Russian vs. Chinese analysis on the Iran war: Russian analysts think that US talk of negotiations is a smoke screen for future ground operations and Chinese analysts think that hints of ground operations are designed to pressure Iran into negotiations.
We @fpri.bsky.social published insights from @salisbot.bsky.social @michaelbpetersen.bsky.social and Frank Hoffman about the challenges ahead for the US Navy as it considers how to take control of the Strait of Hormuz
www.fpri.org/article/2026...
Initial reports indicate a small number of mines currently in the Strait of Hormuz, but it only takes the threat of mines to throttle shipping. U.S. mine clearing capabilities have badly atrophied, and mine clearing can’t be done in stride. Especially in the shadow of land-based ASCMs. 2/
In 1991, it took a multi-national mine clearing task force of 40+ ships (plus aircraft) four months to clear Iraqi mines *after the war ended* and they knew where the mines were because they had the charts. Today, unmanned systems help, but the process is still extremely slow and dangerous. 1/
The U.S. military has been preparing to operate in environments like this for years. They have countermeasures for these eventualities.
But dynamic over the horizon intelligence that can allow near real-time targeting is something Russia struggles with in Ukraine, let alone help with in the ME. Again, this is all challenging, but not game changing. 7/
Strategic cyber intelligence, which can allow Iran to understand things like logistics flows, possibly anticipate future force dispositions, and so forth. 6/
Electronic intelligence. Russian satellites can snoop on US communications or radar emissions that allow Iran to understand strategic force dispositions, presence and density of air defense radars, etc. 5/
Russia can also provide overhead battle damage assessments, something Iran may lack if the reports about U.S. counter-space activities are true. 4/
Russia may also provide locations on intelligence stations in the region, allowing Iran to put them under drone attack. Same for other fixed sites that may not show up on satellite. 3/
But it won’t shut down a base, and won’t provide real-time target data. Challenging, but manageable. 2/
What intelligence is Russia giving Iran? It’s possible to speculate. Much will be space based imagery of various kinds. This is good for knowing what bases are being used when, and where aircraft may be parked. It can allow Iran to temporarily slow or halt airfield ops, or harass base personnel. 1/
Russia passing intelligence to Iran is challenging, but not game changing. Their ability to produce over the horizon dynamic targeting is limited. They can help with fixed targets, but moving targets are another thing entirely. And there’s the challenge of passing perishable intelligence to Iran.
“Mowing the lawn?”
The Iranian Navy was never really a threat. But IRGCN FAC/FIACs and unmanned surface vessels are going to be a problem if/when Navy ships head back into the Gulf. Hopefully, the IRGCN has taken the same beating as the actual Iranian Navy.
Lots of good stuff here. And where I explain why the submarine CO who sank Dena could not have done otherwise. It’s worth knowing facts, context, and feasibility in that conversation.
Folks, you know less than you think about how submarine warfare works. Take a knee on this one.
It is remarkable how little industry knows about the Navy and vice versa.
In an odd confluence of social media arguments over professional military education and the Iran War, my old colleagues at the Naval War College have years of research showing how difficult it is to defeat Shahed attacks, something they’ve warned of for quite a long time.
A very important and welcome piece. Drones are dangerous. Their use is necessary. But maneuver, mission command, flexibility, and air power can mitigate impacts like those we see in Ukraine.
Lots of people going a few rounds on the other site over the war game sponsored by Die Welt. Won’t rehash the criticisms, but it’s always useful to remember that it’s just one single-pass war game. Its results aren’t dispositive and only reflect one possible outcome. That’s getting forgotten.
I’m thrilled join the Foreign Policy Research Institute’s (@fpri.bsky.social) Eurasia Program as a senior non-resident fellow, where I will be writing about Russian and European military and maritime power. Super stoked to rejoin my bud @emilyholland.bsky.social for critical work in a crucial time.
There’s a historical footnote: Engineers were among the earliest supporters of National Socialism in Germany because the party linked blood and soil renewal to technological modernism - an illiberal, anti-modern solution adopted by a profession founded on modernist, rational principles.
If the Russian Navy is increasing presence in the Baltic, this is a good thing in the long run. Burning readiness in response to NATO naval activity is a net loss. Increased operational tempo is more “expensive” for Russia than it is for NATO navies.
This is precisely what the Russians have been concerned about for years, and why they put so much intellectual emphasis on long-range precision strike.
Not a perfect piece, but I think you’re missing a big point. I’ve watched Navy leadership first-hand nearly kill itself trying to suppress national and COCOM appetite and then fail because the cost of not doing fulfilling demand was considered worse. This lack of strategic discipline is a key point.
I was very happy to talk about this with the Washington Post. There's quite a bit of hype about the Poseidon, but I'm not buying it. Gift article:
wapo.st/3LiPswj
This is a reminder that a single Russian SSBN packs way more firepower than a Poseidon whatever-it-is.
We look at current Russian writing on combined arms ops, naval surface warfare, air ops, & long-range strikes. Despite the massive technological/tactical churn, Russian operational and strategic thinking remains wedded to pre-war ideas, and Russia plans for war the same way it did before UKR. 2/2