Posts by Robert Clarke
Abandoning ambiguity would compromise American security, and raise the risk of a Chinese-Taiwanese war.
@defpriorities.bsky.social's latest brief “Target Taiwan: One China and Cross-Strait Stability” makes a sharp, overdue point: the U.S. must reinforce the One China policy and strategic ambiguity—not abandon them.
New survey brief for @defpriorities.bsky.social: most experts believe an invasion of Taiwan is unlikely, allies will offer weak troop support, and the U.S. may fight alone. Realism matters. Strategy cannot be built on certainty that doesn’t exist.
www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/w...
.@kellygrieco.bsky.social & @hunterslingbaum.bsky.social's new piece for @stimsoncenter.bsky.social cuts through the veneer: Taiwan’s “asymmetric defense” remains undone, its natural advantages squandered. If deterrence means anything, we must acknowledge reality.
www.stimson.org/2025/taiwans...
Chris McCallion's new brief for @defpriorities.bsky.social reminds us that deterrence isn’t boundless. Strategy fails when commitments exceed what America can—or should—defend. Real strength lies in matching means to ends, and preserving liberty at home.
www.defensepriorities.org/explainers/g...
As Sumantra writes, the promise of Germany is also a test of Europe. Will Europe finally act as the security provider it claims to be—or remain dependent on a weary ally across the Atlantic?
The United States cannot forever play the arsenal, the diplomat, and the conscience of the free world. The Founders would recognize the danger—power overextended abroad weakens freedom at home.
Europe has the wealth, industry, and proximity to deter Russia. What it lacks is will—and decades of American guarantees have allowed that deficit to grow.
Sumantra Maitra's latest for @stimsoncenter.bsky.social makes the case few in Washington will say out loud: it’s time to shift Europe’s defense burden back to Europe. The rationale is simple—our resources are finite, and global threats are multiplying. 🧵
In Latin America the first rule must still be what the Founders knew—abuse of power abroad weakens liberty at home. If the U.S. overcommits without a clear exit strategy or regional buy-in, it risks losing the very freedom and alliances it means to protect.
The article does not oppose enforcement of law or interdiction of illicit networks. It insists on realism: America’s finite resources and the fragility of its regional standing mean we must prioritize diplomacy and partnership before missiles.
These actions add up to making the U.S. a strategic pariah in a region where it must preserve partnership, not sow resentment. The question becomes not “Can we strike?” but “Should we?”
Option three: regime-change. The article says this is perhaps the worst of all: massive cost, high risk of escalation, with drug-trafficking outcomes that history says military campaigns nearly always fail to solve.
Option two: strikes inside Venezuelan territory. This would bolster the very regime it claims to weaken, as Venezuela’s state and military would rally around the identity of victimhood and sovereignty.
Option one: continuing kinetic strikes on civilian-maritime target-boats. The piece warns this already invites international condemnation, threatens U.S. relations in Latin America, and undermines long-term anti-drug cooperation.
The United States is flirting with a poisoned bargain in the Caribbean. @stimsoncenter.bsky.social's Evan Cooper & Alessandro Perri make the case that recent strikes on vessels linked to Venezuela carry extensive risks and little upside. 🧵
Ukraine’s survival should be Europe’s cause. If Europe chooses otherwise, it is not America’s role to drag itself into another generation of war.
Caldwell & Logan cut through decades of wishful thinking: endless U.S. subsidies don’t guarantee peace—they erode American freedom and leave Europe strategically dependent.
The U.S. has signaled—Biden no less than Trump—that Ukraine will not be defended by American troops. That means Europe must step forward or watch Ukraine’s fate be decided by Moscow.
Europe is more than capable: its combined GDP rivals America’s, its population dwarfs Russia’s, and it already spends more on defense collectively than Moscow. What it lacks is will, not means.
This isn’t retreat. It’s realism. U.S. leaders from Eisenhower to Obama warned that European free-riding would hollow out the transatlantic alliance. The war in Ukraine makes that danger plain.
The hard truth is simple: America cannot forever underwrite Europe’s security. Dan Caldwell & Justin Logan argue persuasively that if Ukraine wants guarantees, they should come from Europe—not Washington.
thefederalist.com/2025/08/26/i...
That should remain true today, but is at more risk than an other generation of American governance. If we want to preserve the American experiment, we must resist the temptation to become, in Adams’ words, “the dictatress of the world.”
Adams’ warning was realism, rooted in a belief that America’s greatest contribution to the world would be as a living example of self-government and individual freedom.
The post–Cold War project of liberal hegemony has stretched America’s commitments across the globe, with the war in Ukraine as its latest test case. Each entanglement promises to defend liberty abroad while subtly eroding it here.
The endless global war on terror gave us decades of domestic surveillance, secret lists, and unaccountable power in the name of security.
Our republic is not secured by crusades abroad, but by protecting liberty at home. They knew that war is the health of oppressive, expansive government—and that in no other condition are civil liberties more endangered than during wartime. We forget this at our peril.