Otherwise you just get attrition…which while useful…should probably be tied to something

and b) you can’t just Leroy Jenkins targeting @bradduplessis.bsky.social
or forget about main efforts or other basic things. The BCT can fight much harder w/o the division, which is good for the SE1 BCT and by extension everyone, but the ME will still need assistance

4. I think what this supports a) if the AF isn’t around - I.e the first week or whatever when it’s trying to get air superiority and we’re all on the defense and outnumbered - BCTs can still fight hard and possibly preserve higher level army assets to help w/other targets or SEAD/DEAD

The problems are 1) I think the single mode of thinking of only we have this and battle is now on easy mode is a bit too common as BCTs get these capabilities and 2) while BH took losses far above the norm (good), curiously so too did the BCT (not good)

That led some in the regiment to believe (wrongly) this was a one way construct and only BCTs had to adapt. Obviously the minute a BCT got similar capability BH was on the back foot.

3. We viewed this paper as the second of three; the first talking about BH changes; the second talking about the results, and the third comparing with the new TIC BCTs. For a couple years BH has had the advantage in these new systems and that advantage was/is a key part of our success.

2. BH took extremely heavy losses above the norm and key parts of our fighting style were disrupted or harmed - by capabilities trialed at being BDE controlled/executed. That’s good - and it definitely helped the BCT. More lethal BCTs probably not a bad idea

1. Yeah AirPower is the ten million dollar question. It’s replicated but very little and for a good practical reason: if you obliterate half the BTG through AirPower alone…the BDE doesn’t get that good of a fight.

That’s absolutely a fair question/point and something I thought about while writing this and has been at the back of my mind while working on our next paper: a red side examination of TiC based off of what we’ve seen at the NTC.

A couple thoughts though

The Dead Zone and the Empty Battlefield - Modern War Institute In a letter to his mother, British World War I poet Wilfred Owen described no man’s land, the piece of territory between belligerent trench lines, as “like the face of the moon, chaotic, crater-ridden...

During two recent brigade rotations at the National Training Center, both the OPFOR and the Rotational Unit suffered the highest total losses in two and a half years. Here’s why

mwi.westpoint.edu/the-dead-zon...

So what happens when you do replicate that near peer threat?

mwi.westpoint.edu/the-dead-zon...

Think the Dead/Gray/Kill Zone is solely an outcome of Ukraine - think again. If it can happen in the Mojave it can happen anywhere

mwi.westpoint.edu/the-dead-zon...

There’s a C2 specific AMPV variant

This aged…interestingly

4) Skip over what we are doing in the realm of CUAS/air defense
5) Avoid the U.S.’s economic advantage and preferred moderately priced toy goes brr way of war
5) Forget that all this destruction…has still locked the front and not enabled much of anything

I like how these articles commonly

1) Avoid analyzing overarching political factors that perhaps influence military strategy and lessons learning
2) How rare any non-wartime military innovates faster than a wartime military
3) Want more money for more things with no mechanism to get it

1/2

Nah marines got rid of their AT-TEs (Abrams)

Read Theory

Armies going into WWI weren’t ignorant of the military developments appearing from the Boer War, the Russo-Japanese War, or the Balkan Wars - rather they were struggling with often contradictory observations that still pointed to the same unsolvable reality. Big war = big casualties

Listen to theory

TNSR had a great podcast that would in someways support this

Trade in wartime gets read

Bingo

bsky.app/profile/josh...

Damn it should be - weird not read

Listen to theory

TNSR had a great podcast that would in someways support this

Trade in wartime gets read

Although intercept rate is down I think the point still stands

The American way of war has always leveraged our outsize GDP to spend more than other nations so…while we may be spending more raw dollars to knock down missiles/drones who can handle it via a vis national budget more - Iran or U.S.?

@sashotodorov.bsky.social what was it? Homo-nonsapiens

#innovation

This will also be a challenge for the entire Army to understand - but it will not be helped by having a doctrine that is so specific it doesn’t apply to one

Fini

different “armies” due to different threats as they weight various combined arms differently, develop different Corps doctrines, integrate with the joint force differently. 6/7

The tactics for the BDEs of attack/defend won’t - hence why MDO isn’t focused on BDE level and below. Feature not a bug.

Operational approach will differ - but under the broad guidance of the Army service level doctrine of MDO

Arguably I/III Corps are gonna to increasingly become very 5/6

than ALB as lower commands in different theaters against different threats can under its broad aegis choose their own operational strategies. Like I Corps (INDOPACOM aligned) and III Corps (EUCOM aligned) are going to have different operational approaches 4/6

the Army’s big actions during ALB - Grenada, DS 91, Panama didn’t really feature an outnumbered American force defending against an onrushing Soviet horde. The specific threat and place that served as the generating impetus for ALB

Thus MDO IMO provides a more flexible and appropriate doctrine 3/6

The problem I have always had with that thought - is that the Army a) chose to focus on ALB at the cost of preparation for other operations say…COIN? Something many of these individuals are now chastising the Army for similarly pivoting away from and b) 2/6