An Epistemology for Concealing the Crime: A Review of Altanian’s The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism, Arshak Balayan

Melanie Altanian’s The Epistemic Injustice of Genocide Denialism is an insightful application of the epistemic injustice paradigm to unveil social-epistemic processes,…

On the Epistemology of Public Discourse: A Reply to Ryan and Hammerton, Marko-Luka Zubčić “I ain’t no physykist, but I knows what matters.” — Popeye The Problem of Public Discourse While there is an abundance of disagreements in contemporary epistemology—obviously, philosophy is the business of disagreement—the discussion on the problem of the public discourse seems to me among the most urgent and consequential because it stands some chance to spill over into policy. And while my reply to Shane Ryan and Matthew Hammerton’s…

On the Epistemology of Public Discourse: A Reply to Ryan and Hammerton, Marko-Luka Zubčić

“I ain’t no physykist, but I knows what matters.” — Popeye The Problem of Public Discourse While there is an abundance of disagreements in contemporary epistemology—obviously, philosophy is the business of…

The State’s Violent Little Tools: Over the Dead Bodies of Whales and/or Fish, Kevin Pijpers

"The State’s Violent Little Tools: Over the Dead Bodies of Whales and/or Fish," Kevin Pijpers, wp.me/p1Bfg0-b2V

No Choice But Choose: A Reply to Fairhurst, Youssef Aguisoul

"No Choice But Choose: A Reply to Fairhurst" Youssef Aguisoul, wp.me/p1Bfg0-b2C

The Idea of Tradition and Language: Thinking Through Talal Asad, Aboobacker M A

"The Idea of Tradition and Language: Thinking Through Talal Asad," Aboobacker M A, wp.me/p1Bfg0-b2c

How We Build Our World to Build Our Knowledge, Adam Riggio

"How We Build Our World to Build Our Knowledge," Adam Riggio wp.me/p1Bfg0-b1H

Usable Antiquity: On Breidenstein’s Nietzschean, Feminist, and Embodied Perspectives on the Presocratics, Mark D. West Joseph I. Breidenstein Jr.’s Nietzschean, Feminist, and Embodied Perspectives on the Presocratics arrives with a blurb that performs substantial framing before the argument even begins.

Mark D. West, “Usable Antiquity: On Breidenstein’s Nietzschean, Feminist, and Embodied Perspectives on the Presocratics." wp.me/p1Bfg0-b14

When Epistemology and Ethics Converge: Reflections on Jarczewski’s “Making Sense of Epistemic Authority”, Aleksandra Vučković Abstract This article examines Dominik Jarczewski’s (2025) account of epistemic authority and its reliance on the Pre-emption thesis. While critics of this thesis suggest that it threatens epistemic autonomy and critical thinking, I argue that Jarczewski offers a compelling defense of it. I then examine Jarczewski’s two proposed strategies for addressing concerns about authority abuse, with the first being the inclusion of an ethics of authority, and the second the development of epistemic respect as a distinct category.

When Epistemology and Ethics Converge: Reflections on Jarczewski’s “Making Sense of Epistemic Authority”, Aleksandra Vučković

Abstract This article examines Dominik Jarczewski’s (2025) account of epistemic authority and its reliance on the Pre-emption thesis. While critics of this thesis suggest…

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 3, 1–90, March 2026 Volume 15, Issue 3, 1–90, March 2026 ❧ Pongiglione, Francesca. 2026. “Further Reflections on Epistemic Hubris: A Reply to Lanius.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (3): 1–6. ❧ Mizrahi, Moti. 2026. “No Such Thing as Reliable Bullshit Machines: A Reply to Hauswald.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (3): 7–14. ❧ Pongiglione, Francesca. 2026. “Intellectual Vices: Perhaps More is More?

