[Eugene Volokh] Second Circuit Upholds Decision Denying Pseudonymity for Law Doctorate Student With Psychiatric Conditions
From Monday's decision in Doe v. Yale Univ., by Dennis Jacobs, Richard C. Wesley, and Michael H. Park:
Plaintiff Jane Doe appeals from an order of the district court denying her motion to proceed by pseudonym as well as the district court's order denying reconsideration. Doe, a student in Yale Law School's Doctor of Juridical Science ("J.S.D.") program, sued Yale University, Director of Student Accessibility Services Kimberly McKeown, and Assistant Dean for Graduate Programs Gordon Silverstein (collectively, "Yale"), alleging [disability] discrimination and retaliation … as well as breach of contract. Doe primarily claimed that Yale improperly refused to extend her J.S.D. candidacy for an additional year—which she believes she needs in order to produce a dissertation of sufficient quality—and sought injunctive relief barring Yale from discharging her from the program.
The same day that she filed her complaint, Doe moved for an order permitting her to proceed by pseudonym. She asserted that her identification as plaintiff in this lawsuit would diminish her academic and employment opportunities because the case would necessarily disclose details concerning her diagnosed medical conditions, her medical treatment history, and the impact of her conditions on her academic performance. She also contended that "[p]ublic disclosure of [her] identity would likely exacerbate her existing psychiatric conditions" and subject her to "stigma associated with mental health conditions."
On June 17, 2025, the district court denied the motion in an order that identified and applied several factors articulated by our Court in Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant (2d Cir. 2008). In so doing, the court noted that it had taken steps to protect her privacy by sealing Doe's private medical information.
Doe's motion for reconsideration, filed three days later, added an affidavit from Doe and a letter from her psychiatrist of nine years, which substantiated Doe's claim that disclosure would risk serious mental harm. Because the new evidence attached to the motion "could have been raised earlier," the court declined to consider it and denied the motion. The district court's denials of both orders were proper.
The district court properly denied Doe's initial motion to proceed by pseudonym. We review a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to proceed under a pseudonym for abuse of discretion. A district court abuses its discretion when it "bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence or when its decision—though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) directs that "[t]he title of [a] complaint must name all the parties." This requirement "serves the vital purpose of facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings and therefore cannot be set aside lightly." Courts have, however, "carved out a limited number of exceptions to the general requirement of disclosure of the names of parties, which permit plaintiffs to proceed anonymously." Courts determine whether a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym by balancing "the plaintiff's interest in anonymity … against both the public interest in disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant." … Ultimately, "pseudonyms are the exception and not the rule, and in order to receive the protections of anonymity, a party must make a case rebutting that presumption."
Contrary to Doe's contentions, the district court identified the relevant factors and undertook a reasoned, clearly-articulated analysis of the pertinent considerations…. Its decision therefore reflects a proper exercise of its discretion….
Here's an excerpt from the decision that the court affirmed:
Plaintiff's medical condition and the accommodations she sought as a result thereof are at the heart of this case and indeed appear in the first sentence of the sealed complaint. Nonetheless, "'[t]he fact that a case involves a medical issue is not a sufficient reason for allowing the use of a fictitious name." Otherwise, every ADA plaintiff would be entitled to proceed pseudonymously. In this case, the court has sealed Plaintiff's private medical information, and finds that Defendants have been respectful of that fact (at oral argument, in docketing protected material under seal, and in eliciting testimony and evidence). Defendants also do not appear to dispute that Plaintiff is disabled within the meaning of the relevant statutes. Thus, Plaintiff's privacy has been protected to date, and the court finds that this is likely to continue.
For similar reasons, and also in light of the accommodations provided by Defendants to date, the court finds that Plaintiff's claim of vulnerability to future discrimination (due to the publication of her identity) is entirely speculative. Whether Defendants previously discriminated against her, and whether they will continue to have any authority over her academic career, remain contested questions. Even so, the individuals currently having authority over her already know of her disability.
And as to future authorities, while the court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's asserted concerns regarding the impact of her potential identification upon her prospects for employment, Plaintiff initiated this action long after already obtaining accommodations which themselves create gaps in her resume likely to be explored by any prospective employer.
