Die Wählerwanderung aus RP wird gerade wieder verwendet um zu argumentieren, die SPD verliere stark an die AfD. Vielleicht nachvollziehbar. Großer Balken da denkt man große Verluste. Ist aber schlicht nicht so. Ich versuche die Schwierigkeit mit Wählerwanderungen mal zu erklären. 1/
Share widely with your students in Switzerland 🇨🇭thinking about a PhD @eui-eu.bsky.social
𝗢𝗻𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗲 𝗘𝗨𝗜 𝗣𝗵𝗗 𝗣𝗿𝗲𝗽 𝗧𝗮𝗹𝗸 🇨🇭
21 Nov 2025 | 2:30pm CET
@alissasiara.bsky.social introduces the program & life at EUI, I share my experience, and we answer your questions.
👉 Register: www.eui.eu/events?id=58...
@dpzollinger.bsky.social and I are thrilled "Cleavage Politics in Western Democracies" is out as an SI at @wepsocial.bsky.social!
Its papers explore the foundations of the cleavage pitting new left against radical right parties, and how it compares to the classic cleavages of Lipset & Rokkan:
🧵⬇️
Congratulations!
Looking back to some excellent panels and fruitful discussions with colleagues and friends at #ecprgc25 in vibrant Thessaloniki!
📄 🚨 New Research on Polarization, Fragmentation, and Democracy in @democratization.bsky.social
Nils-Christian Bormann and I explore the impact of ideological polarization and fragmentation on the democratic systems of interwar Europe: lnkd.in/erjJr9qF
#polarization #democracy #data #history (1/4)
How do parties shape which issues are perceived as part of GAL-TAN?
In my paper presented at the ECPR General Conference in Thessaloniki, I delve into this question, focusing on climate change and LGBTQ rights.
Thank you @ecprpovb.bsky.social for a great section!
1/3
Thank you for organizing!
Join us for the presentation “Perceived Group Representation as an Indicator of Cleavage Formation”, co-authored with @siljahausermann.bsky.social and @dpzollinger.bsky.social in the fantastic POVB @ecprpovb.bsky.social panel “New Dimensions of Political Cleavages”, #ecprgc25, Wednesday 8.30-10.15!
Even in times of sociocultural conflict, a progressive left electorate is more averse to sociocultural *and* socioeconomic inequalities than (far) right voters.
New paper with @siljahausermann.bsky.social Palmtag @tabouchadi.bsky.social @stefwalter.bsky.social Berkinshaw
tinyurl.com/d42wyb79
1/n
This study is part of the excellent special issue on ‘Updating Cleavage Theory for the 21st century” that @davidattewell6.bsky.social and @dpzollinger.bsky.social
have edited with @wepsocial.bsky.social
🙏
7/7
However: Voters in the right field with less particularistic group identities continue to opt for the mainstream right, suggesting that accommodating the far right would likely entail additional losses for mainstream right parties.
6/7
And among those voters who hold BOTH far and mainstream right parties in their consideration set, how salient economic-distributive issues are to them (relative to socio-cultural questions) explains actual choice only among the elderly.
IOW: the segmentation of the right field is eroding.
5/7
More surprisingly – and reason to worry for these parties – the mainstream right has lost its dominant position even among those younger voters…
• for whom economic-distributive issues are most salient and…
• who hold higher social status identities.
4/7
Unsurprisingly,
• the more salient cultural issues are to voters and…
• the more particularistic their identities…
the more likely they are to consider voting for far right parties. This pattern is similar across age groups, but weakest for the elderly.
3/7
What explains whether right-wing voters consider voting for
• only the mainstream right
• only the far right
• or both?
Using original survey data, we study how saliency, attitudes and identities relate to consideration sets and vote choice.
Important finding: the findings vary by age groups.
2/7
How much competition within the right field?
❗Segmentation is eroding, especially among young voters❗
New article out by @siljahausermann.bsky.social @dpzollinger.bsky.social
@mrsteenbergen.bsky.social and myself
@ipz.bsky.social @wepsocial.bsky.social
tinyurl.com/ycxfx2aj
A short 🧵
1/7
Can government policies moderate political backlash to structural change?
Yes, the effect operates through material benefits and social recognition.
🚨New WP by @retobuergisser.bsky.social, @siljahausermann.bsky.social, @thmskrr.bsky.social and @susanadptavares.bsky.social 🚨
shorturl.at/zFbZE
New publication in @wepsocial.bsky.social with @retobuergisser.bsky.social, @siljahausermann.bsky.social, and Michael Pinggera. We map the welfare preferences of voters at the poles of the second, GALTAN dimension of political conflict. 🧵
Not sure if the world is paying attention—Switzerland is small (though economically powerful). But while other Western leaders sharply criticized VP JD Vance’s speech at the #MSC / in Munich, the current Swiss president largely approved it, interpreting it as „a plea for direct democracy“ polisky
An excellent analysis by Steven Levitsky & Lucan Way on the prospects for democracy in the US under Trump II, with a lot of comparative insight. A sobering view, yet underlining that polarization may not only be a danger, but paradoxically also a safeguard for liberal democray.
🚨 Job Alert! 🚨
I’m looking for a postdoc to join my Emmy Noether project on the New Climate Divide! 🌍
🔍 It is a 3-year position with a likely extension for another 3 years & no teaching obligations
📄 Check out the job call: uni-heidelberg.de/md/politik/p...
Thanks for sharing! 🤝
This is also an amazing tool for tracking the social identities parties (try to) tap into! Typical voters are not identified by political profiles but via brands, bands, lifestyles,... Ping
@dpzollinger.bsky.social @simonbornschier.bsky.social @siljahausermann.bsky.social @magneflemmen.bsky.social
We @dpzollinger.bsky.social @mrsteenbergen.bsky.social @siljahausermann.bsky.social @lhaffert.bsky.social @simonbornschier.bsky.social are happy to see this come out.
A warm thank you to all those who provided feedback!
The book is #OpenAccess at cup.org/3ZLtQ0o
8/8
Party systems have undoubtedly become more volatile and fragmented. Seeing the underlying stability in political behavior and the similarities across countries it produces requires focusing on voter alignments to ideological blocks, rather than individual parties.
7/8
But when parties talk about issues related to the universalism-particularism cleavage (for example, gender equality, LGBTQI+ rights, immigration, or the EU), they speak to group identities that are widely shared in certain social structural groups.
6/8
We started out with a puzzle: Political sociology shows that party preferences remain firmly anchored in social class, urban-rural residency, and, above all, education. Yet parties rarely appeal to these groups directly nowadays, and political behavior appears rather individualistic.
5/8
Is politics driven overwhelmingly by short-term strategies, populism, and issues like immigration? Or is there an underlying stability in terms of a structurally rooted conflict (aka a cleavage) between universalism and particularism? We believe our evidence supports the latter view.
4/8
Yet, these identities do have structural roots, just like class identities did in the past.
3/8
Today, feeling close to cosmopolitans or feminists separates voters of the New Left from those of the Far Right who identify with people who are down to earth and hard working. Our evidence is based on original surveys fielded in four West European countries.
2/8