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 3, 1–90, March 2026

Volume 15, Issue 3, 1–90, March 2026 ❧ Pongiglione, Francesca. 2026. “Further Reflections on Epistemic Hubris: A Reply to Lanius.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (3): 1–6. ❧ Mizrahi, Moti. 2026. “No Such Thing as Reliable Bullshit…

I Believe, Therefore I am Right? Against Epistemic Egocentrism, János Tőzsér This paper is the sixth stage in my debate with Bálint Békefi in the pages of SERRC about my book, The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (previous papers: Békefi 2024; Tőzsér 2025a; Békefi 2025a; Tőzsér 2025b; Békefi 2025b). I am afraid it is also the last. Békefi sees our debate as having unfortunately “become unhitched from the monograph initially reviewed” and is therefore “not entirely in line with the vision of a ‘review and reply collective’” (2025b, 47).… .

I Believe, Therefore I am Right? Against Epistemic Egocentrism, János Tőzsér

This paper is the sixth stage in my debate with Bálint Békefi in the pages of SERRC about my book, The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (previous papers: Békefi 2024; Tőzsér 2025a; Békefi 2025a; Tőzsér 2025b; Békefi…

We Are All Suicide Cult Sky Pilots: A Reply to West, Lee Basham What does my death matter, if thousands are stirred to action? –Sophie Scholl, White Rose Resistance[1] Jews have always been on trial, and if current circumstances are any guide, they will continue to be. It’s hard to imagine a community so loathed in their desperation and yet so beneficial to our Western societies. Mark D. West addresses my arguments that both Masada and Heaven’s Gate mass suicides were rational, even reasonable.

We Are All Suicide Cult Sky Pilots: A Reply to West, Lee Basham

What does my death matter, if thousands are stirred to action? –Sophie Scholl, White Rose Resistance[1] Jews have always been on trial, and if current circumstances are any guide, they will continue to be. It’s hard to imagine a…

Review: Steve Fuller’s Media and the Power of Knowledge, Rubén Martínez Steve Fuller's book Media and the Power of Knowledge offers a broad, critical and thought-provoking reflection on the relationship between communication, knowledge and power in Western history and in the contemporary context. From the outset, the text breaks with the common idea that communication is simply a neutral channel for transmitting information. Instead, it argues that communication constitutes a fundamental infrastructure for producing, organising and legitimising knowledge.

Review: Steve Fuller’s Media and the Power of Knowledge, Rubén Martínez

Steve Fuller's book Media and the Power of Knowledge offers a broad, critical and thought-provoking reflection on the relationship between communication, knowledge and power in Western history and in the contemporary context.…

On Critical Cyborg Literacy: A Reply to Azamnia, Laura Forlano and Danya Glabau Our book Cyborg, which was published in 2024 as part of the MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series, set out to revisit and extend feminist cyborg theories for the 21st century. We argue that it is possible to understand the politics and possibilities of technology through the figure of the cyborg, paying specific attention to thinking about questions around race and disability that were largely ignored in earlier scholarship.

On Critical Cyborg Literacy: A Reply to Azamnia, Laura Forlano and Danya Glabau

Our book Cyborg, which was published in 2024 as part of the MIT Press Essential Knowledge Series, set out to revisit and extend feminist cyborg theories for the 21st century. We argue that it is possible to understand…

The Constraints of Technical Practices or Epistemological Commitment? A Reply to Ting and Montgomery, Jill Morawski Carol Ting and Martin Montgomery (2024) ground their perceptive analysis of experimental social science in its optimistic albeit problematic adoption of the experimental methods of the physical sciences. This fervent embrace has been diagnosed as “physics envy” and “epistomopathy” (Toulmin and Leary 1986); the authors aptly describe it as an “indiscriminate transfer of method” (662) that haunts attempt to produce reliable and valid knowledge about human phenomena.

The Constraints of Technical Practices or Epistemological Commitment? A Reply to Ting and Montgomery, Jill Morawski

Carol Ting and Martin Montgomery (2024) ground their perceptive analysis of experimental social science in its optimistic albeit problematic adoption of the experimental methods of…

On Atkins’s Average Believer: Reflection, Inquiry, and Epistemic Responsibility, Jeff Kasser “Apology for an Average Believer” (2024) casts judgment on those who would judge our ordinary fellow citizens “irrational” for believing “demonstrably false” claims such as that significant irregularities marred the 2020 American presidential election. It criticizes our tendency to be overly and uncritically critical of our epistemic peers, our fellow average believers. In this essay, I situate Richard Atkins’s  important argument against the background of two valuable nineteenth-century resources: the Ethics of Belief debate and C.S.

