No connection to my own academic interests but reposting due to bigging up animals.

It is my birthday today. So I am taking a day off from the (alas non-academic) day job to do my favourite thing: go to the library and read philosophy of science articles on scientific models!

Has anyone ever written about adopting an identity as requiring some type of epistemic commitment, that most people will not adopt an identity unless they genuinely believe there is a significant level of fit between themselves and the identity. Any philosophy, psychology, sociology etc. on this?

Given the apocalyptic language in the news and the highly remote but non-negligible possibility that the end of the world is nigh, I would just like to reiterate my support of The Enlightenment. Largely failed in its aims but I cannot think of a better alternative. Science, truth, reason, etc.

Also @eikofried.bsky.social
This gives support formative.jmir.org/2023/1/e39206
This claims to give support but some figures look questionable to me
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
This suggests people are kind of close when selfdx with depression
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...

Put another way, my concern about self-diagnosis advocates is that they are aiming to produced improved DSM diagnoses, but they are effectively doing something fundamentally different to the DSM. Maybe better, maybe worse, but we need a clearer picture of what that different thing is intended to be.

upon these somehow reflecting reality but because the DSM is one way of modelling. Self-diagnosis advocates, HiTOP, psychodynamic, might model in a different way, and that is great as long as every one is clear about how they are idealising and abstracting and what they are ultimately producing.

Anyway, I never really answered your question. I think false positives and false negatives still make sense in an idealised and abstract sense, which then relates to standardisation. The DSM places various boundaries in various places and that sets, false positives and false negatives, not based

Strangely enough, the empirical evidence suggests that MDD (or possibly just 'depression, I forget exactly what the studies cover) is actually a diagnosis which has higher levels of accuracy when self-diagnosing compared to other conditions commonly self-diagnosed like autism, ADHD and DID.

what compromises their new diagnoses are based upon. The compromises of the DSM result in at least some standardisation. Self-diagnosis advocates should either show that they are getting similar levels of standardisation or admit they are compromising standardisation for some other goal. 4/4

criteria for various conditions providing explicit compromises are being made. The DSM is the product of a series of massive compromises (as is HiTOP, psychodynamic AFAIK), and to be a genuine alternative, I think that alternative diagnoses produced by diagnostic communities also need state 3/4

reliability). Having read every empirical study I can find on self-diagnosis, it looks like there is much less standardisation, especially given that some self-diagnosing individuals purposefully alter DSM criteria. I am 100% up for diagnostic communities coming up with alternative diagnostic 2/4

I'd give the DSM 3 out of 5. Could certainly be better but could also be worse. So self-diagnosis as an alternative only has to meet 3 out of 5, which is a low bar, but if there is one advantage to the DSM is that it has a level of standardisation (granted, I know there is debates over 1/4

If this is not obvious, I don't know what the answer is but strongly suspect things are more complicated than one side being right and the other wrong, and I don't think polarisation helps.

This has obvious implications for self-diagnosis. Self-diagnosing could be accurate for some people, and immensely helpful for them, meanwhile it could inaccurate for other people and harmful for both them and the wider community.

There is a massively polarised debate in relation to over/under-diagnosis in psychiatry. Over/under-diagnosis are both harmful. Also, both could occur simultaneously: loads of people might get diagnoses they should not, whilst simultaneously loads of other people might not get diagnoses who should.

The experimental psychology behind coordination - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences - In the philosophy of science, the problem of coordination concerns the difficulty of linking abstract theoretical concepts with their empirical...

Not read it yet but looks super interesting: considering Reichenbach's principle of coordination and his interest in experimental psychology in light of modern notions of construct validity in psychology.

Giving the keynote on Defending Psychiatric Diagnoses at the Swedish Congress of Psychiatry. You know the drill by now, psychiatric diagnoses as not reflecting real people but that is alight because they are idealised and abstract models, and modelling is great in science. #psychiatry #philsci

It may turn into a paper in a year or two's time.

At the Swedish Congress of Psychiatry. I am surrounded by hundreds of psychiatrists. Do they know there is a philosopher in their midst? What might they think of such a strange creature?

We could create new diagnoses. We could add subtypes to autism (not ones based around level of functioning, they were not very good). We could go person centered. We could diagnose dimensionally rather than categorically. We could use HiTOP or psychodynamic diagnoses instead of the DSM.

This is your friendly reminder that when it comes to debates about autism being over or under diagnosed, there are more options than 1) expand autism or 2) leave people who would likely benefit from a diagnosis without a diagnosis. #autism

Earlier today was the annual Lancaster philosophy of psychiatry work in progress day. I spoke on Self-diagnosis, modelling and the Duhem-Quine thesis.

In relation to self-diagnosis, if someone is autistic/ADHD/DID/etc, and if they consider that condition, I strongly suspect they can accurately self-diagnose. The challenge of self-diagnosis is whether people without the condition can work out that they do not have the condition. #autism #ADHD #DID

“The struggle is real” - Karl Jaspers, 1913 #psychiatry

Thanks. I shall try and keep things short.

For academic job applications, I typically write some 5,000 word plus epic. This one only wants a covering letter. Are there any advantages to keeping things to say 1,500 words, whilst still hitting all the criteria?

New article by me, HiTOP, Objectivity and Logical Positivism. I use Carnap's notion of a framework to consider how categorical and dimensional approaches relate to objectivity within HiTOP. (This is a commentary on Aftab et al's HiTOP article) #philsci #hps #philpsy #psychiatry

Academic CVs for philosophy and medical humanities jobs, should I have a 'Under Review' section and should I have a 'In Preparation' section?

Not read it myself but this look very relevant for philosophy of psychiatry: