A century ago, visitors were already doing what many still do now: trying to match the landscape before them to the battlefield they had in mind. 4/4

What fascinates me is how much had already changed.

Roadside trees that were not there in 1815. New infrastructure. A landscape still recognizable, but modern times already creeping in. 3/4

These postcards were souvenirs. Mass-produced images for visitors who came by train and tram to walk the same ground where 50,000 men were killed or wounded.

The farm where the King's German Legion held out was now a photo opportunity. 2/4

Old postcards of La Haye Sainte.

The farm is instantly recognizable. Same white wall, same gate, same roofline.

But look closer and the landscape is already changing. By 1900, Waterloo had become a tourist destination. 1/4 🧵

That is what makes it interesting.

The blame game was not only on the French side after the campaign. The Allies did it too.

When everything depends on human judgment, where was the real failure: in the reports themselves, or in the reaction to them? 4/4

Dörnberg sent the warnings. But were they early enough, clear enough, urgent enough?

Later Colquhoun Grant blamed him for the failure to concentrate sooner.

But was Dörnberg at fault, or did Wellington simply not act on the warning fast enough? 3/4

Dörnberg, handling intelligence for Wellington on the border, warned on 12 June that major French forces were concentrating and that hostilities could begin soon.

Three days later the French crossed into Belgium.

So the warning signs were there. 2/4

Intelligence in 1815 was never straightforward. No satellites, no radio, no instant overview. The Allies had to piece things together through patrols, spies, deserters and newspapers.

Did they actually fail to read Napoleon’s intentions? 1/4 🧵

The date will slip. Multiple times.

Four separate armies need to concentrate. Supplies must move across Europe. Diplomatic assurances have to be made.

Coalition warfare is slow. June gives Napoleon weeks to act first. Could they have moved sooner? 2/2

📜 Hundred Days News, 20 April 1815

The Allies in Vienna set 1 June as their offensive start date. Communications go out. Napoleon still holds the initiative. 1/2 🧵

The rematch will have to wait. Which suits me just fine, because for now I intend to enjoy the glory.

A perfectly timed Medics & Mechanics card let me reinforce a bunker unit and keep the defence alive.

At 5–5 in victory points, one well-aimed shot gave me my sixth and shattered my opponent’s morale.

No Napoleonic Wars tonight. Instead I was defending Wake Island in the Pacific.

Japanese infantry swarmed my right flank and centre, and for a while it looked like the line might crack. But the dice and card gods smiled on me.

Reading a book helps you understand the context. Plotting places on a map helps you grasp the scale of it all and connect the dots. Walking the ground brings it to life.

This year I will follow von Pirch, 2nd division of I corps. 5/5

What went through their minds? What did they feel beyond sheer exhaustion?

My own tiredness was nothing compared to theirs. But walking that road helped me better understand what the operation was like.

If only they had known what the next days would bring. 4/5

There they screened the river crossing while French troops had already crossed at Charleroi.

Then they fell back toward Fleurus and fought again as the French kept pressing forward.

Only when night fell did they get some rest, near St-Amand, next to Ligny. 3/5

Zieten’s corps had to concentrate, slow the French advance, and avoid being cut to pieces.

One Landwehr battalion under von Gillhausen had already been under arms the previous night. The first in contact with Jérôme’s troops and had a forced march to the Piéton river. 2/5

Last June I walked 45 km retracing 15 June 1815.

The first 35 km were manageable. The last 10 were hard.

I was following Steinmetz’s brigade as it raced across the Belgian countryside. By the end I had a better sense of the demands of the day. 🧵1/5

Private W. Rolle thanks Frieda for the Christmas package he has just received.

Then he wonders whether the fallen comrades of 1815 were also remembered from home.

One war, another war, same ground. 2/2

December 24, 1914. A German soldier stands at the Prussian memorial on the Waterloo battlefield and writes a postcard.

On the front, beside the monument, he writes: “Here we are.”

He is stationed in Maransart, just east of where the Prussians broke through at Plancenoit a century earlier. 🧵1/2

Won another postcard auction. Doubled my collection in one go.

Barely any duplicates, which is good luck. Among them are these postcard books, you were meant to tear out the cards you wanted to send, but most people kept them intact.

A hundred years later, I'm glad they did.

Next week (the 26th), I'll change hats, or shakos, and guide a group around the Waterloo battlefield.

12 km, 6 hours, from Hougoumont to Papelotte and Plancenoit. Every position matched to period maps, every sightline walked.

It'll be in Dutch, but if you're nearby and want to join, let me know.

This was the Seventh Coalition and every power still had its own agenda.

Austria wanted command and influence in Italy. Russia wanted its share in Napoleon’s defeat. No one wanted to move too fast, unless someone else might get the glory.

Armies of allies entering Paris 1814. Painting by Malek source Wikipedia.

In Vienna in April 1815, the Allies were debating the next move.

Austria wanted time to mobilize and Schwarzenberg in overall command. Russia feared that a swift offensive might leave Alexander on the sidelines in Napoleon’s final defeat.

Gneisenau’s plan in April 1815 aimed straight at Paris.

The idea was simple: keep advancing on a wide front, one army in reserve. If Napoleon struck one army, he could not stop the others.

This time the aim was different. Not just Paris, but the army that sustained his rule. Isolate it, defeat it in the field, cut it off from France. Then let internal opposition finish what military force had begun. 2/2

A historical map shows strategic military positions marked by colored boxes and arrows, indicating Wellington's plan to invade France.

Wellington drafted a plan in April 1815 to target Napoleon’s army.

The Allies had already taken Paris in 1814. It had not been enough. 1/2 🧵

Whether Napoleon meant this as strategy or desperation hardly mattered. The damage was done.

The alliance would hold, but the question of whether Prussia could rely on its partners would linger all the way to Waterloo. 4/4

Prussia was supposed to trust these same powers in a war against Napoleon. March alongside them. Coordinate strategy. Maybe even depend on them in battle.

Except now Gneisenau knew what they'd agreed to behind closed doors three months earlier. 3/4

The treaty was explicit. 150,000 men from each power. An attack on one treated as an attack on all. No separate peace.

And a secret article: don't tell Prussia or Russia any of this.

Gneisenau now held that document. 2/4