On Atkins’s Average Believer: Reflection, Inquiry, and Epistemic Responsibility, Jeff Kasser

“Apology for an Average Believer” (2024) casts judgment on those who would judge our ordinary fellow citizens “irrational” for believing “demonstrably false” claims such as that significant irregularities…

Truths Beyond Our Ken: Responding to McCraw, Peter Baumann I am very grateful to Benjamin McCraw for his recent contribution and continuation of our discussion of the “Reidian Transcendental Argument” (RTA) (see McCraw 2026). I think that McCraw is bringing up a new and very important point: one about the difference between truth and arguability. This is a point which deserves much more attention in the debate on epistemic skepticism.

Truths Beyond Our Ken: Responding to McCraw, Peter Baumann

I am very grateful to Benjamin McCraw for his recent contribution and continuation of our discussion of the “Reidian Transcendental Argument” (RTA) (see McCraw 2026). I think that McCraw is bringing up a new and very important point: one…

Beyond Representation: Systemic Epistemic Alterity and the Architecture of Knowledge in the Contemporary Academy, Part II, Wael Saleh 3. Productive Intersections Between Systemic Epistemic Alterity and Other Traditions in the Study of Knowledge and Power Placing Systemic Epistemic Alterity in dialogue with major traditions in the study of knowledge and power clarifies a central claim: the production of the epistemic other is not a contingent deviation within academic life, but a structural mechanism. Language, institutions, authority, algorithmic infrastructures, and geopolitical configurations intersect within a global knowledge regime that continuously redraws its boundaries, its agents, and its criteria of legitimacy.

Beyond Representation: Systemic Epistemic Alterity and the Architecture of Knowledge in the Contemporary Academy, Part II, Wael Saleh

3. Productive Intersections Between Systemic Epistemic Alterity and Other Traditions in the Study of Knowledge and Power Placing Systemic Epistemic Alterity in…

Beyond Representation: Systemic Epistemic Alterity and the Architecture of Knowledge in the Contemporary Academy, Part I, Wael Saleh Abstract This article advances Systemic Epistemic Alterity as a critical analytical framework rather than a comprehensive empirical model. It does not claim to exhaustively explain all forms of epistemic exclusion, nor to replace existing theories of epistemic injustice, postcolonial critique, or Science and Technology Studies. Instead, it seeks to render visible a specific configuration of epistemic power emerging from the interaction of institutional arrangements, evaluative regimes, and algorithmic infrastructures within contemporary academic systems.

Beyond Representation: Systemic Epistemic Alterity and the Architecture of Knowledge in the Contemporary Academy, Part I, Wael Saleh

Abstract This article advances Systemic Epistemic Alterity as a critical analytical framework rather than a comprehensive empirical model. It does not claim to…

Intellectual Vices: Perhaps More is More? A Reply to Matheson, Francesca Pongiglione Abstract Jonathan Matheson’s critique (2025) of my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025) hinges on the claim that the vice I describe is not novel, but rather a variation of familiar epistemic vices—namely, intellectual arrogance and hyper-autonomy. In what follows, I will explain in more detail why I chose to posit a new epistemic vice rather than rely on existing categories to explain the phenomenon of…

Intellectual Vices: Perhaps More is More? A Reply to Matheson, Francesca Pongiglione

Abstract Jonathan Matheson’s critique (2025) of my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025) hinges on the claim that the vice I describe is not novel, but rather a variation of familiar epistemic vices—namely, intellectual…

No Such Thing as Reliable Bullshit Machines: A Reply to Hauswald, Moti Mizrahi Abstract In Mizrahi (2025a), I sketch two arguments against the claim that LLMs should be granted the status of epistemic authorities worthy of epistemic respect. Rico Hauswald (2026) objects to the second premise (2, II) of each of these arguments and asks, “Why shouldn’t there be reliable bullshit machines?” In this paper, I respond to his objections and answer his question.

