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Posts by Political Psychology

Post image Figure 1: (A) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to geographic region. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies for location and covariates. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1407. (B) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies capturing team support and covariates. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1410. (C) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team and level of concern. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies capturing team support interacted with level of concern about the game's outcome, and covariates. “Weak” indicates a respondent scoring 0 on the 0–10 level of concern measure; “Strong” indicates a score of 10. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1408.

Figure 1: (A) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to geographic region. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies for location and covariates. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1407. (B) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies capturing team support and covariates. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1410. (C) Changes in mood from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team and level of concern. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in mood on dummies capturing team support interacted with level of concern about the game's outcome, and covariates. “Weak” indicates a respondent scoring 0 on the 0–10 level of concern measure; “Strong” indicates a score of 10. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1408.

Figure 4: Changes in SWD from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team and level of concern. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in SWD on dummies capturing team support interacted with level of concern about the game's outcome, and covariates. “Weak” indicates a respondent scoring 0 on the 0–10 level of concern measure; “Strong” indicates a score of 10. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1408.

Figure 4: Changes in SWD from before to after the Super Bowl according to preferred team and level of concern. Estimates are from an OLS regression of change in SWD on dummies capturing team support interacted with level of concern about the game's outcome, and covariates. “Weak” indicates a respondent scoring 0 on the 0–10 level of concern measure; “Strong” indicates a score of 10. The horizontal lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. The number of observations is 1408.

Lions, Tigers, and... Futbol? Oh my! From our April issue, Singh et al. try to isolate the effects of emotion on citizens' satisfaction with democracy through reactions to cultural phenomena like watching The Lion King or experiencing a win/loss for your favorite team. Read online: buff.ly/ifYLPcL

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Post image Figure 1: Indirect effect of national narcissism on support for claiming war reparations from Germany via collective victimhood (Study 1). ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effect is reported in brackets. The pattern of results remained similar when we controlled for national identification, political orientation, and assessment of Polish‐German relations.

Figure 1: Indirect effect of national narcissism on support for claiming war reparations from Germany via collective victimhood (Study 1). ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effect is reported in brackets. The pattern of results remained similar when we controlled for national identification, political orientation, and assessment of Polish‐German relations.

Figure 2: Indirect effect of national narcissism on support for claiming war reparations from Germany via collective victimhood (Study 2). **p < .01. ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effect is reported in brackets.

Figure 2: Indirect effect of national narcissism on support for claiming war reparations from Germany via collective victimhood (Study 2). **p < .01. ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effect is reported in brackets.

Figure 3: Tested the structural dual‐mediator model (Study 3b). **p < .01. ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effects are reported in brackets.

Figure 3: Tested the structural dual‐mediator model (Study 3b). **p < .01. ***p < .001. Entries are standardized coefficients; total effects are reported without brackets, and the direct effects are reported in brackets.

When does national victimhood "expire"? Główczewski et al. study the psychology behind Polish and Greek citizens' support for WWII reparations from Germany. Read their piece from our April issue for their findings on what we can learn when calls for restitution surface doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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EXTRA! EXTRA! The April issue of Political Psychology is hot off the press! With over 40 amazing articles in this issue, we'll be highlighting each in batches. Check out the classifieds here for the first set we're promoting or check out the full issue online: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/toc/14679221...

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Post image Figure 1: Confirmatory factor analysis of social tension. RMSEA = .067, CFI = .978, TLI = .958, χ2 = 1557.347, n = 31,476 (this model was estimated with all available observations, before listwise deletion).

Figure 1: Confirmatory factor analysis of social tension. RMSEA = .067, CFI = .978, TLI = .958, χ2 = 1557.347, n = 31,476 (this model was estimated with all available observations, before listwise deletion).

Figure 2: Multilevel regression of perceived social tension. Dots indicate the point estimate, lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 2: Multilevel regression of perceived social tension. Dots indicate the point estimate, lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Random slopes of loneliness by country. The random slope estimates were added to the fixed coefficient of loneliness to estimate the total effect of loneliness. The lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 3: Random slopes of loneliness by country. The random slope estimates were added to the fixed coefficient of loneliness to estimate the total effect of loneliness. The lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

If politics is a party game then why is loneliness on the rise? And what does the loneliness epidemic mean for political attitudes? Langenkamp et al. find a connection between loneliness and heightened perception of threats & conflict in society. Read open-access for more: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Post image Figure 1: Means (and 95% CI) of the Latent Profile classes on the authoritarianism, spirituality, and conspiracy beliefs variables.

