Merci @alietteh.bsky.social pour son invitation cette semaine dans "Entendez-vous l'éco" sur @franceculture.fr! 👇
Que peut nous apprendre l’économie sur les élections? Peut-on penser la politique comme un marché? La main invisible y opère-t-elle?
🎧A écouter ici: www.radiofrance.fr/francecultur...
De l'autocratie - et de la résistance - en Amérique.
Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇
Thanks! The effects are smaller in the more recent period:
This definition allows us to also consider parl elections that do not lead to the designation of the head of government (e.g., in the U.S.). But as part of our ongoing revisions we will consider also an alternative definition where the outcome is one if the party controls the government.
Full paper on our websites: drive.google.com/file/d/1pMj5...; www.vincentpons.org/global-incum...; vrollet.github.io/files/Incumb... (n/n).
Finally, the national-level incumbency advantage has generally fallen over the past decades: despite democratic backsliding, incumbents do not seem increasingly entrenched (12/n).
For instance, in the least democratic countries in our sample, only 56% of elections are followed by another election held on schedule; 17% are followed by a late election or by no election at all (11/n).
In less democratic settings, the incumbency advantage largely stems from manipulating the fairness and timing of follow-up elections (10/n).
Indeed, similar incumbency advantages can reflect very different mechanisms. In established democracies, incumbency mainly helps through better performance in follow-up elections that are free and fair (9/n).
The contrast with the subnational evidence is striking. At the subnational level, incumbency advantage is strongest in richer and more democratic settings. At the national level, it is large in both the most democratic and the least democratic countries (8/n).
This average effect hides major regional differences. The national incumbency advantage is large in Western Europe/North America (+26pp) and Africa (+42pp) but muted or negative in Latin America and Asia/Oceania (7/n).
On average, winning a national election raises the probability of still being in power after the scheduled end of term by 10pp on average, but this effect is short-lived (6/n).
The national incumbency advantage hasn’t been studied so far. It may differ from existing subnational estimates because national incumbents have additional levers to stay in power: they may alter the timing, fairness and results of the follow-up elections (5/n).
We then turn to national elections worldwide since 1945 and use a close-election RDD to estimate the incumbency advantage at the national level, which we define as the effect of winning on the probability of still being in power beyond the scheduled end of term (4/n).
We start with a meta-analysis of subnational incumbency estimates from 58 studies covering 29 countries.
A clear pattern emerges: the subnational incumbency advantage is larger in richer, less corrupt, and more democratic settings (3/n).
We ask a simple question: once a party or candidate narrowly wins national office, how much does that increase its chances of remaining in power later on? We use all presidential and parliamentary elections held worldwide since 1945 to respond (2/n).
Very happy to share our new paper on “The Global Incumbency Advantage”! 👇👇
We provide the first estimates of the incumbency advantage at the national level for all elections worldwide since 1945.
with Raphaël Descamps, Ben Marx and @vincent-rollet.bsky.social.
Short 🧵 below (1/n).
Comment en finir avec la démocratie des cheveux gris?
A l'approche des municipales, notre tribune dans @liberation.fr propose 4 leviers pour réduire l'abstention, notamment des jeunes. 👇👇
Focus @caeeco.bsky.social associé: cae-eco.fr/les-absents-...
Avec Jean Beuve et Etienne Fize.
joint with Jake Brown, Enrico Cantoni, @ryanenos.bsky.social, and Emilie Sartre
What explains the rise in geographic partisan segregation in the U.S.?
While most studies focus on residential mobility, generational change and Democrats leaving their party explain a much larger share of that trend.
See our @voxeu.org column 👇👇 and our paper: www.vincentpons.org/partisan-seg...
"Pour Trump, le pouvoir est une fin en soi et il entend l’exercer sans aucune limite".
Merci à François Miguet pour cette interview dans @lepoint.fr 👇👇
www.lepoint.fr/monde/pour-t...
Faut-il vraiment ouvrir une guerre commerciale avec la Chine?
Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇
Faut-il vraiment ouvrir une guerre commerciale avec la Chine?
Ma dernière chronique pour @lesechosfr.bsky.social 👇👇
Full paper here: www.annualreviews.org/content/jour...
And here: www.vincentpons.org/voting-rules (n/n).
d/ understanding why voter turnout has declined in many countries in recent decades even though barriers to voting have generally come down. One explanation is a weakening sense of civic duty, calling for research on the reasons explaining the erosion of the civic norm and possible remedies (16/n).
b/ studying how voting procedures are implemented in practice and the effects of election administration quality on voter turnout
c/ investigating how being an active voter affects other individual outcomes, such as accepting election outcomes or seeking political information (15/n)
Finally, we highlighting questions for future research:
a/ measuring the effects of election rules that have not changed much over time and that tend to vary at the national level—such as holding elections on Tuesdays in the United States (14/n)
These rules operate mostly through benefits, for instance by affecting the number and types of candidates as well as electoral competitiveness. As a result, they can be just as crucial for political participation as voting procedures (13/n).
Fourth, we examine the turnout effect of rules that, before the election, govern redistricting, primaries, candidacy requirements, and campaigns, as well as the effect of rules that determine how the votes cast map onto a set of election winners (e.g., plurality voting versus PR) (12/n).
We also discuss the (exaggerated) tension between combating voter fraud and facilitating voter participation and review cross-country evidence on the large effects of compulsory voting (11/n).