No Such Thing as Reliable Bullshit Machines: A Reply to Hauswald, Moti Mizrahi

Abstract In Mizrahi (2025a), I sketch two arguments against the claim that LLMs should be granted the status of epistemic authorities worthy of epistemic respect. Rico Hauswald (2026) objects to the second premise (2,…

Further Reflections on Epistemic Hubris: A Reply to Lanius, Francesca Pongiglione In commenting on my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025), David Lanius (2025) makes several interesting observations, all of which point to the need for a deeper exploration and clearer definition of this epistemic disposition. The objective of these observations is manifold: to distinguish hubris from other similar but distinct vices; to avoid confusing it with a totally legitimate, and valuable, epistemic practice—namely, thinking critically; and finally, to more carefully assess the social risks raised by it.

Further Reflections on Epistemic Hubris: A Reply to Lanius, Francesca Pongiglione

In commenting on my paper “Epistemic Hubris” (2025), David Lanius (2025) makes several interesting observations, all of which point to the need for a deeper exploration and clearer definition of this epistemic…

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 ❧ Hauswald, Rico. 2026. “Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable ‘Bullshit Machines’? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 1–7. ❧ McCraw, Benjamin W. 2026. “Will the Anti-Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Continuing Dialogue with Baumann.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 8–10.

SERRC Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026

Volume 15, Issue 2, 1–106, February 2026 ❧ Hauswald, Rico. 2026. “Why Shouldn’t There be Reliable ‘Bullshit Machines’? A Response to Mizrahi on Artificial Epistemic Authorities.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 15 (2): 1–7. ❧ McCraw,…

Why Epistemic Criteria Are Not Primary and Not Enough: A Response to Holst’s Epistemic Approach to Democratising Expertise, Hannah Hilligardt Within the values in science debate, it is a popular position to allow for social values and aims to shape scientific research as long as they do not conflict with epistemic values and aims. In her recent paper, Cathrine Holst applies a similar argument to debates on the democratisation of scientific institutions. She proposes that while democratisation is in principle desirable, epistemic considerations should have priority over whatever other reasons we might have to implement democratisation measures in scientific institutions.

Why Epistemic Criteria Are Not Primary and Not Enough: A Response to Holst’s Epistemic Approach to Democratising Expertise, Hannah Hilligardt

Within the values in science debate, it is a popular position to allow for social values and aims to shape scientific research as long as they do not…

Radical Universalism: A Review, Mark D. West The Enlightenment’s universalist wager now faces coordinated assault from positions that ostensibly oppose one another. On the right, nationalism and civilizational particularism treat universality as a naïve fiction or, worse, as a solvent of the loyalties that make political life possible; the relevant unit of moral concern is not the human being as such but the compatriot, the co-religionist, the member of “our” people.

Radical Universalism: A Review, Mark D. West

The Enlightenment’s universalist wager now faces coordinated assault from positions that ostensibly oppose one another. On the right, nationalism and civilizational particularism treat universality as a naïve fiction or, worse, as a solvent of the…

Maintenance, Repair, and the Nature of Artifacts: Comments on Lawler and Vega-Encabo, Tim Juvshik Two recent trends have emerged in two separate subfields of philosophy which have increased our understanding of the nature of artifacts—things like cellphones, chairs, and hammers. First, analytic metaphysics has increasingly recognized that artifacts are distinctly social entities (e.g. Thomasson 2014; Pearce 2016). Second, philosophy of technology has recently come to recognize the importance of maintenance and repair practices for our understanding of the nature of technical artifacts and the built world, more generally (e.g.

Maintenance, Repair, and the Nature of Artifacts: Comments on Lawler and Vega-Encabo, Tim Juvshik

Two recent trends have emerged in two separate subfields of philosophy which have increased our understanding of the nature of artifacts—things like cellphones, chairs, and hammers. First, analytic…

Dialectical Neglect, Principles, and Pragmatic Deep Disagreement Optimism: A Second Reply to Serebrinsky, Scott F. Aikin and Alison Emery Abstract In “Epistemic Principles and Dialectical Neglect,” Dalila Serebrinsky defends her development of the principles approach to deep disagreements, noting that with the notion of ‘derived’ principles, not only can the principles approach accommodate the phenomenon of gradable depth of disagreement, the principles approach can mitigate the worries of what we had called ‘dialectical neglect’ between deeply disagreeing parties. We, here, reopen the critical discussion along three lines.