Figure 1: Means (and 95% CI) of the Latent Profile classes on the authoritarianism, spirituality, and conspiracy beliefs variables.

Figure 2: Means and 95% CI of the variables support for general protest, support for illegal protests, and anger across classes (Study 1, similar pattern in the other studies).

Figure 2: Means and 95% CI of the variables support for general protest, support for illegal protests, and anger across classes (Study 1, similar pattern in the other studies).

Figure 3: Interaction effect between spirituality and authoritarianism (note 95% CI).

Figure 3: Interaction effect between spirituality and authoritarianism (note 95% CI).

Strange bedfellows? Maybe not. The various ideologies observed participating in violent protests may seem incompatible at first glance, but Frenken & Imhoff in our February issue find commonalities that paint a clearer picture of support for violent protests. Open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Post image Figure 1: Curvilinear effects of objective SES on economic inequality beliefs (Panel A), government assistance (Panel B), help for needy beliefs (Panel C), and beliefs about poor people (Panel D), Study 1. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects, and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects.

Figure 1: Curvilinear effects of objective SES on economic inequality beliefs (Panel A), government assistance (Panel B), help for needy beliefs (Panel C), and beliefs about poor people (Panel D), Study 1. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects, and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects.

Figure 2: Linear and curvilinear effects of SES on economic conservatism (Panel A) and welfare support (Panel B), Study 3. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects. Shaded bands represent Standard Errors for point estimates.

Figure 2: Linear and curvilinear effects of SES on economic conservatism (Panel A) and welfare support (Panel B), Study 3. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects. Shaded bands represent Standard Errors for point estimates.

Figure 3: Linear and curvilinear effects of SES on economic conservatism (Panel A), welfare support (Panel B), and intolerance of inequality (Panel C), Study 4. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects, and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects. Shaded bands represent Standard Errors for point estimates.

Figure 3: Linear and curvilinear effects of SES on economic conservatism (Panel A), welfare support (Panel B), and intolerance of inequality (Panel C), Study 4. Data are estimated based on SES scores. Dotted lines represent linear SES effects, and solid lines represent curvilinear SES effects. Shaded bands represent Standard Errors for point estimates.

Are economic attitudes based on status as direct as we often assume? Burns & Ray find that economic conservatism & welfare policy support is more complicated than high status = high conservative attitudes. Read for more on how the middle class throws a curveball to linear assumptions buff.ly/lgtxaWK

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Post image Figure 1: Distribution of Brexit group affects among the Leavers and Remainers in each sample.

Figure 1: Distribution of Brexit group affects among the Leavers and Remainers in each sample.

Figure 2: Overall Brexit in‐group bias.

Figure 2: Overall Brexit in‐group bias.

Figure 3: Affective polarization and support for publication of Brexit in‐group and Brexit out‐group criticism. See Tables A2 and A22 in the Supplementary Material for full models.

Figure 3: Affective polarization and support for publication of Brexit in‐group and Brexit out‐group criticism. See Tables A2 and A22 in the Supplementary Material for full models.

The UK may have left the EU, but the two sides of the #Brexit debate are still PO'd. Phillips & Stoeckel explore the lingering animus Remainers & Leavers have toward each other & how those feelings manifest in political bias. Read their open-access article for their findings doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Post image Figure 1: Perceived threat theoretical model. In dotted lines, theoretical constructs; in regular lines, empirical variables tested in our studies.

Figure 1: Perceived threat theoretical model. In dotted lines, theoretical constructs; in regular lines, empirical variables tested in our studies.

Figure 2: Timeline of the studies in relation to the approval of the trans law in Spain. Italic = final decision around the specific proposal.

Figure 2: Timeline of the studies in relation to the approval of the trans law in Spain. Italic = final decision around the specific proposal.

