A reasonable jury could also find that Mckesson breached his duty of care by “organizing the protest in such a manner where it was reasonably foreseeable that a violent confrontation with the police would result.” Doe, 71 F.4th at 284. As this court held, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana confirmed, “It was patently foreseeable that the Baton Rouge police would be required to respond to the demonstration by clearing the highway and, when necessary, making arrests.” Doe, 339 So. 3d at 531 (quoting Doe, 945 F.3d at 827). A jury could find that Mckesson was undeterred by the foreseeable risk of violence and engaged in “intentional lawlessness” by leading “the demonstrators onto a busy highway . . . to provoke a confrontation between police and the mass of demonstrators.” Id. Mckesson “direct[ed]” protestors “to go out into that road and block traffic.” Such an action is patently illegal under Louisiana law. La. Stat. Ann. § 14:97. Additionally, Mckesson was in charge while protestors looted a store and threw water bottles at police. A jury could find that by engaging in this conduct, he put the lives of “officers, bystanders, and demonstrators” at risk and “failed to exercise reasonable care in conducting his demonstration.” Doe, 339 So. 3d at 531 (quoting Doe, 945 F.3d at 827).
5th Cir., 2-1, holds that police officer's claim that DeRay Mckesson negligently led a protest that resulted in injuries to the officer must go to a jury.
Follows SCOLA's ruling that under Louisiana law there is a duty not to "negligently precipitate the crime of a third party."