🎙️ NEW PODCAST 🎧
On the latest episode of Oil Ground Up, I spoke with @gbrew24.bsky.social about Trump killing the Carter Doctrine and how to think about the political contours of the Iran War on *all* sides of the conflict and how they constrain our path forward.
open.spotify.com/episode/4TcG...
I'm going to do more to post here, y'all, and not just the other place.
I am constrained somewhat by limited mental ability--in my advanced age, it's really only feasible for me to be glued to one platform at a time.
But I shall do my best.
ICYMI my latest on Trump's Russia sanctions.
Why he did it, what it means, and why it's (potentially) a risky move. @gzeromedia.com @eurasiagroup.net #OOTT #TheDebrief youtube.com/shorts/M8mUA...
Trump sanctioned Russian oil last week.
But after this first big blow, Trump will have to take it slow--or risk letting sanctions undermine his broader agenda and his position at home.
I break it down for #TheDebrief @gzeromedia.com youtube.com/shorts/M8mUA...
Trump sanctioned Russian oil last week.
But after this first big blow, Trump will have to take it slow--or risk letting sanctions undermine his broader agenda and his position at home.
I break it down for #TheDebrief @gzeromedia.com youtube.com/shorts/M8mUA...
FWIW the image of Pezeshkian narrowly escaping death and heroically leading the rest of the council out of danger is certainly helpful at a time when the president is fending off significant criticism.
Among other takeaways, confirms that Israel did, in fact, attempt to assassinate Iran's key civilian and military leadership.
By a stroke of luck, the president and the rest of the SNSC walked away. www.nytimes.com/2025/08/30/u...
"The U.S. has never been closer to armed conflict with Venezuela."
Still flying under the radar--but maybe not for much longer. www.axios.com/2025/08/29/v...
"Witkoff isn’t consistently engaged. He will pop in for a visit to Vladimir Putin, say a bunch of stuff, not tell anyone what really happened and then just fuck off to his life again."
However you feel about the sourcing, these are some wild quotes. www.politico.com/news/2025/08...
Per Reuters, E3 will pull the SnapBack trigger tomorrow--but they're holding out hope for diplomatic progress during the 30-day implementation period. www.reuters.com/world/europe...
An idea that needs a lot more validation relative to its popularity is China "replacing" real estate investment with higher ROI investment.
I buy that they tried. We all see the latter's progress in many sectors. I don't buy that "replacement" worked or is even conceptually appropriate framing.
Trump seems committed to increasing electricity prices by any means necessary. www.nytimes.com/2025/08/22/c...
My chat with @roryjohnston.bsky.social on tariffs, Russia, the sanctioned oil market, and deciphering Trump's approach to the oil market.
Check it out: open.spotify.com/episode/7sxd...
🎙️ NEW PODCAST 🎧
In the latest episode of Oil Ground Up I spoke with @gbrew24.bsky.social about:
- Indian secondary tariff risks
- US-India trade relations
- Alternative outlets for Russian oil
- the ever-more policy-Balkanized crude market
LISTEN:
open.spotify.com/episode/7sxd...
A regional hegemon that depends on another state for its defense and (perhaps) its very existence.
A sign of how sharply the discourse on Gaza has shifted:
Idea that Hamas has been stealing aid, a major piece of the Israeli case behind controlling aid flows and cutting out the UN and int'l agencies, has now been outed as a baseless fabrication.
"Israel would have been overwhelmed" is burying the lede.
Israel was conducting a limited war. If air defenses got close to collapse, Israel would have escalated to force Tehran into standing down.
Critical infra and/or more extensive targeting of leadership come to mind.
WSJ has some specific figures on how US/Israeli interceptors performed against Iran.
Upshot: if the war had continued, Israel's air defenses would have reached a critical point--one that could have pushed Israeli leaders into more intensive escalatory options. www.wsj.com/world/israel...
The experience with Iran and Russia makes it abundantly clear: while oil sanctions are good for restructuring oil flows around geopolitical relationships, they fall short on changing state behavior.
With implications for US-China.
My latest for @foreignpolicy.com foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/23/o...
My piece in @foreignpolicy.com on oil sanctions.
What they do, what they fail to do, and what lessons they hold for US-China policy. foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/23/o...
My piece in @foreignpolicy.com on oil sanctions.
What they do, what they fail to do, and what lessons they hold for US-China policy. foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/23/o...
The experience with Iran and Russia makes it abundantly clear: while oil sanctions are good for restructuring oil flows around geopolitical relationships, they fall short on changing state behavior.
With implications for US-China.
My latest for @foreignpolicy.com foreignpolicy.com/2025/07/23/o...
The only way the military option made sense was as a comprehensive strike-- you have to destroy *everything* and quickly, to reduce proliferation risk.
Moreover, the military option is not a military solution. The US has bought time. But they still need to negotiate.
For Vance to immediately confirm in public that the HEU stockpile was not destroyed, despite the US dropping 13 MOPs, suggests the rationale for using force wasn't rock solid.
Also underscores how risky this was. Iran learned that even massive ordinance is likely not enough.
🚨🚨🚨Trump: we have bombed Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan.
Trump was trying to get a meeting with the Iranians through Turkey.
He even contemplated going himself.
But comms with Khamenei were too slow to facilitate it. I also imagine the SL was too suspicious of such an offer to consider it.
Israeli officials tell J-Post that there are no signs of regime collapse in Iran.
Israel's top general acknowledges that the war will be long and the most complicated in Israel's history.
Missiles continue to strike Tel Aviv and Haifa.
