The result of this gap in risk assessment pushed the question of strait transits away from wardrooms on Navy ships and into boardrooms in London or Greece, a mindset shift that continues to be difficult for the national security apparatus to integrate into military planning.
As it turns out, and as the Red Sea comparison showed us, you can effectively constrict a waterway to commercial traffic through much less precise, less expensive demonstrations of risk, without extensive mining and thus without foreclosing Iran’s own ability to export small quantities of oil.
Bottom line for the U.S. in the Strait of Hormuz? I assume we ended up in this situation not because planners ignored the risk of Iran closing the strait, but because planners likely took “closed” to require much more dramatic, overt, sustained, and costly military action by Iran.
(4) Tankers are also much more fungible than container ships, with an active spot market for resale at sea, making the sector extremely reactive to price signals and making for the possibility of faster uptake of Hormuz post-crisis (in contrast to the Red Sea’s very slow return to normal).
(3) SoH primarily impacts oil & gas, and the tanker market is the Wild West. Ownership is more disperse, making it harder to influence the market through individual leaders, but also making it possible to get small numbers of risk takers willing to run through the SoH as conditions shift.
(2) The big supply chain shock in the Red Sea was containers, where decisions from ~6 players impact global traffic. Until e.g., Maersk was satisfied with the Red Sea route, Suez traffic was always going to look depressed. Major carriers operate ships on fixed routes, raising the cost of switching.
Yet there are also some important differentiators: (1) In the Red Sea, carriers had an alternative route. It was longer but the length worked to lines’ advantage in driving freight costs up. There is no such alternative for Hormuz, which will keep pressure high on achieving a resolution.
On the one hand, many lessons apply across cases: (1) How little cost & capability it takes to disrupt commercial trade flows, (2) The limits of hard power in influencing commercial decisions to induce lines to resume transits, (3) The adversary’s advantage in determining when the crisis is over.
“"It was a tactical and operational victory and a strategic draw, if not a strategic defeat," said Joshua Tallis, a naval analyst at research firm CNA.”
A 🧵 on the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz, and what they teach us about the commercial variable in war at sea.
www.reuters.com/business/ene...
“The US Navy “spends very little time at a strategic level understanding the pressures and demands of the commercial maritime economy”, said Joshua Tallis…at the Hellenic American-Norwegian American Chambers of Commerce conference on February 10.” www.lloydslist.com/LL1156532/Th...
“But from a narrower standpoint — is there a backup plan in the wings similar to the 1980s tanker wars? To me, that is a much less central part of how the navy thinks of its primary mission, which is: in the event of a war, to win the war, not protect the [shipping] folks in this room.”
“Three weeks before the Middle East war broke out, Tallis said, “With scenarios like Iran, the navy understands, at the top line, that the Strait of Hormuz is a critical chokepoint for the movement of oil.”
www.lloydslist.com/LL1156532/Th...
“One aim of Iran’s strategy to disrupt tankers was to “try to provoke outrage in allied and partner capitals to try to bring diplomatic pressure on the US”, said Tallis.” www.ft.com/content/e006...
“Trump’s insurance backing idea is “novel”, said Tallis, but “it remains to be seen how quickly and effectively the US can create comprehensive and reliable war risk insurance”. There are no details yet on who would qualify, and which flag states and companies would want it.”
“The “arrows in Iran’s quiver” for other attacks include fast inshore attack craft, speedboats armed with rockets and small missiles, said Tallis…
Tallis said Tehran could place [mines] using dhows — double-bowed merchant vessels that are common in the region.“
“Joshua Tallis, at [CNA], said it was “unlikely” that the US Navy would be able to defend commercial vessels “over the next seven to 10 days”. Escorts would come “only after the initial phase of major hostilities”, he added, and when more Iranian anti-ship capabilities had been destroyed.”
“Naval warfare experts said the destroyers and jets needed for the escorts would not be available immediately, given their role in the attacks on Iran.”
“President Donald Trump on Tuesday said that “if necessary”, the US Navy would escort tankers through the strait “as soon as possible”. The US Development Finance Corporation would also provide risk insurance and guarantees for tankers travelling in the Gulf “at a very reasonable price”.
Thoughtful writeup by @lloydslistdaily.bsky.social on my recent remarks on global instability in the maritime domain as a commercial shipping conference this week.
www.lloydslist.com/LL1156326/Ef...
It’s been a real pleasure helping bring this strategy to life, I’m extremely excited to see CNO34 push the cause as his tenure progresses. www.navy.mil/Leadership/C...
The centerpiece is the Hedge Strategy, a theory of adaptive readiness, tailored force packages, and innovative offsets designed to cost-effectively manage asymmetric threats. www.navy.mil/Leadership/C...
It’s live!
The U.S. Navy Fighting Instructions are ADM Caudle’s thesis on how the Navy adapts to dynamic adversaries. They are how the Navy builds a repeatable process to organize, train, and equip a force that is capable of deterring a fight and ending one.
There's more to say on this—I wrote a few years ago that NATO's Mine Countermeasure Groups might be well suited for adaptation to CUI defense—but we must start from these two observations: (1) this is a constabulary issue, and (2) cost-effective surveillance is a main material obstacle.
This cost asymmetry has defined some European reactions, prompting more expansive (but not inherently more effective) surveillance via crewed platforms. More innovative approaches are being tested: Nordic Warden is experimenting with AI, Denmark is investing in lower-cost MDA assets like Saildrone.
(2) While interdiction is often a focus, effective surveillance is the real short pole in the tent. The "surface area" exposed to CUI sabotage is enormous, putting an attacker in a position of asymmetric privilege. It is less costly to stage an attack and more costly to detect or interdict one.
Yet sabotage must be investigated by law enforcement, bringing all the demands of a legal proceeding: burden of proof, chain of evidence, due process. Creating effective defense and deterrence for CUI starts with understanding the issue as a predominantly constabulary mission when short of war.
(1) Short of war, CUI is a law enforcement issue more than a military matter. Navies often have the range and endurance to operate persistently far from shore, and so naval assets are a necessary and visible feature of CUI security.
