My article forms part of a special issue on Political Change in African Cities, edited by Kristian Hoelscher, @taibatlawanson.bsky.social and Jeffrey Paller. Check out the other articles that are already out, and watch this space for the full issue: www.sciencedirect.com/special-issu... (9/9)
The Kenyan case also underlines the destructive effects of a general perception of the urban poor as a security risk: election-related violence in these cities also includes police brutality and extrajudicial killings of real or perceived criminal elements during election periods. (8/9)
I complement the statistical analyses with qualitative insights from low-income areas of Nakuru and Nairobi, two rapidly growing Kenyan cities. The dynamics of contestation in these neighbourhoods align with my overall argument but also underline the importance of local context and history. (7/9)
Extended analysis indicates that urban growth is associated with a higher risk of election violence in larger, more established cities (including both major and secondary cities), but not in the smallest cities. This is in line with arguments that ‘new cities’ feature distinct urban politics. (6/9)
My analysis also underlines that factors like political importance and city size are stronger predictors of electoral violence, and that context-specific dynamics condition the effects of urban growth. (5/9)
In my statistical analyses, I identify a robust positive correlation between the pace of population growth and the risk of electoral violence in the city. The results hold when controlling for city size, media freedom, and socioeconomic factors that could affect both urban growth and violence. (4/9)
While many previous studies of urban growth and violence have focused only on major cities (and generally found little evidence of such a relationship), I include a broader range of smaller and larger cities across Africa, enabling new insights. (3/9)
While urbanization holds a strong potential for progress and democracy-enhancement, rapid urban growth can also sharpen political competition and intensify urban grievances. I argue this can incentivise and enable political leaders to use violence to shape election outcomes. (2/9)
How does rapid urban growth affect the risk of electoral violence in African cities? In a new article (open access in World Development), I find that cities growing more rapidly were at higher risk of electoral violence. doi.org/10.1016/j.wo... (1/9)
These findings make two important contributions: we provide new empirical evidence about the discontinuity in wartime and postwar urban violence, and develop and test theoretical arguments about how the transition from war to postwar shapes urban contestation, under different conditions. (5/5)
Instead, we find that politically important cities (national or regional capitals) and cities where the war ended through rebel victory, are more likely to see high levels of postwar violence. We connect this to the way that contestation remains, but motives and opportunites shift, after war. (4/5)
In our analyses, we find that the level of violence in the city during war is a poor predictor of postwar urban violence. If anything, cities that saw high wartime violence experience lower levels of postwar violence compared to other cities. (3/5)
Using cross-case and micro-level data, we study how both levels and dynamics of violence change from war to postwar. We analyse a dataset covering postwar cities around the world, as well as novel micro-level data from five cities to study the dynamics of violence in more depth. (2/5)
Which cities become arenas for violent contestation after war? Me and @rokon-uddin.bsky.social study this question in a newly published article in @intlinteractions.bsky.social. A key takeaway: Postwar urban violence is not just a continuation of war. doi.org/10.1080/0305... (1/5)
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Agenda 2030 is being systematically deprioritized by the Swedish government, with harmful consequences both for global development and Swedish security. Debate article by me, Jesper Sundewall, Janet Vähämäki and Petra Tötterman Andorff, on behalf of SweDev and CONCORD Sweden (in Swedish).
No universal cure for the growing pains of African cities, me, @krishogl.bsky.social, Angela Muvumba Sellström & Camille Pellerin conclude in this recent NAI blog post. It summarizes research within our Urban dilemma project (funded by the discontinued VR Uforsk grant).
nai.uu.se/stories-and-...
🎓 The call is out for my favorite academic conference: the Conflict Research Society Annual Conference 2025. If you like your conferences inviting, informal, theoretically and empirically diverse, and full of relevant practitioners, CRS is for you!
conflictresearchsociety.org/call-for-pap...
As people are leaving X and joining Bluesky instead, here is a starter pack of peace and conflict researchers for all new users ⤵️
go.bsky.app/7o8tZt2
About two-thirds of respondents (65%) say their work was either discontinued or significantly altered as a result of the funding cuts. Long-term projects, collaborative research with colleagues in other countries, and networks that have been built up over time are particularly impacted.
67% say that their incentives to include researchers from the Global South were negatively affected and 38% reported that their research teams’ structure has changed because of the funding cuts.
Some key findings: 53% of the respondents in research/academia have adjusted their research in response to the funding cuts. 33% of respondents say they have changed their research topics, and 20% have shifted geographical research focus.
How have the cuts in funding affected development researchers? SweDev surveyed 200 researchers and practitioners, and responses indicate significant impacts in research foci and collaborations. Read the report here: swedev.dev/report-the-c... #polisky #conflictsky
Missa inte denna spännande föreläsning - idag 8 april kl 18.15!
While you're there, check out CHRIPS' other reports - in depth and insightful analyses of insecurity and human rights in Kenya: chrips.or.ke/category/pub...
5) The experience of living in slum areas influences women and men differently. Women on average rated their living conditions lower than men, saw fewer positive developments in their area of residence, and expressed more fear of insecure housing conditions.
4) More transitory areas pose challenges for conflict management. In Korogocho there is overall more familiarity with potential conflict management actors, and also higher trust in relevant conflict management actors, compared to Kawangware where respondents had on average lived for shorter periods.
3) The fear of being evicted from the place of living is high, and more so in Korogocho where land ownership is less formalised and land not privately owned. Residents in both areas saw the local administration (e.g local chief) as most relevant for addressing conflicts related to land or housing.
2) Trust in police is low, but the police is not irrelevant. Of the different actors relevant for local security, police enjoy the lowest trust. However, a majority still say they would turn to police for help/report crime.
Some key insights: 1) The sources of conflict in the settlements are diverse, yet intersect. Several of them intertwine with politics and may spill over into election-related violence. There is a need to address these challenges with attention to how conflict dynamics are connected.