…clearly that process began earlier and was driven by other factors (collapse of JCPOA revival talks?). 6/6

3. This also calls into question the idea that “the walls closing in” in late 2024 was a big driver for Iran seeking shortcuts to a bomb. It might have spurred that research again/gave it more urgency, but if this 2023 data point is true…5/

2. Similarly, if you have explicit intelligence Iran is considering making a crude bomb without needing to go to 90+ (which is how this Wapost article reads), this puts Iranian threats to revise its doctrine in 2024 in a different (more credible) light. 4/

1. The concern over the buildup of Iran’s 60% stockpile during this time, already warranted, would be even more so if there was explicit intelligence Iran was considering shoving that material into a crude device. 3/

One can imagine a version of events that bridges both of these claims, but if the 2023 data point is true, a few implications. 2/

Killing the ‘brain trust’: How Israel targeted Iran’s nuclear scientists A Washington Post-PBS Frontline investigation reveals new details about Israel’s Operation Narnia, targeting Iran’s nuclear scientists during the 12-day war.

One of the more interesting bits in this article is the claim that intelligence first emerged in early 2023 that Iran was exploring a faster pathway to a crude nuclear device. Previous reports pegged that development in late 2024/early 2025. 1/

www.washingtonpost.com/national-sec...

Would military strikes kill Iran's nuclear programme? Probably not The recent U.S. deployment of B-2 bombers, the only planes able to launch the most powerful bunker-busting bombs, to within range of Iran is a potent signal to Tehran of what could happen to its nuclear programme if no deal is reached to rein it in.

Told Francois Murphy that "a strike by the United States could probably cause more damage than an Israeli strike, but in either case you're talking about buying time and there's a real risk that it drives Iran toward rather than away from a bomb.”

www.reuters.com/world/middle...

Lots of focus on what the U.S. end goal should be as part of nuclear talks with Iran. Fair. But Witkoff needs to staff up, and fast. These talks are highly technical and he’s going to need both nuclear and sanctions experts. Doing otherwise is courting disaster.

U.S. Revives Talks With Saudi Arabia on Transfer of Nuclear Technology Energy Secretary Chris Wright said he sees a “pathway” to a deal that would allow the kingdom to develop a commercial nuclear power industry and potentially enrich uranium.

Sec Wright: “We’ve not reached the details on an agreement, but it certainly looks like there is a pathway to do that…The issue is control of sensitive technology. Are there solutions to that that involve enrichment here in Saudi Arabia? Yes.”

www.nytimes.com/2025/04/13/w...

How Iran’s nuclear gains complicate Trump's desire for a 'stronger' deal President Trump says he's seeking an Iranian nuclear deal stronger than the one he trashed in his first term. But with Iran's nuclear program more advanced than ever before, is that even possible?

“You can remove centrifuges, but you can't remove that knowledge... Even if you remove those machines and dilute and cap the material, Iran is starting from a much more advanced place today than it was in 2015," says NTI's @ebrewer.bsky.social ⤵️

Quoted: “There is growing doubt among allies and partners about whether the United States will meet its defense commitments when the chips are down…But there are a lot of other systemic factors driving countries to talk about developing nuclear weapons.”

www.politico.com/news/magazin...

bsky.app/profile/ebre...

Scoop: Iran wants to explore interim nuclear deal in talks with U.S., sources say President Trump has set a two-month deadline for negotiations with Iran on a new nuclear deal.

As I predicted last week.

www.axios.com/2025/04/10/i...

For example: Bar certain inspectors (which Iran has already done), or bar/any all inspections, which would be a major provocation? Similarly, moving materials to a secure location could be done with IAEA monitoring (not good) or without (really, really bad).

Advisor to the Supreme Leader 👇
The conditions (“continuation of external threats and being in a state of military attack”) are pretty ambiguous and leave a lot of room for flexibility, as do the threatened consequences.

Treasury Imposes Sanctions on Enablers of Iran’s Nuclear Program WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating five entities and one individual based in Iran for their support to key entities that manage...

Sanctioning Iranian entities involved in enrichment ahead of U.S.-Iran talks certainly seems like a signal to Tehran that Washington has no intention of accepting that enrichment program under any agreement.

home.treasury.gov/news/press-r...

A third question: Will maximum pressure continue while diplomacy is underway? I suspect yes, but North Korea under Trump 1.0 offers a counterexample. 3/3

Sticking with the latter would be a recipe for a short negotiation. Another big Q is whether the Trump admin sees this as more of a temperature-taking session or plans to lay out early redlines and/or put something more substantive on the table (my guess is temp-taking). 2/

Far more important than whether US-Iran talks are direct or indirect is how the Trump admin approaches these first meetings. Does it frame its goal as making sure Iran can’t produce a nuclear weapon? Or that Iran needs to dismantle its entire nuclear infrastructure? 1/

So, in order of likelihood, I think we see 3 next, and if that doesn’t work, then back to 2. I think 1 is very unlikely, and remain skeptical or 4. You now have my very public predictions based on current info. I’ll revise as warranted! 12/12

I think this remains a risky option, and is thus unlikely unless Iran determines the US and/or Israel is determined to strike and there’s no way to prevent it (and even then, I think it’s still more likely Iran weathers the strike and uses it as justification to leave the NPT and weaponize). 11/

Option 4: Cross the nuclear threshold (or come really damn close). The goal would be to establish a reliable deterrent, thus preventing a strike, and strengthen Iran’s negotiation position vis-a-vis the US. Like option 1, this is a “hard exit” from the current dilemma. 10/

Like #2, it’s unclear whether Israel could talk the US out of it and/or would decide to strike on its own. That said, I think this is probably Iran’s preferred option assuming the status quo can’t last, and the one we’re most likely to see it try in the coming months. 9/

The goal would be to avoid a strike, let snapback expire, retain the key elements of the nuclear program, and keep options open for diplomacy in the future. Iran might also think it can lean on Russia and China (who also don’t want snapback or a strike) to convince the US this is a good option. 8/

Option 3: Try and sell Trump on something short of his maximum demands as a first step (like a JPOA) while promising to continue negotiations to reach a broader/bigger deal. 7/

If/when snapback happens, Iran might moderate its response (eg no 90%) to avoid said strike. The wildcard here is Israel, which Iran will have a much harder time deterring with this strategy. 6/

This is kind of where Iran is at now, though it is exploring Option 3 (below), and I suspect that’s where it might pivot to next as things heat up. 5/

Option 2: Don’t make a deal, keep the nuclear program more or less on cruise control, and call Trump’s bluff. This would be betting that Trump cares more about avoiding a war than he does solving the nuclear problem. 4/

I think this is the least likely option, and Khamenei would accept a military strike on Iran’s program over this outcome (and if that happens, use that as justification to leave the NPT and develop weapons). 3/

Option 1: Give in to the maximalist version of Trump’s demands (abandon the nuclear program, and perhaps other policies of concern) in exchange for significant sanctions relief. 2/