Figure 3: Conditional effects of feminist identification on pro‐trans and collective actions moderated by perceived threat in Studies 1a (Figure A) and 1b (Figure B). Blue line = Mean level of perceived threat; Green line = −1SD below the mean (lower perceived threat); and Red line = +1SD above the mean (higher perceived threat).

Figure 3: Conditional effects of feminist identification on pro‐trans and collective actions moderated by perceived threat in Studies 1a (Figure A) and 1b (Figure B). Blue line = Mean level of perceived threat; Green line = −1SD below the mean (lower perceived threat); and Red line = +1SD above the mean (higher perceived threat).

Protect the dolls AND have it all? Galván-Hernández et al. study feminist support for Spain's Trans Law. They find that win-win messaging bolsters support among feminist women, while conflict narratives increase zero-sum beliefs. Read the full piece open-access for more: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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To conceal or to reveal? Campbell & Williams dive into what drives the decision to share or hide one's identity as Roma. Read open-access to see the 3 motivating factors they identify in this decision & what their work could mean for ethnic & minority populations more broadly doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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With rising populism and affective polarization globally, are the two entwined? Stefanelli & Castanho Silva explore in their paper from our Feburary issue and find that the relationship isn't as straightforward as we might assume. Read for more on their findings doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Post image Figure 1: Moderations by perceived material meaning of the effects of (A) collective angst and (B) empathetic collective angst (simple slopes with 95% confidence interval bands).

Figure 1: Moderations by perceived material meaning of the effects of (A) collective angst and (B) empathetic collective angst (simple slopes with 95% confidence interval bands).

Figure 2: Latent true change models for collective angst and empathetic collective angst, with political orientation as covariate and voting intention (depicted here or actual vote) as predictor variable.

Figure 2: Latent true change models for collective angst and empathetic collective angst, with political orientation as covariate and voting intention (depicted here or actual vote) as predictor variable.

What can political angst reveal about efforts to redress past wrongs? Wenzel et al. describe 2 types of angst (collective & empathetic collective) in the Australian Indiginous Voice referendum. Read their findings & what they mean for empowering historically victimized groups doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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What can affective styles reveal about emotion's role in politics? Nielsen & Mønster suggest pushing beyond the Big 5 to better understand the relationship between why people "adjust, conceal, or tolerate" & social trust. More on these styles in their February article for us doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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What effect does politician corruption have on the publics they serve? Ramos et al. explore in their paper from this month's issue. Read the full piece for their findings on corruption's toll on perceived morality & justice of society & what it means for people's well-being. doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Check out the thread below about my new article with @fatiherol.bsky.social and @aleksks.bsky.social in @ispp-pops.bsky.social !

We show that better sleep quality is associated with being more likely to vote, but that poor sleep quality leads to more engagement in non-electoral political acts.

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New in @ispp-pops.bsky.social: “Waking up to politics: How sleep quality relates to political participation”: doi.org/10.1111/pops... With @nmicatka.bsky.social & @aleksks.bsky.social, we examined how sleep quality relates to voter turnout & non-electoral participation across multiple countries.🧵1/8

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now out at @ispp-pops.bsky.social from me, Agnieszka Golec de Zavala, and Tomasz Baran, "Rebels without a cause: Collective narcissism and political contrarianism" -->

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Post image Figure 1: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of national CN and IS (Study 1). Plot based on estimates in Table S2.

Figure 1: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of national CN and IS (Study 1). Plot based on estimates in Table S2.

Figure 2: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of GN, VN, national CN, and national IS (Study 2). Plot based on estimates in Table S5.

Figure 2: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of GN, VN, national CN, and national IS (Study 2). Plot based on estimates in Table S5.

Figure 3: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of GN, VN, national CN, and national IS (Study 3, Wave 1). Plot based on estimates in Table S8.

Figure 3: Coefficient plots: NFC and AE as a function of GN, VN, national CN, and national IS (Study 3, Wave 1). Plot based on estimates in Table S8.

Is narcissism bad for democracy? Federico et al. examine the relationship between collective narcissism and politically contrarian attitudes ("need for chaos" & "anti-establishment"). Read the full piece for their full findings and what they mean for democracy. doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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The algorithmic curation of information online can exacerbate polarization and support the spread of misinformation.

