The U.S. minesweepers are closer to the war between Geno’s and Pat’s than the Strait of Hormuz.
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This all helps explain a story raised by our reporting last year — when we spoke with Lennar homeowners who described mold, flooding, and cracked foundations.
Now we may know one explanation for why the corners are being cut.
Full investigation: hntrbrk.com/lennar-accounting
So Lennar is stuck on a treadmill. Build to avoid compounding fees. Slash prices to sell. Cut corners on construction to save costs. Watch margins shrink. Repeat.
Meanwhile, cash flow has gone negative and the stock has been cut in half.
“There is absolutely no flexibility,” TPG Angelo Gordon, Lennar’s biggest Land Banker, told their investors.
“If they fall behind, we then have the right to instantly terminate, take their deposit, sell it to one of their competitors.”
The problem: It’s not clear Lennar can afford to slow down.
The contracts with its land banks are rigid — mandatory monthly takedown schedules, penalties for falling behind, and cross-termination clauses that make walking away from even one community complicated and costly.
The TLDR: The fees will eventually hit earnings — either when Lennar buys the land or walks away from it.
And they're already starting to show up. Lennar's gross margin has fallen to 15.2%, the lowest of any major homebuilder. Five points below its closest competitor.
That's a $2.2 billion gap. Something other than land deposits is inflating that number. (In the article, we explain a range of things that could be contributing to this, including the options fees.)
At Lennar, it has disconnected.
In the past year, Lennar's land pipeline shrank by 47,000 homesites.
Theoretically the deposit line might have gone DOWN by ~$600 million.
Instead it went UP by $1.6 billion.
There's a line on Lennar's balance sheet called "deposits and pre-acquisition costs." It should theoretically roughly track the amount of land Lennar controls. More land, more deposits. Less land, fewer deposits.
Why do we think Lennar is doing this — besides the company having confirmed it to sell-side?
"Seems a little nuts," said one accounting professor who reviewed the filings, though reasonable accountants can disagree on this!
But here's the twist: Most of those fees aren't showing up in Lennar's reported earnings.
Instead, Lennar appears to be recording them as assets on its balance sheet — as if the fees were an investment, not an expense.
The reality: Hunterbrook estimates those fees will total around $2 billion a year at full run-rate.
How much does Lennar earn in profit? About $2 billion a year.
So nearly everything Lennar makes goes right back out the door — just to hold land it hasn't built on yet.
Anyway:
Over the past 5 years, Lennar went from owning 75% of its land to just 2%. It sold or transferred the land to financial firms setting up “land banks” and now pays them fees to hold it — essentially renting back what it used to own.
The promise: this would cost just 1% of margins.
So, below, we present our reporting without Lennar’s direct reply, which is a shame — because journalism is better when the companies being investigated respond. We suppose, if Lennar could have rebutted the findings we shared with them, then that is what they would have done.
We reached out again to Lennar after their statement. Nothing. Lennar’s only reply appears to be selective disclosures to analysts at Evercore and other investment banks, rather than the public.
(The corporate equivalent of responding to your haters on your Close Friends story.)
We sent Lennar detailed questions on our reporting last week. They ghosted.
Then yesterday — the day after we followed up — Lennar put out an unusual midday press release assuring investors its accounting is "carefully vetted."
Evercore's initial reaction: "If you're explaining, you're losing."
Hunterbrook Media’s investment affiliate, Hunterbrook Capital, has no positions related to this article at the time of publication. Positions may change at any time. See full disclosures on our website.
NEW: Lennar appears to have locked itself into paying billions in fees to Wall Street firms just to hold land it used to own.
Those fees are recorded as assets — not expenses — on Lennar's balance sheet.
But the bill is coming due. And it may rival $LEN’s profits.
Full investigation link at www.hntrbrk.com/indorama
The reporting is based on regulatory records, emissions data, dispersion modeling, and interviews with affected residents. It raises broader questions about oversight, transparency, and the human cost of industrial pollution.
Residents near both plants describe chronic odors, flaring, respiratory illness, and cancer diagnoses—alongside a deep reluctance to speak out in communities where petrochemical jobs underpin the local economy.
And at Indorama’s facility in Westlake, Louisiana, company filings show unusually uniform—and potentially unreliable—self-reported pollution data.
Despite the findings, proposed state penalties for the Texas violations total less than $75,000. Indorama reported $15.4 billion in revenue in 2024, making the fines effectively negligible.
Using federal atmospheric dispersion models, a Hunterbrook analysis estimates that a single three-minute leak exposed more than 11,000 residents to ethylene oxide concentrations far above EPA safety thresholds, with the plume extending into Louisiana.
Health data adds context. Jefferson County, where the Indorama facility is located, has the highest breast cancer mortality rate among women under 50 in Texas. Long-term ethylene oxide exposure is associated with elevated cancer risk.
State records show some of these releases were not reported within the legally required 24 hours. In multiple cases, regulators only discovered them during later inspections, more than a year after the fact. Nearby residents Hunterbrook spoke to say they were never notified.
One incident in September 2023 illustrates the scale: a defective tube leaked roughly 1,880 pounds of ethylene oxide in just three minutes—an amount comparable to what some U.S. medical sterilization facilities emit in an entire year.
According to Texas Commission on Environmental Quality records, Indorama emitted several thousand pounds of ethylene oxide and other hazardous pollutants without authorization, following a pattern of leaks and equipment failures.
The facility, located in Port Neches, produces ethylene oxide—an industrial chemical used in plastics and medical sterilization that the EPA classifies as a carcinogen linked to blood and breast cancers.