6️⃣ These changes, however, may undermine the rule of law:

⚖️ while severe drugs & political unrest receive harsher punishment, malfeasance in office by politicians and officials received more favorable treatment.

5️⃣ The effect does not kicks in until the period of extra-monitoring and the result was driven by judges who were lenient pre-reform.

4️⃣ Using DID, I find that monitoring has *huge* effect on judges’ behavior.

🕵️‍♀️ Monitored cases received significantly longer prison sentences post-reform.

3️⃣ I collected and transcribed 100k+ Thai court cases and linked with individual registry data.

2️⃣ I study this question from the context of Thailand.

💡Using a constitutional reform by a military government which mandates a set of cases (at the suboffense-by-region level) to be monitored by supervising judges before judgment delivery.

1️⃣ Governments often intervene in the court process to consolidate political power. But what happens when judges are monitored? 🤔

⚖️ How does monitoring of judges affect efficiency and equity in the criminal justice system?

🚨 Excited to share my #EconJMP! 🚨

"Courtroom Surveillance: Evidence from a State Intervention in the Courts"

📄 Link: drive.google.com/file/d/1i8-T...

Here’s a summary ⬇️

4️⃣ Using DID, I find that monitoring has *huge* effect on judges’ behavior.

🕵️‍♀️ Monitored cases received significantly longer prison sentences post-reform.

3️⃣ I collected and transcribed 100k+ Thai court cases and linked with individual registry data.

2️⃣ I study this question from the context of Thailand.

💡Using a constitutional reform by a military government which mandates a set of cases (at the suboffense-by-region level) to be monitored by supervising judges before judgment delivery.

1️⃣ Governments often intervene in the court process to consolidate political power. But what happens when judges are monitored? 🤔

⚖️ How does monitoring of judges affect efficiency and equity in the criminal justice system?