinction.

Art 35(3) and Art 56 are usually mentioned. I think Art 57(2)(a)(ii) is on that list, because it requires weapons to be chosen that have a less harmful effect if doing so is feasible. Failure to do so amounts to an attack employing means that have effects which are not limited as required by

I should have formulated my words more carefully: I don’t have any special insight into the facts, so I’m just relying on what is in the public domain. It may well be wrong and incomplete. On the law, Art 51(4)(c) doesn’t list what the limits “required by this Protocol” are. Proportionality,

harm) and therefore, in my view, the customary equivalent of Art 51(4)(c) API (use of means the effects of which cannot be limited as required by API/custom). Still an indiscriminate attack, but for a different reason.

is the cluster warhead. Cluster munitions are area weapons, designed to achieve lethal effects over a wider area. While the delivery may be precise, the lethal radius is too big. The rule implicated is the customary equivalent of Art 57(2)(a)(ii) API (choice of means to minimize incidental harm

type, somewhere between tens to low hundreds of meters. Not high precision, but accurate enough, depending on type, for hitting large objects with a reasonable likelihood of success. This makes them capable of being directed against military objectives, at least sufficiently large ones. The issue

A slightly different take. The cluster munitions used by Iran are missiles equipped with cluster warheads, as only they have the necessary range among Iranian cluster munitions to hit Israel. A quick search suggests that the accuracy (circular error probable) of these missiles is, depending on

Quote: “Whether or not the law of armed conflict applied to Khamenei’s killing is not some technicality that risks diverting our attention from the ‘real’ issues. On the contrary, it has great practical and normative significance.”

Did the law of armed conflict apply to the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader?

AUREL SARI (@aurelsari.com) responds to a text we published last week and argues that the law of armed conflict applies from the very first act of violence in an armed conflict.

verfassungsblog.de/killing-kham...

Early visitors this morning at Streatham Campus at @exeter.ac.uk

Provided it did involve killing or injury (capture not being part of the customary rule), the use of the ambulances would be perfidious. The ICRC Customary Study suggests that medical units enjoy protection even if not marked with the protective emblem.

The logo of the Islamic Health Organization is not a protected emblem. I’m not sure what the Israeli position is on whether the rules on the improper use of enemy uniforms apply in NIACs, but the DoD Law of War Manual does not expressly recognise such a rule (unless I’ve missed it).

Please do share if you get a copy, I'd be interested in your thoughts.

The United Kingdom’s Use of Force Against Iran: Walking a Legal Tightrope? An assessment of the United Kingdom's ability to maintain a legal line between defensive versus offensive operations against Iran.

Compelling analysis. Prof Weller seems to assume that Gulf countries have not provided operational support to the US, but I think that assumption is questionable, adding another layer of complexity, as discussed www.justsecurity.org/133231/unite...

Let’s hope someone has checked in with the Cypriot authorities to see how they feel about the duties of neutral States…

My thoughts on the legal basis and justification for the UK’s military operations against Iran. It’s complicated…

Why are the States concerned not involved in an armed conflict?

spot on by Profs @mikeschmitt.bsky.social and Marko Milanovic

application of the rules governing the use of force to Iran raises some genuinely difficult and partly unsettled doctrinal questions. It's with that in mind that I made my initial comment, not to score points or to offend. I apologized because I meant it, otherwise I would not have.

I do regret having made my comment now, as I did not intend to cause any offence. I apologised twice for any misunderstanding on my part and I'll do so a third time: I'm sorry if I misread your post. I thought it made some very good points about the state of the international legal order. The

can do is to offer my apologies again for any misunderstanding on my part.

civilian infrastructure is a legitimate military target for Iran from a jus ad bellum point of view. The aggression/self-defence questions revolve not just around "those" States that are totally unconcerned with the US-Israeli attacks, but also those that facilitate those attacks. Anyway, all I

What led to the misunderstanding is that you wrote "those not concerned with the American and Israeli attacks". Kuwait, for example, is "concerned" with the US attack in the sense that it allows its territory to be used by the US for attacks against Iran. But that does not mean that Kuwaiti

I read that paragraph to count Iranian attacks on US bases in the region among the “reckless” ones - apologies if I misunderstood.

not retaliation, but covered by self-defence.

Good post on some of the perennial questions of the rule of law in an anarchical international system. One comment on Iran’s targeting: much of it is aimed at US installations and assets in the region which are almost certainly making an operational contribution to the US attack. These strikes are

Are there any analyses you'd recommend for China's response to this? Would assume China has a major interest in keeping Iran in the fight.