Dialectical Neglect, Principles, and Pragmatic Deep Disagreement Optimism: A Second Reply to Serebrinsky, Scott F. Aikin and Alison Emery

Abstract In “Epistemic Principles and Dialectical Neglect,” Dalila Serebrinsky defends her development of the principles approach to deep disagreements, noting…

Knowledge Management Against Scientific Autonomy? An Interview with Steve Fuller, Yang Yang This interview engages with Steve Fuller’s analysis of knowledge management (KM), focusing on its implications for scientific autonomy, epistemic values, and the governance of innovation under contemporary capitalism. Rather than approaching knowledge management as a neutral set of organizational techniques, the discussion treats KM as a historically situated project that actively redefines what counts as valuable knowledge, legitimate innovation, and responsible scientific progress.

Knowledge Management Against Scientific Autonomy? An Interview with Steve Fuller, Yang Yang

This interview engages with Steve Fuller’s analysis of knowledge management (KM), focusing on its implications for scientific autonomy, epistemic values, and the governance of innovation under contemporary…

How to Respond to Generalism about Contrarian Conspiracy Theories: A Reply to Duetz, Kurtis Hagen Arguably the most contested area in the epistemology of conspiracy theories is the epistemic status of conspiracy theories that conflict with an “official account” (variously defined). In a recent article, J.C.M. Duetz purports to argue that “we ought to be particularists, not only in the face of conspiracy, but in the face of official explanations too” (2025, 1 and 3). That is, we ought to judge official explanations on their own particular merits, rather than just accepting them uncritically on the basis of their official status (and whatever is thought to ground that status).

How to Respond to Generalism about Contrarian Conspiracy Theories: A Reply to Duetz, Kurtis Hagen

Arguably the most contested area in the epistemology of conspiracy theories is the epistemic status of conspiracy theories that conflict with an “official account” (variously defined). In a recent…

Structure, Culture, and Norms: A Further Dialogue with Mangraviti, Colin R. Caret In “The Logician’s Responsibility: A Response to Caret” (2025), Franci Mangraviti takes me to task (Caret 2025) for underplaying logic’s contribution to epistemic injustice. My skepticism is said to be “stuck between underselling the role of logic education in making a difference, and misrepresenting contemporary logic culture”. In this note, I continue our discussion of these issues with a focus on explanation and mediation.

Structure, Culture, and Norms: A Further Dialogue with Mangraviti, Colin R. Caret

In “The Logician’s Responsibility: A Response to Caret” (2025), Franci Mangraviti takes me to task (Caret 2025) for underplaying logic’s contribution to epistemic injustice. My skepticism is said to be “stuck between…

If It’s Too Good to be True, It Ain’t: On Feminist Epistemology and a Historical Myth, Part II, Valeria Edelsztein and Claudio Cormick Section 4: … And Its Philosophical Uptake According to Natalie Ashton and Robin McKenna (2018), it is: [N]ow accepted that the peak in sexual activity during ovulation is explained by female rhesus monkeys initiating sex, but for a long time the research carried out overlooked this fact and instead focused on the behaviours and capacities of the male monkeys. / Kim Wallen […] says that the crucial turning point was in 1976—over 30 years after examples of female initiation were first recorded—when one of the “patriarchs” who had “dominated” the field published a paper distinguishing proceptivity (the active solicitation of sexual activity) from the more passive receptivity.

If It’s Too Good to be True, It Ain’t: On Feminist Epistemology and a Historical Myth, Part II, Valeria Edelsztein and Claudio Cormick

Section 4: … And Its Philosophical Uptake According to Natalie Ashton and Robin McKenna (2018), it is: [N]ow accepted that the peak in sexual activity during…