In the language of America it is called "The Epic War of Fury", in the language of Israel “The Roar of the Lion,” and in the language of Iran “True Promise 4.” Yet, in my view, it is "The Great Middle East war", one that will change the face of the entire region. 🧵

The file of a ground operation, which he does not want, has now moved closer to his desk. In his other hand holds the file of ending the ninth war since the start of his second term.

Meanwhile, in Israel, Netanyahu awaits a whisper from the Mossad and military intelligence leadership to reinvigorate the war effort, while his eyes are fixed on areas north of the Litani River in Lebanon and Sana'a. In Washington, Trump is looking toward his generals with anticipation.

Victory, in their view, is no longer about preserving interests and achieving gains, but about striking enemies, creating pain, and inflicting the greatest possible losses upon them. With such a mindset, the diplomatic path becomes almost invisible.

against America, Israel, and the Gulf states. Amidst doubts about whether Mojtaba is alive or dead, the conclusion is the same: Tehran today is no longer the same pragmatist and patient Tehran it once was. It has reverted to the mentality of the early days of the Islamic Revolution.

In his first message, delivered in written, Mojtaba Khamenei revealed what we, as observers, already knew: a hardline, religious-military mindset. The statement contained no indication of peace or diplomacy; rather, it reiterated the IRGC leadership's threatening rhetoric

offensive a new positive momentum as soon as possible. He knows that the growing scepticism in Washington may push Trump to end the war, so the new card may buy him more time and keep morale high within the Israeli society, which has begun to grow tired of the atmosphere of alert.

However, the situation in Tehran does not appear sufficient for Netanyahu's aspirations. Regime change there remains an Israeli objective, even if it means more days and weeks of war. Therefore, Netanyahu must put a new card on the table that gives the Israeli-American

oday the fronts have become clearer. Yes, Netanyahu's administration was expecting Iranian missile and drone attacks similar to the 12-day war. Netanyahu also knew that Hezbollah would participate in this war, and therefore Israel would have to fight on several fronts.

political leadership whose electoral interests aligned with it, a military leadership that had been preparing for this war for two decades, Gaza removed from the equation of danger, Hezbollah weakened, and Trump in the White House: and so, the war began.

From this perspective, Netanyahu believed that if a war with Iran, in alliance with Washington, ended in victory, would mean that his return to the premiership was only a matter of time. The result: an Israeli public ready for war, a

which has been in a state of war since October 7, 2013, was willing to endure a few more weeks of conflict. If the war ended in victory for Israel, the Middle East could be opened to Israeli influence and, consequently, lasting peace.

Netanyahu, who was forced to end the Gaza war with an agreement that satisfied Trump more than the Israeli right wing, believed that appeasing Trump was a prelude to the Iranian war. In the Israeli political mindset, a war with Iran had become popularly acceptable, and Israeli society,

With the end of the 12-day war, we, as observers, were convinced that what had happened was only a round and that a full-scale war was only a matter of time.

presenting a convincing picture to the American ally, which was still hesitant that the Iranian regime, which had faced four waves of widespread protests in the last two decades, would not be a source of military threat in the face of Israeli military capabilities and advanced American technology.

However, the timing and scale of this war were still unclear. The decision became more certain after Trump's victory in the presidential elections. The 12-day war came as an Israeli initiative aimed at testing the Iranian response and Tehran's defensive military capabilities, while also

In my opinion, the decision to engage in military confrontation with the Iranian regime was made in the early days following the October 7th attacks. The Iranian project had become a clearer and more visible threat and had borne its teeth through Hamas's attack on the Gaza envelope.

It can be said that we are approaching a point where Trump faces two options: either expand the war to include a ground intervention (even a limited one) or end it and consider what has been achieved sufficient and declare victory.

Striking military bases has not halted attacks in the region, nor has it stopped the threat to the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the number of voices questioning the viability of continuing this war, which still appears insufficient to change the Iranian Islamic regime, are growing.

Today, nearly two weeks into this war, and despite the enthusiastic statements from Trump, his administration, and his generals, the situation appears more complex than anticipated. The target bank is expanding daily to include energy and industrial facilities.

This was the Israeli message conveyed to the White House. The result was a combination of external and internal pressure and a race against time, amid a closed diplomatic track and a military danger from Iran that did not seem serious, so the decision was made for war.

At the same time, there was significant Israeli pressure pushing toward the military option, which it argued had become inevitable. “Either the US and Israel take the initiative, or Tehran will go towards a secret nuclear bomb or a pre-emptive military strike.”

launch of "Operation Midnight Hammer", during which Washington destroyed three nuclear sites that were the most important for the Iranian nuclear project. The Iranian response was again limited by targeting the Al-Udeid base in Qatar after it had been evacuated.

The assassination of General Qassem Soleimani at the beginning of 2020, despite its impact and pain on the Iranian regime, was met with a very limited response: a few missiles fired at a US military base in Iraq. Then came America’s participation in the 12-day war through the

Iran would not be costly and prolonged. Moreover, the Iranian responses to American strikes in previous years gave the Trump administration the impression that the Iranian regime would not go to uncontrolled escalation.

However, the deadlock in negotiations and the approaching US midterm elections, which may not produce satisfactory results for the Republicans, prompted Trump to adopt the decision. The success of the move in Venezuela encouraged the belief that a war in

There was no consensus in the White House regarding the decision to go to war with Iran. One of Trump's closest confidants and his chief negotiator, Steve Wittkoff, was among the leading opponents of the move. Vice President Vance was also not enthusiastic about this adventure.

Then came the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, confirming the IRGC's control over decision-making in Iran, which will complicate any possible future diplomatic path, and it place the US and Israel before limited options for ending the current war.

were heard in Manama, Doha, and Abu Dhabi. This contradiction between statements and actions cannot be interpreted as a game of role-playing, but it confirms what has been recently reported about disagreements between the leaders of the IRGC and the political leadership.

Headquarters, one of the most important bases of the IRGC, to confirm the closure of Hormuz. Then, a statement from the Iranian President, Pezeshkian, affirmed that the Gulf states would not be targeted, yet no later than a minute after this statement, air-raid sirens