In other words, distinguishable from a case wherein a plaintiff's disability itself would be the likely impediment to future employment, Plaintiff (who, as was her right, chose to physically appear at a public hearing wherein at least some of her accommodations were freely discussed) very likely would have to explain to any prospective employer why it would have taken her several years longer than the average time normally needed to complete the J.S.D. program. That lengthy span of time would draw the attention of any prospective employer, regardless of the name of the applicant.
The court is cognizant that employment law limits inquiry on topics such as disability and anticipated accommodations prior to extending an offer, and that these protections would be useless to a litigant if her identity and the specifics of her claims were readily available to any prospective employer. But where, as here, the litigant's medical information is kept under seal, such prospective employer is likely to glean only that Plaintiff asserted certain rights (without the stigma of any particular diagnosis) and the manner in which she did so (and again, the unusually long time to complete her J.S.D. would be exposed, even if her medical condition is not).
The fact that someone has sought the help of the courts is not protected. Granted, some prospective employers might be wary of an applicant who has brought suit against a prior employer (or other authority), whether by way of a wage claim or an ADA claim, but this does not justify pseudonymous status for every plaintiff in an employment case. Thus, Plaintiff's arguments on this point are unpersuasive. Still, in looking beyond this case, the court neither wishes to discourage the disabled from asserting their rights through litigation (for fear of being exposed), nor to encourage baseless litigation that unjustly impacts defendants while shielding the identity of the false accuser, but sometimes it is only the merit of any lawsuit that determines how or whether a plaintiff or a defendant will be judged by a future employer or by society at large.
Turning to Plaintiff's claim that unveiling her identity will negatively impact her health, the court notes that this assertion is not directly supported by the medical documents [Doe filed], nor elsewhere throughout the docket which includes a trove of email communications, school policies, and other exhibits. "And where a plaintiff claims that disclosure will harm their mental health, courts in this Circuit look for corroboration from medical professionals that detail the risk to plaintiff."
Although the court prevented Defendants from calling Plaintiff as a witness at the preliminary injunction hearing upon only the most general legal support offered from her counsel (to include a claim that calling Plaintiff as a witness at the hearing on her own motion, within the case which she herself had initiated, amounted to "surprise"), the court did so out of an extreme abundance of caution in protecting Plaintiff from aggravation of her undisputed disability, balancing the need for truth with the fact that Defendants had not subpoenaed her (despite their full knowledge of the nature of Plaintiff's claimed disability and Defendants' assertion as to the necessity of Plaintiff's prospective testimony). Proportional protection of Plaintiff's identity toward the purported end of protecting her health simply is not justified on the present record of this case. Cf. Doe v. Smith (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (granting anonymity based upon "specific evidence" from a health professional stating that disclosing the plaintiff's identity likely would cause "psychological and emotional pain so intense that it would threaten her stability, her safety, and even her life."). Finding otherwise would risk prejudice to the defendants, who must be permitted to explore Plaintiff's claims freely and diligently in preparation of their own defense.
And while the court appreciates that Defendants concede a lack of prejudice in Plaintiff proceeding under a pseudonym, the court does not necessarily agree with that assessment, for neither Yale nor the individual defendants enjoy the benefit of anonymity sought by Plaintiff while their reputation is challenged through the claims underlying the instant case. And as previously stated, just as the court seeks to avoid discouraging people with disabilities from asserting their rights, so too does it wish to avoid encouraging threats of baseless litigation as a means for prospective civil plaintiffs to extort settlements from more vulnerable prospective private defendants than those at bar in the present case.
Finally, the court finds that this case does not present purely legal issues such that there is an unusually weak public interest in Plaintiff's identity. To the contrary, the court finds that the parties' respective narratives will be far more significant to the outcome of this case than the legal questions presented….
For more on how badly split courts are on the question whether plaintiffs can sue as John/Jane Does in order to avoid being publicly connected with their mental health conditions, see Appendices 3A & 3B of The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation. Part of the reason for this inconsistency is appellate courts' reviewing such decisions only for "abuse of discretion," as the Second Circuit did here: That means that even if two judges reach opposite results on identical facts, both cases can be upheld as being within the zone of each judge's discretion. And such decisions thus won't be binding precedent as to what lower courts should do, just what lower courts may do if they want to.
Patrick M. Noonan, Giovanna Tiberii Weller, and Jeffrey M. Beck (Carmody Torrance Sandak & Hennessey LLP) represent Yale.
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