This review makes the case that social media algorithms amplify content from extreme parties, especially the far right, and threatens democracy.
www.science.org/doi/full/10....

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Political Psychology: Volume 47, Issue 1

February is here, and so is the latest issue of Political Psychology! We'll be highlighting all 12 special issue articles and 14 original articles throughout the month, but if you can't wait to see what's in store, check out the full issue now! buff.ly/l4gb7cg

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Call for ISPP 2026 Awards Nominations

ISPP’s nominations process for all 2026 Awards is now open. We encourage members to recognize outstanding contributions to the field by submitting a nomination.

Award recipients will be honored during the 2026 ISPP

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Registration is now open for International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP)’s 49th Annual Scientific Meeting, taking place 16-19 July 2026 in Newcastle, United Kingdom.
👉 Register here: bit.ly/isppannualme...

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Applications are open for the 2026 ISPP Academy!
The International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) Academy takes place July 13–15, 2026 at the University of Newcastle, UK.
Deadline: March 1, 2026
Apply here: https://bit.ly/3LTXX1E

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📣 Applications Now Open: ISPP 2026 Early Career Scholar Travel Awards

ISPP is pleased to announce the 2026 Early Career Scholar Travel Awards, supporting early career researchers to attend ISPP's Annual Meeting in Newcastle.

For more information and to apply, visit docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...

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First graph: Study 1 (Right-wing cause). Second graph: Study 2 (Left-wing cause)

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Post image Relationship between political ideology and collective action intentions (Study 1). The shaded area represents the 95% CI.

Relationship between political ideology and collective action intentions (Study 1). The shaded area represents the 95% CI.

Relationship between political ideology and collective action intentions (Study 2). The shaded area represents the 95% CI.

Relationship between political ideology and collective action intentions (Study 2). The shaded area represents the 95% CI.

How much does extremism—independent of ideology—determine participation in collective action? Marinthe et al. present two studies in their paper from our December issue that suggest extremism could play a role in the intention to and act of participating. Full paper: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Post image Average of contact intentions with refugees index over time. The horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

Average of contact intentions with refugees index over time. The horizontal lines denote 95% confidence intervals.

What role does authority play in people's decision to reach out to, or avoid, outgroup members? In their article from our December issue, Ditlmann & Turkoglu study how those in positions of power can dissuade or encourage intergroup contact. Read open-access for more: buff.ly/ngzqYhz

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Post image Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors in France, Belgium, and Canada.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors in France, Belgium, and Canada.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors at different levels of minority awareness among French participants.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors at different levels of minority awareness among French participants.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors at different levels of environmental awareness among French participants.

Difference between boycott intentions and behaviors at different levels of environmental awareness among French participants.

What divides the fans who intend to boycott major sports events from the ones who follow through? Bertin & Grippa investigate calls to boycott the 2022 World Cup, finding that those who more strongly identified with fan culture tended to renege on intentions to tune out. doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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Post image Voting preferences by conceptions of nationhood. Bars represent the vote share of all parties by Conceptions of Nationhood across all panel waves and respondents in the main models.

Voting preferences by conceptions of nationhood. Bars represent the vote share of all parties by Conceptions of Nationhood across all panel waves and respondents in the main models.

How do national identities become politically activated? From our December issue, Antonia C. May finds that the salience of immigration-related coverage in the media is connected to the activation of national identity in electoral/political cognition. Read open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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All you'll feel is doom and gloom: Multiple perspectives on the associations between economic anxiety and conspiracy beliefs

All you'll feel is doom and gloom: Multiple perspectives on the associations between economic anxiety and conspiracy beliefs

The relationship between economic anxiety and COVID‐19‐related conspiracy beliefs in the three waves of the present study. The values represent standardized coefficients derived from a cross‐lagged panel model. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

The relationship between economic anxiety and COVID‐19‐related conspiracy beliefs in the three waves of the present study. The values represent standardized coefficients derived from a cross‐lagged panel model. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

What is the relationship between economic anxiety and conspiracy beliefs? Findings from Adamus et al. in our December issue suggest that conspiracy beliefs may lead to feelings of economic anxiety, but not the other way around. Read open-access: doi.org/10.1111/pops...

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