"The presence of a chemical"

There is a third road - one I do not think is likely but is entirely possible - in which no deal is reached, the Strait gradually defacto reopens, and the conflict ends status quo ante bellum.

The Gun From IKEA Inspired by some recent struggles with a daybed

I have written something very silly that likens deterrence to assembling IKEA furniture.
open.substack.com/pub/horsdoeu...

Sometimes history truly is cyclical. In 1967 in order to support the Vietnam war, US pulled formations earmarked for NATO, deployed them to Vietnam, and expended vast amounts of munitions. In order to close the gap the US complained to the allies about their defense expenditure.

South Korea’s Ominous Missile Deployments By placing more than 300 fixed, short-range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles on permanent alert at several above-ground sites close to the Demilitarised Zone, South Korean Strategic Command ha...

@dexeve.bsky.social & I have a new piece out in Survival. In 2024, South Korea secretly deployed more than 300 KTSSM missiles at soft, fixed sites--suggesting that, in a crisis, Seoul may strike first & giving Pyongyang 300 reasons to beat them to it.
doi.org/10.1080/0039...

I really do think we need some sort of disparaging term for people whose only interaction with fiction is Weir and qntm.

I argue missiles not being able to achieve Iran's deterrence objectives makes nuclear proliferation a more appealing option, regardless of costs to Iran. While Iran in previous years was very keen on avoiding sanctions, their cost-benefit calculus is now entirely different.

Here is the key part: Despite trying, Iran failed to destroy major Israeli HQs and airbases. They did damage, but not enough to ensure deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.
We can debate about how effective the strikes precisely were, but the deterrence failure is undeniable.

How Iran’s Deterrence Collapsed Ahead of the War A key failure in 2024 paved the way for U.S. and Israeli attacks.

My latest in FP, on how Iranian deterrence has collapsed over the last two years:
foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/24/i...

FPRI Experts React | Understanding the Third Gulf War - Foreign Policy Research Institute The third Gulf War began with an assassination on February 28, 2026, in broad daylight in central Iran. The war has engulfed the region in conflict, extending

Experts from the @fpri.bsky.social analyze the latest military developments from the Third Gulf War

@slair.bsky.social @dexeve.bsky.social @michaelbpetersen.bsky.social @salisbot.bsky.social & Guy Plopsky

www.fpri.org/article/2026...

We should think carefully about the benefits of drones and their associated force postures in relation to different kinds of wars. This is not a capability that relates evenly across all conflicts.

In the Ukraine conflict, this is easier to do because Russia is not dealing with the kinds of capabilities that US is throwing at Iran. So Russia can build these big fixed and defended drone launching sites without much fear.

Like missile launchers, drone trucks have to leave the base, move to firing positions, erect, fire, and then go back to base without being detected, tracked, and destroyed. This, as we are seeing, is very hard!

Drone launches are down for the same reason missile launches are down. Its a posture issue. You can have the biggest drone arsenal in the world but if your forces aren't postured to effectively continue operations under fire, eventually you won't have the capability to use them

I should also note: even if Iran runs out of launchers and/or missiles, its unclear what effect that would even have on the outcome of this conflict.

They are probably holding some capabilities in reserve, unless we've collectively completely misjudged their actual stockpile. Unclear if that will be enough.

Missile salvos are thinner by the day. This is probably due to a combination of C3 problems, bureaucratic frictions inherent in the IRGC mosaic approach, and launcher shortages.

Obviously every launcher is precious for Iran. Lack of maintenence and faulty propellant may be making them especially vulnerable. This is combined with Iran's lack of a field reload capability, which always struck me as an odd decision.

An update on how the Iranians are fairing. We're seeing lots of hits on stationary abandoned launchers, which implies either a high missile failure rate or Iranian crews are simply abandoning launchers after firing.

So far that campaign seems to be having the precise opposite effect, but that may change if this really does last weeks.

The Iranian attacks on all fronts, especially those attacks aimed at US allies and partners in the region, is almost certainly a semi-planned campaign to attempt to impose enough costs on US allies to isolate US/ISR diplomatically.

That MIGHT be a function of changes the IRGC made to its command structure post 12 Day War to prevent the paralysis that seemed to grip them at the time.

Unlike the 12 Day War in which Iran used a certain segment of its missile force to retaliate in distinguishable waves, this is complete chaos. Many missiles across many fronts, potentially with units acting without centralized authority.

Some really interesting questions now arise. I don't recall something like this ever happening in the precision munitions era: how do you handle regime transition when your adversary can track and eliminate leadership targets?

Consequence of Iran targeting US bases across the region is that it's attacks have to get through the fresh air defense networks of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, etc, countries the United States has spent the last two decades equipping for just this sort of thing.

Obviously this tells us nothing about the depth of Iranian missile stockpiles. Remember that it took Iran 16 hours ish before the first major retaliatory salvo during the 12 Day War.

This is probably correct. Also makes it easier for missile defenses to deal with it.

Causes and Effects of Chinese Nuclear Testing A Desire for Safety is a Headache for Arms Control

My latest Substack post, with some thoughts on Chinese testing, and some half-baked thoughts on its effects on the arms control framework.
horsdoeuvresofbattle.substack.com/p/causes-and...

We are quickly moving past "will there be a war" and into "what kind of war will it be" territory. What US chooses to strike in the first 48 hours will set the tone here.

I refuse to believe that the shih tzu with the bow in its hair is not a paid actor dog.