Opinion | Trump now plays by China’s rules The U.S. wins through openness and innovation, not tariffs and centralized planning.

In his new piece comparing U.S. and Chinese economic strategy, Fareed Zakaria references research from Fletcher PhD student @vikingbohman.bsky.social. @washingtonpost.com

www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/202...

Pressure on the Periphery: China’s Economic Coercion in the Borderlands - Mapping China's Strategic Space Over the past two decades, economic sanctions have emerged as a central instrument in the foreign policy toolkit of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As the most valuable export destination for ma...

China does not always rely on charm offensives to shape the behavior of its Borderlands neighbors but has also regularly used economic coercion. Read Audrye Wong, @vikingbohman.bsky.social and @victoraferguson.bsky.social's new study.
strategicspace.nbr.org/pressure-on-...

China’s rare earth export controls have gone global. Can it enforce them? As economies look to diversify rare earth supplies in wake of China’s broad export controls, analysts say measures will be hard to implement.

China’s rare earth export controls have gone global. Can it enforce them? – SCMP: ‘China does not yet have a comparable compliance architecture underpinning its export control regime’

... from state-backed consumer boycotts to formal export controls — all manually coded and regularly updated.

Visualize the full spectrum of PRC sanctions at: www.chinasanctionsmonitor.com

Economist: www.economist.com/china/2025/0...

Excited to see our database mentioned in @economist.com today alongside comments by Rebecca Arcesati and @mmaggiori.bsky.social

The China Sanctions Monitor, developed with @victoraferguson.bsky.social and Audrye Wong, tracks more than 200 cases of China’s economic sanctions from 2010 to today ...

If you're interested in China’s latest moves in the sanctions space, have a look at our new resource, the China Sanctions Monitor: chinasanctionsmonitor.com

Joint Statement on U.S.-China Economic and Trade Meeting in Stockholm The Government of the United States of America (the “United States”) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China (“China”), Recalling the Joint

Joint statement: www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-st...

MOFCOM statements: exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gndt...

exportcontrol.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gndt...

Overall, China’s export control system remains firmly in place, and Beijing retains considerable flexibility in how it applies these controls to actors in both the United States and Europe.

Second, China is not (even) committing to fully withdraw these restrictions — Chinese companies must still apply for permission to do business with the listed entities, and MOFCOM retains the authority to reject those applications.

Based on MOFCOM’s statements, China appears to be suspending only four decisions from April 4 and 9, covering 28 US entities on the export control list and 17 US entities on the Unreliable Entity List.

First, the promise to ease non-tariff measures remains highly partial — it applies only to measures against the United States imposed since April 2, while many export licensing requirements were introduced earlier.

Judging from the US–China joint statement after talks in Stockholm, and clarifications from China’s Ministry of Commerce, Beijing is again showing no sign of committing to roll back the export controls it has tightened on critical raw materials during the trade war.

China’s Social Spending Hits Highest Level in Nearly Two Decades China’s government spending has pivoted toward social welfare to a degree unseen for at least a generation, as it runs a record budget deficit with a focus on boosting consumption to cushion the blow ...

“China’s government spending has pivoted toward social welfare to a degree unseen for at least a generation” www.bloomberg.com/news/article...

China’s Elastic Export Controls - The Wire China Beijing’s economic coercion is getting smarter.

New in @thewirechina.bsky.social: Audrye Wong, @victoraferguson.bsky.social and I on how China’s export controls mirror Western frameworks but keep strategic flexibility through vague legal wording

www.thewirechina.com/2025/07/13/c...

NEW: Some bonkers numbers in China's May customs data.

Detailed figures came out Fri when I was off, so took a deep dive today

First big picture EU stuff:

China's EU exports up 12%
China's EU imports down 2.37%

There is a 22% increase in the EU's China deficit in May alone

China’s sanctions gambit: Formal and informal economic coercion in the second trade war - Swedish National China Centre In the first half of 2025, China responded to the renewed US–China trade war with more aggressive and sophisticated measures than during the 2018–2020 conflict.

Some may have hoped China’s shift to formal sanctions would bring clarity. It hasn’t (yet). Licensing remains opaque, justifications vague, enforcement selective. This underscores the need for the EU to further sharpen its monitoring tools to detect coercion.

Report: kinacentrum.se/en/publicati...

In the years ahead, Europe should be prepared for the possibility that China could use export controls more frequently, not only to pressure member states and derail EU policies it opposes, but also to target firms that pose a threat to its commercial dominance. /6

China’s new global export controls also create problems for third parties. In Europe, some firms have had to halt production due to delays—delays that may have been intended as a warning against imposing further restrictions or aligning too closely with Washington. /5

The US agreed to a compromise with Beijing just 3 months after its first tariffs—twice as fast as in the first trade war. A key reason may be that China’s use of formal sanctions like export controls, resembling Western legal tools, delivered a more credible and legible threat to Washington. /4

Beijing increasingly uses a flexible two-step sanctions method: first establishing legal grounds for escalation, then activating them when tensions rise. Export controls, antitrust actions, and anti-monopoly probes all follow this pattern. /3

The second US–China trade war in early 2025 was the first real test of China’s new economic weapons. At least 26 measures, formal and informal, targeted the US—tariffs, export controls, regulatory probes, and more—demonstrating an increasingly sophisticated approach to economic coercion /2

China’s sanctions strategy is evolving fast.

In a new study, we map 200+ PRC economic restrictions from 2010–2025—the first database to capture the full range of sanctions, from informal state-backed boycotts to formal measures like export controls. /w @victoraferguson.bsky.social, Audrye Wong /1

Exclusive: US-China trade truce leaves military-use rare earth issue unresolved, sources say Beijing has not committed to grant export clearance for some specialized rare-earth magnets that U.S. military suppliers need for fighter jets and missile systems, the sources said.

Exclusive: US-China trade truce leaves military-use rare earth issue unresolved, sources say – Reuters: ‘Beijing has not committed to grant export clearance for some specialized rare-earth magnets that U.S. military suppliers need for fighter jets and missile systems, the people said.’

Bloomberg: #China Forced to Keep Unprofitable Firms Alive to Save Jobs & Avoid Unrest
Saddled with the most loss-making industrial companies since 2001, Xi is trying to avoid mass layoffs. Protests rose 41% in the 4th Q from same period in 2023 www.bloomberg.com/news/feature...

Dan and I have substantially revised our paper after engaging with colleagues. It has been a particularly tough paper for me to think through and digest the why, how, and what of WTO collective action in response to the United States' trade actions. @ssrn.bsky.social papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....

Shock at Harvard After Government Says International Students Must Go

1/A government that is willing to do this is the same government that would nationalize a company. It is the same mentality of state-market relations. This is not an issue of Universities need to stand up. The whole free market system needs to stand up.
www.nytimes.com/2025/05/22/u...