1/4 Blog @lawfaremedia.org with @alcis.org funded by @XCEPT It focuses on the transformative effects of solar power: how it has supported Afghan farmers cope with climate change but ultimately how its expansion now threatens the livelihoods of 3.65 million people www.lawfaremedia.org/article/unde...
The strategic logic of this operation is lacking.
“The Taliban are saying, ‘bring it on.’ They don’t want Pakistan to have leverage over them,” says @graemesmithauthor.bsky.social
But the returnees were “walking into a real humanitarian disaster and an economy that cannot grow fast enough”
on.ft.com/3FJBEZ7
Economic cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbors holds promise, but tensions along the disputed border with Pakistan could impede growth -- as I told PRI's @theworld.org theworld.org/segments/202...
Hard to overstate the impact of USAID freeze in #Colombia.
Last year, US provided 70.6% of incoming humanitarian funds.
A 90 day freeze amid acute humanitarian crisis means Colombia has <1/3 of resources it would have last year to respond. Beyond 90 days would be devastating.
Lots of questions right now about the impact of Trump's aid cuts on Afghanistan. Short answer: we don't know. But it's worth noting that the US and other donors were already cutting back. Emergency funds offset the halt to development aid after 2021, but only temporarily.
The roof, the roof, the roof is on fire
I discussed my book on Syrian (former) jihadis, including HTS, including why they took over the leadership of the opposition, transformed politically, and their current role in Syria. Free to listen, and free to download as a book too fdslive.oup.com/www.oup.com/...
Good free-to-read @foreignaffairs.com piece piece on how the USA and Europe appear set to wreck Syria’s transition by simply defaulting to economic warfare for lack of clear ideas.
@delaneysimon.bsky.social
@jeromed.bsky.social
@graemesmithauthor.bsky.social
www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/...
In @foreignaffairs.com, @graemesmithauthor.bsky.social, @jeromed.bsky.social and I urge Western policymakers to make better choices in #Syria than they did in #Afghanistan, or risk sabotaging Syria's transition 🧵1/
www.foreignaffairs.com/afghanistan/...
"When Syria rebuilds, it's going to have to move beyond the illicit economy. It will have to reinvigorate industry and the banking sector. This will be really difficult with sanctions in place." My interview with @mattgalloway.bsky.social on
@cbcradiocanada.bsky.social
cbc.ca/listen/live-...
the person to read about these humanitarian carve-outs is @mayaungar.bsky.social : www.crisisgroup.org/global/polit...
This morning I talked to BBC's Lyse Doucet about the steps Western governments can take right now to help Syria get on its feet. Failing to take action on #sanctions relief is like pulling the rug out from under Syria just as it's trying to stand.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=e2cj...
We need better tools for dealing with such situations. The current all-or-nothing approach serves no one well, especially the civilians who suffer in the grey zones. Here’s hoping that Syrians do not get stuck in the same limbo that afflicts Afghans. /end
Sadly, the so-called international system is not built for this. Sanctions are crude instruments. States tend to fall into “with us” or “against us” categories, with few options in between. 32/
I’ve been sending copies of the UN independent assessment of Afghanistan to colleagues who work on Syria, because it reads like a checklist of the many ways the new regime in Damascus might struggle to restore functional relations with the world 31/
unama.unmissions.org/sites/defaul...
Sixth, more broadly, there’s a bunch of connectivity issues: civil aviation, telecommunications, customs integration, border security, etc. The Taliban case shows how hard it is for rebel groups to plug into global systems. 30/
Fifth, Syria needs to rebuild -- but World Bank and IMF programs can be difficult in these settings. Afghanistan got a “yes” vote from the Bank board for an electricity project earlier this year, but most infrastructure funding has been halted since 2021. www.worldbank.org/en/news/pres...
29/
Fourth, Syria's sticky web of pre-existing sanctions will likely continue to affect the banking and financial sectors. In Afghanistan, businesses still have trouble with wire transfers for basic transactions such as importing food and medicines. 28/
Third, we don't know how Syria's UN representation will play out. The Taliban still haven't taken Afghanistan's seat at the General Assembly, and UN-led normalization talks have been plagued by contentious politics (mostly over the Taliban’s awful treatment of women). 27/
Second, the central bank of Syria may have trouble meeting AML/CFT requirements if the decider of new appointments at the institution is a listed terrorist with a $10m bounty on his head. Syria was already under scrutiny by the FATF. 26/ www.fatf-gafi.org/en/countries...
First, it's unclear whether central bank assets belonging to Syria might become an issue like Afghanistan's frozen reserves. The Taliban lost access to $9.5B in overseas accounts, crippling monetary policy. 25/
In the meantime, it’s possible that the interim government in Syria will face some of the other issues that troubled the Taliban in recent years. These are speculative, but worth mentioning. 24/
Complete removal of the UN sanctions on HTS or the Taliban would require a broader political understanding with the permanent members of the Security Council. Unilateral sanctions will need separate negotiations. 23/
Instead, there is a UNSC committee that supposedly reviews the sanctions. In practice, it takes few actions. Committee staff sometimes feel puzzled about why they are tasked with prolonging sanctions that no longer fit reality. 22/
main.un.org/securitycoun...
This highlights the political side of the problem. There is no world court of sanctions, where experts weigh the merits of a) coercing the Taliban, hoping to change their rules that crush the rights of women, or b) lifting sanctions to ease poverty.
www.lawfaremedia.org/article/why-...
21/
The Council asked for implementation of the Special Coordinator’s recommendations, but nobody took the initiative to review the Taliban sanctions. The economic pressure continues. Ironically, the worst effects fall upon Afghan girls and women. 20/ www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-a...
In 2023, the UN Special Coordinator reviewed all international engagement with Afghanistan and concluded, among other things, that sanctions against the Taliban should be reformed to “make the sanctions regime more relevant to current realities”. 19/
unama.unmissions.org/sites/defaul...
But even the relatively straightforward sanctions on the Taliban have proven tricky. The U.S. promised to work toward lifting sanctions on the Taliban as part of a deal with the insurgents in 2020, but implementation fell apart as the Afghan government collapsed. 18/ www.state.gov/wp-content/u...