FIPR very pleased to sign this statement by EDRi against current moves by the US govt to rein in EU regulation of technology providers edri.org/wp-content/u...

Property rights in Bitcoin Today we have a guest article by IP Draughts’ colleague, Francis Davey, on the implications of: (a) an interim decision in the High Court case of Ping Fai Yuen v Fun Yung Li [2026] EWHC 532 (…

ipdraughts.wordpress.com/2026/03/26/p... Property rights in Bitcoin, which explains the weirdness of the other UK thing. By @francisdavey.bsky.social of @fipr-policy.bsky.social #AIEthics #digitalEthics #digitalLaw

As everyone knows, the only thing more viscerally exciting than a 3rd sector consultation response is a consultation response to a regulator's annual plan of work. But FIPR's response to Ofcom's recent consultation is worth a read - we cover some of the biggest policy issues facing the UK today.

Huge thanks to everyone at FIPR who's contributed to this consultation response as well.

You can read our consultation response at fipr.org

We recommend that Ofcom commission further research work on currently proposed technological approaches to regulating platform-based public communication. 7/7

It is these groups who, in the context of a global resurgence of far right politics, face both the most acute harms in online spaces and the most immediate potential for negative consequences from intensified digital surveillance. 6/7

It is particularly important to consider the challenges -- differing technical consequences, effects on rights, and harms -- posed for marginalised groups 5/7

We emphasise the importance of policymakers and regulators' engagement with technical stakeholders and expertise from outside the platform and 'big tech' industries, and of renewed consideration of the negative consequences of potential technical designs and restrictions. 4/7

We suggest that Ofcom engage in further consultation with technical expert groups, including FIPR, on the benefits and negative consequences of potential technical designs, and what is possible -- in technical terms -- for the implementation of desired government policy 3/7

We outline key challenges for 2026-27 in relation to AI and communications services, emerging cross-jurisdictional flashpoints and 'digital sovereignty', age checks with regard to user-to-user regulated services, and debate and policy on social media and children. 2/7

FIPR has submitted a response to the Ofcom consultation on its work plan for 2026, arguing that the UK needs an ambitious programme of technically-informed work on the digital rights, privacy, and information policy issues that we currently face. 1/7

‘Orwellian’: Sainsbury’s staff using facial recognition tech eject innocent shopper Man misidentified by London supermarket using Facewatch system says: ‘I shouldn’t have to prove I am not a criminal’

The #AI company blames the store, and they're right – the store should NEVER have hired the AI company.

www.theguardian.com/technology/2... #facerec #AIEthics #AIBias via @fipr-policy.bsky.social

If Ofcom did decide to ban the social media platform X, how would such a ban work? Some thoughts drawn from Internet history...
iptegrity.com/online-safet... @fipr-policy.bsky.social

The #OnlineSafetyAct allows providers to mark their own homework. @ofcom.bsky.social told to kick X into gear, with little effective power. How likely will we see positive action? My take on the policy problem. iptegrity.com/ai/grok-ai-i... @fipr-policy.bsky.social

APT Meets GPT: Targeted Operations with Untamed LLMs Starting in June 2025, Volexity detected a series of spear phishing campaigns targeting several customers and their users in North America, Asia, and Europe. The initially observed campaigns were tail...

More technical report www.volexity.com/blog/2025/10... via the excellent @fipr-policy.bsky.social

Systems like this need real institutional legitimacy to work.

Governments and industry are building ID systems to support their needs to administer, govern - and profit.

In turn, these systems are being used to facilitate targeting, profiling and surveillance.

Learn more about our approach to identity: privacyinternational.org/learn/identity

The PM mentioned taking inspiration from systems in Estonia and India.

Our research on the ID systems in both countries has documented a lack of transparency around data processing, and the high risks to people’s safety and dignity.

privacyinternational.org/long-read/46...

The UK Prime Minister has announced plans for a new mandatory digital ID scheme for anyone who wants to work in the UK.

The initiative is being pitched as a way to control borders - we fail to see how the two are linked.

www.bbc.co.uk/news/live/cw...

The other countries where this kind of digital ID has been implemented are far smaller, and don’t have our appalling track record of expensive government IT disasters.

There are absolutely real cybersecurity risks as well - not least, from the people with legitimate access to the system. For example, every year more than half of the prosecutions under the Computer Misuse Act are of serving police officers caught misusing their access to police databases.

Linking together all these different government systems and databases and tying them to a single point of truth about you - the obsession of the Tony Blair Institute - is going to be incredibly complicated, and is a disaster waiting to happen.

This isn’t just about ID - most people have some form of ID, and digital ID systems can be designed well and preserve our privacy and basic rights. It’s about the particular design of this system and what they want to achieve with it.

Has this all be throught through. In short, this has all the makings of another fiasco like the Post Office scandal. People will be wrongly denied access to basic services, employment, and other aspects of day to day life when this all breaks down.

On the BritCard - in theory better government systems are a great idea, but implementing it requires very high levels of management competence to cope with the ambition and complexity; the costs will correspondingly be very high.

Update: Our case against UK Government's secret surveillance orders to be heard in 2026 Yesterday the Investigatory Powers Tribunal announced next steps in Apple’s and PI’s challenges to the purported UK order undermining iCloud’s security.

⏰ Our case against UK Government's secret surveillance orders to be heard in 2026! But...

privacyinternational.org/news-analysi...

Don’t want your phone to know where you’ve been? 🤫

We have a guide for that…

privacyinternational.org/guide-step/5...

⏰ UPDATE: The US Government is not happy with the UK Government's secret surveillance orders

privacyinternational.org/news-analysi...

The government would be sensible to step back and retract this notice, and instead focus on the important work of renewing the UK’s basic infrastructure, digital security, and privacy protections."