And this interpretative confusion filters down into all of our extant English translations. Note that for this same passage, three of our most popular translations manage to come up with three completely different and contradictory meanings.
But even this is an interpretation of what Sun Tzu meant and others disagree. In fact, many of the historical commentators, such as Du Mu, Chen Hao, and Wang Xi contradict Guo Huaruo's interpretation. They believe Sun Tzu's intent was to divide one's own forces, not the enemy's.
Many may not realize that none of us are reading "direct" translations of Sun Tzu. We are reading interpretations--even the Chinese. What Sun Tzu conveys in four characters, a contemporary Chinese translator, like Guo Huaruo, needs to use 16 characters to make this intelligible.
difficult to implement and achieve results. One should choose the opportunity to carry out preemptive strikes on the enemy’s forward bases set up in third countries and destroy its support for operations, which can achieve the effect of “taking firewood from under the cauldron.”
its attack intensity and sustainability will inevitably be greatly reduced. In the Kosovo War, if there had been no air bases in Italy, Spain, Hungary, Germany, Albania, Turkey, and other countries for its use, the U.S. military’s all-directional attack operations would have been
Lesson the PLA is learning from the Battle of the Hong River (638 BC):
“Destroy the enemy’s forward bases. Military bases are the way for a strong enemy to conduct operations and affect the scope, intensity, and duration of operations. Without forward bases as support, ...
His key takeaway, though, is measured. While he decries the amoral methods employed by Yue in support of its dogged determination to annihilate the Wu hegemon, he admires Yue's ability to transcend traditional norms and "boldly adopt unconventional approaches."
Professor Ye identifies a key lesson from this history as one in which "the Yue State’s diplomatic ideology of 'strategic pragmatism transcending moral constraints' allowed it to effectively 'bide its time' and reach its end goal of destroying the power of the Wu state."
When Chinese scholars discuss grand strategy, do they begin their analysis with Thucydides? No, they draw from their own strategic canon. Ye Zicheng's "The Grand Strategy of China" begins with the 5th cent BC example of Yue's methodical destruction of the reigning hegemon, Wu ...
industry and commerce, we are in the forefront of the world. China's capitalists will be the advanced ones in the future—I can write that check too."
— Speech at the Symposium on the Socialist Transformation of Capitalist Industry and Commerce (Oct. 29, 1955)
Only on the day we catch up with and surpass the United States will we be able to breathe a sigh of relief. Right now we are not presentable; we are bullied by others ... The whole world is going to take the socialist road; in the area of socialist transformation of private
Mao Zedong (1955): "Our goal is to catch up with the United States and surpass the United States. Exactly how many decades it will take depends on everyone's efforts—at least 50 years, perhaps 75 years. Seventy-five years is 15 Five-Year Plans ...
www.npr.org/2026/03/12/n...
Cleary is no longer translating Sun Tzu's original text, but simply transmitting his own beliefs. As Yu Rubo explains in his own critique of Cleary: "The Art of War is a military classic exploring cautious warfare, intelligent victory, stratagem, and winning in battle, it is not an anti-war text."
Most notably, Cleary completely omits the opening verse of Chapter 2 (Giles' version below), in which Sun Tzu outlines the military force one needs to assemble, presumably because this violates Cleary's belief that a true Daoist abhorred weapons and wouldn't discuss them.
Of note for anyone undertaking a serious study of Sun Tzu's Art of War in english, avoid Thomas Cleary's version (1988) at all costs. He was so intent on proving that Sun Tzu was an icon of peace that he deliberately omitted parts of the original text which implied violence ...
Also, if you are looking for how the Chinese have historically approached the text, this remains the best source on this topic. Unfortunately it has never been officially translated, but I can send you a copy of my translation of it if you want.
Relying solely on one translation is problematic (as I attempt to illustrate here). My preference is to start by comparing verses using these three (Griffith, Sawyer & Ames). Giles, Nylan, and the latest Modern library version are ok as well for comparison, but suggest avoiding Cleary.
which determines that our struggle and competition with them are IRRECONCILABLE (不可调和) ... We will not change our banner and sails, and they will not change their tune. Our struggle and competition is thus inevitably long-term, complex, and sometimes extremely sharp.”
Deng Xiaoping (1974): “The contradiction between the two superpowers [U.S. & USSR] is IRRECONCILABLE (不可调和); one either overpowers the other, or is overpowered.”
Xi Jinping (2012): “Our social system and ideology are fundamentally different from those of Western countries,
While Kissinger remains the most famous modern American strategist within the name dropping set in China, amongst serious Chinese strategic thinkers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and particularly this 1997 book of his, appears to be much more influential in their own writings.
Liu Huaqing (2001): “Defense development is a gradual accumulation process. We cannot ignore it for a decade or two and then rush to address it when funds are available. Many development projects have long cycles, and if we don’t prioritize key projects, the gap will widen.”
establishing an advantage in material and spiritual forces through the development of comprehensive national power, influencing the adversary’s will and determination, and compelling the adversary to abandon intentions that harm one’s interests.”
— Deterrence Strategy (1989)
adversaries psychologically. The comprehensive national power competition strategy does not aim to physically destroy an adversary’s military, political, economic, or technological strength. Its fundamental focus remains on the adversary’s psychological factors,
“Comprehensive national power competition strategy is to compel adversaries not to take military action against oneself while striving to achieve predetermined strategic objectives through non-war means. It uses strength as the material foundation for deterring adversaries. It emphasizes defeating …
while also requiring corresponding changes in the social superstructure.”
Xi Jinping believes this is an objective truth, as described earlier by his chief ideologue, Wang Huning. We now have a complete English translation of Wang's major work on this subject:
www.amazon.com/dp/B0FNMTFK4...
production cannot accommodate the increasingly powerful social productive forces it has created. Ultimately, the development of social productive forces will inevitably break through the capitalist mode of production, transitioning to a newer mode of production,
This inevitability stems from the internal contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, namely the contradiction between the private ownership of social means of production and socialized large-scale production. Capitalism has created powerful productive forces, but the capitalist mode of
Wang Huning (1994): “Marxism first asserts that a communist society is an objective necessity, not a subjective desire of individuals. The internal driving force of historical development & the contradictory movement of various social relations inevitably lead to realization of a communist society.
"If a situation arises during combat where the military commander and the political commissar have differing opinions, the responsibility falls to the one whose role pertains to the issue [and] anyone at any time has the right to report the situation to a higher organization."
"The division of responsibilities among commanders specifically means that, under the unified collective leadership of the Party committee, military administrative issues are handled by the mil. commander, while political work is organized and implemented by the pol. commissar."