On the basis of Art 7 TEU, yes. See eg Comm communication from 2003 eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-conten...
On the basis of the ECJ Art 2 test outside of Art 7 TEU procedures, not clear.
Posts by Laurent Pech 🇺🇦
Indeed. Raises plenty of questions e.g. on financial consequences considering horizontal enabling condition relating to the Charter, operation of the EAW framework, etc.
Whether this adds much in terms of political, legal and/or financial consequences is I think the key aspect which remains to be clarified.
My reading: Should the Commission allege an infringement of Art 2 value(s) in a 258 context, Court will require a a case-by-case demonstration that the national measure/practice in dispute "is in breach, in a way that is both manifest and particularly serious" of Art 2 value(s)
CJEU's response to the HU argument that only the Art 7 procedure permits a finding that there has been a failure to respect Art 2 values: EU "values cannot be regarded as being incapable of being protected by the European Union except under the procedure provided for in Article 7 TEU"
Difference btw the 2 options seem to be:
(i) the scope of application with Art 7(2) TEU also available for situations/breaches falling outside the scope of EU law and
(ii) non-persistent (but manifest/particularly serious) breaches may be caught by the new Art 2 TEU (infringement) avenue.
Art 7(2) TEU: European Council may determine existence of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of Art 2 TEU value(s)
Additional Art 7-like option now: Commission may ask Court to confirm existence of manifest and particularly serious breaches of Art 2 TEU value(s) by a Member State
Talked to the BBC about today’s historic @eucourtofjustice.bsky.social ruling
Today’s ruling is for everyone who love who they love
But it is particularly for those who fought for that statement-of-the-obvious to become the EU’s highest law (@reclaim-eu.bsky.social)
www.bbc.com/news/article...
Interesting. I have been waiting for a case to test the limits of the Commission's discretion under Art 260 TFEU. Let's wait and see.
In this scenario, the Court is indeed "merely" informed tbomk but this could open the door to a legal challenge but whether privileged plaintiffs would sue is a different story. I may try to bring a test case in any event if they go ahead and further undermine the rule of law for political reasons
🇪🇺🏳️🌈⚖️🇭🇺 A legal earthquake - CJEU finds Hungary to have violated EU law on multiple counts with its anti-LGBT+ legislation (as expected) but also for the first time in history, in an EU law-reshaping precedent, finds Hungary to violate Art 2 TEU in a self-standing manner.
I would need to double check this but if I remember correctly, Comm must inform Court without delay when a MS is deemed to have remedied violation(s) previously identified in a 260(3) judgment so as to justify why there is no longer an obligation for the MS to pay a penalty payment where applicable
Old enough to remember Comm rejecting EP's calls for independent experts to be involved in Annual RoL Report on grounds of accountability, legitimacy, etc. Subcontracting RoL assessments with financial consequences to non-EU body difficult to reconcile with this stance
@sophieintveld.bsky.social
If so, the framework governing membership of the Venice Commission - and the (non)enforcement of its code of conduct re existing members - will become ever more important
verfassungsblog.de/immunising-t...
Could this be the 1st time EU funding is suspended on rule of law related grounds, with EU condition to unlock the suspended amount compliance with non-binding recommendations of a non-EU body?
@kimlanelaw.bsky.social @jmorijn.bsky.social @jakubjaraczewski.bsky.social @profkochenov.bsky.social
The next Hungarian government would need to submit a new recovery fund spending plan to the @ec.europa.eu by the end of May, a Tisza party official told @euractiv.com adding that administrative capacity remained the main constraint. EU Commission officials held talks in Budapest at the weekend.
Interesting (not saying it wouldn't be politically & legally suicidal for the Commission to return to the CJEU on this basis in the absence of any measure addressing what the CJEU described as an unprecedented and exceptionally serious breach of EU law...). Btw, is there a press article on this?
This will put the credibility of the @ec.europa.eu (and @eppgroup.bsky.social) to the test. The rule of law should prevail, not (party) politics. (PS: this demonstrates that enforcement should not be in the hands of the @ec.europa.eu college)
👋 More and more Fidesz insiders are jumping from the sinking ship. Suddenly they blame each other, the circumstances, the party leadership, even Viktor Orbán himself. And of course they all claim they “saw it coming” long ago. 🧵
Magyar needs the EU but the EU needs Magyar, too. And in this mutual dependency, neither should lose sight of the rule of law. That's what I'm arguing in this @financialtimes.com op ed www.ft.com/content/8800...
Let’s hope the Court follows the AG. In general, the Court’s formalistic, restrictive jurisprudence on standing under Article 263 TFEU has not evolved well alongside EU constitutional changes like the insertion of Article 2 TEU values or the binding nature of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
It took close to four years to get to this point but it was worth the time and efforts. Let’s now await the Court of Justice’s judgement.
thegoodlobby.eu/tglprofaction/
cc @thegoodlobby.bsky.social @goodlobbyprofs.bsky.social
Orban's system was rigged to give plurality winners with widespread support in the countryside super-majorities in the parliament - so Peter Magyar generated widespread support in the countryside and has been rewarded with 69% of the parliamentary seats. Now he can undo Orban's constitution!
Zach gets it exactly right. Orban was an authoritarian who built a rigged election system for his own gain. But Peter Magyar cracked the code - realizing that every vote in the countryside was worth two to three votes in the cities and so racked up countryside support, winning 2/3rds of the seats.
🇭🇺🗳️ Good morning to everyone, but in particular to the people at the Hungarian Sovereignty Protection Office and the MCC Brussels Democracy Interference Observatory who are looking into how civil society organisations are "subverting democracy using EU, German and Dutch funds".
a personalist movement using populist messaging and triumphing after all ideological differences in the opposition had to be purged to create sufficient mass and momentum (pun intended). And it only took 16 years to pass in the heavily tilted landscape. What more can one want from 'democracy'
“Fidesz lost power so democratic backsliding isn’t really that much of a thing” is the worst, most complacent take possible. The minimalist definition of democracy as a system in which parties lose elections is a great place to start, but that’s all it is.
In absolutely chef’s kiss timing, Matthew Goodwin is due to speak at Orbán’s in-house propaganda group MCC *today*
Badloss strikes again.
Orbán's best bet for regime survival — for returning to power — wasn't staging a doomed January 6-style putsch in the face of overwhelming defeat.
It was retreating, and doing everything he can to preserve regime elements that would allow for a return to competitive authoritarianism in the future.
A lot of Orbán's American fans are saying that this election proved he was never an authoritarian in the first place.
This is completely wrong — and, in fact, betrays a complete misunderstanding of both Hungarian politics and modern authoritarianism.
Here's why.