1/ Some good news: We have a new article out in our EU in the Indo-Pacific (EUIP) special issue with @globalpolicy.bsky.social
'Reaching the Summit or a Plateau? The EU–New Zealand Relationship in the Indo-Pacific'
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
7/ The timing matters. With US foreign policy in flux under Trump 2.0, the EU has a real opportunity to position itself as a stable, like-minded partner in the Indo-Pacific.
6/ We offer three policy recommendations for the EU:
→ Leverage the positive bilateral relationship with NZ
→ Communicate the IPS more clearly
→ Consolidate EU normative leadership amid geopolitical uncertainty
5/ Top cooperation priorities identified: ocean governance 🌊 and green transition 🌿. EU security & defence capabilities? Largely dismissed — with one respondent calling the EU militarily 'toothless'.
4/ Key finding: while NZ views the EU as a like-minded partner committed to the rules-based order, knowledge of the IPS is surprisingly thin — even among well-informed elites.
3/ We draw on 15 elite interviews with NZ government officials and foreign policy influencers to assess how New Zealand perceives the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) (undertaken in 2023-4) by myself, Matt, and Serena)
2/ This was a truly collaborative effort. A big thanks to Matthew Castle for leading the writing and to Martin Holland, Juan Manfredi, and Serena Kelly for their contributions.
1/ Some good news: We have a new article out in our EU in the Indo-Pacific (EUIP) special issue with @globalpolicy.bsky.social
'Reaching the Summit or a Plateau? The EU–New Zealand Relationship in the Indo-Pacific'
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
1/5 Martin Holland & I have just had the overarching article for our special issue 'The EU in the Indo-Pacific' published in @globalpolicy.bsky.social . We conducted 111 interviews across eight locations to ask a fairly simple question: how is the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy actually being received?
5/5 We lay out two paths forward — a revised IPS 2.0 built around what the EU actually does well, or stepping back from an overarching strategy and focusing on bilateral relationships instead.
Full article (open access): onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
4/5 But in a region where security dominates the foreign policy agenda, the EU's limitations are hard to ignore. And perhaps most striking: very few of the people we spoke to had even heard of the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy.
3/5 The EU is genuinely well-regarded across the board, and there's real appetite for its involvement in climate, trade and digital governance. A solid foundation.
2/5 The research came out of the EUIP Jean Monnet Network — 40+ scholars across 27 universities covering Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. The findings are mixed.
1/5 Martin Holland & I have just had the overarching article for our special issue 'The EU in the Indo-Pacific' published in @globalpolicy.bsky.social . We conducted 111 interviews across eight locations to ask a fairly simple question: how is the EU's Indo-Pacific Strategy actually being received?
1/6 Paul Bacon and I have a new paper out in The Pacific Review.
We tackled a puzzle: how do you analyze something like the "Indo-Pacific" using Regional Security Complex Theory when it's way too big to be a normal region? 🧩
www.tandfonline.com/eprint/NYX5Q...
ABSTRACT The concept of the Anglosphere, while exercising some debate within other of its members, is one that has little currency in the Aotearoa New Zealand context. Instead, it is AUKUS - the most recent project of three core Anglosphere states - that has framed discussion on issues to do with the concept. Utilising three historic ideational tenets of Aotearoa New Zealand's foreign policy - independent foreign policy, nuclear free policy, and a Pacific orientation - this article examines public debate around AUKUS as presented in print news media in the period from its launch in September 2021 through to December 2024. It demonstrates that, while a high number of articles was generated over the timeframe, discussion was largely driven by events external to Aotearoa New Zealand rather than by autochthonous interest. Further, while there has been some local discussion on joining Pillar Il of AUKUS, this has, to date, lacked in-depth analysis. Finally, it finds that the core ideational orientations of Aotearoa New Zealand foreign policy have had relatively little play in media considerations of AUKUS.
🚨New online! Kelly and Doidge: "Aotearoa New Zealand, AUKUS, and the Anglosphere: navigating security identity amidst geostrategic change. Part of an upcoming special edn. on the "Anglosphere".
www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.... ⬇️
#AcademicPublishing #AcademicSky #InternationalRelations #AUKUS
I'm thinking how Zhang Yimou's 2002 film Hero, visually stunning as it is, prefigured the later rise of tianxia-ism and civilizationism under Xi. His Beijing Olympics opening ceremony is another landmark production in Chinese civilizational discourse
🚨New Article🚨
“Dependently Independent: Theorizing New Zealand's “Independent” Foreign Policy via a Neoclassical Realist Lens” by Nicholas Ross Smith
Read OPEN ACCESS here:
academic.oup.com/isagsq/artic...
🧵
I have a new paper out in @gsqjournal.bsky.social: "Dependently Independent: Theorizing New Zealand's 'Independent' Foreign Policy via a Neoclassical Realist Lens"
academic.oup.com/isagsq/artic...
TL;DR: NZ's "independent" foreign policy depends heavily on regional geopolitics. (1/8)
The takeaway: NZ's foreign policy independence isn't exceptional - it's circumstantial. As regional geopolitics become more constrained, expect NZ to align more closely with traditional allies, regardless of which party is in power. (8/8)
This challenges the idea that NZ is inherently an "independent power." Instead, NZ has been fortunate to reside in a geopolitically calm region for decades - a "blessing of distance" that's now shrinking as great power competition intensifies. (7/8)
The theoretical insight: When regional geopolitics are "permissive," NZ can afford to be independent. When they become "restrictive" (like today's Indo-Pacific competition), systemic pressures override domestic preferences for independence. (6/8)
Case 2: Today's AUKUS consideration.
The Sixth National Government is exploring joining AUKUS Pillar II - a major shift toward alignment with US/Australia. Why? Because the regional security environment has become much more restrictive. (5/8)
Case 1: The 1980s nuclear ban.
Yes, NZ stood up to the US - but this happened during a period of relative geopolitical calm in the Asia-Pacific. Cold War tensions had eased, China was opening up, and there were few external threats to NZ. (4/8)
Using a type II neoclassical realist framework, I argue that NZ's regional geopolitical setting is the PRIMARY driver of its foreign policy - not its "independent" role identity.
The independence is real, but it's dependent on having geopolitical room to maneuver. (3/8)
The common narrative: NZ has maintained an independent foreign policy since the 1980s, standing up to superpowers when needed (like banning nuclear ships despite US pressure).
But this misses the bigger picture about what drives NZ's foreign policy choices. (2/8)
🧵
I have a new paper out in @gsqjournal.bsky.social: "Dependently Independent: Theorizing New Zealand's 'Independent' Foreign Policy via a Neoclassical Realist Lens"
academic.oup.com/isagsq/artic...
TL;DR: NZ's "independent" foreign policy depends heavily on regional geopolitics. (1/8)
6/6 Main contribution: showing how RSCT can handle mega-concepts like Indo-Pacific without losing its regional focus. Macrosecuritization bridges the gap between local and global security dynamics! 🌉
5/6 The framework helps explain why some states (New Zealand) got pulled in, others (China) actively resist, and still others (ASEAN, Pacific Islands) try alternative framings. Different responses to the same macrosecuritization 🔄
4/6 This produces what we call a "macrosecuritized constellation" - not erasing existing regional dynamics, but overlaying them with higher-order security competition. Think Cold War but more complex 🌟