In the WSJ, @petereharrell.bsky.social lays out the case for why a trade report due out in April constitutes an opportunity for course correction on the trade war.
www.wsj.com/opinion/this...
Thrilled to host former Trump Term 1 Deputy U.S. Trade Rep. C.J. Mahoney on Security Economics to talk trade policy (as well as how to regulate AI). Whether you agree or disagree with Trump's policies, C.J. helps break them down. Full episode on YouTube, Spotify, etc. youtu.be/Pt97ZQ-h9JA?...
We keep reading that “the market” is a check on Trump economic policy. Interested to see if it is a check on Elon as well.
U.S. tariffs have failed to contain China’s global economic ambitions, writes @petereharrell.bsky.social. The Trump administration will need to pivot—and start working with foreign countries to reduce their trade with Beijing.
Last I checked, Brad Setser still hadn't made over here from the other platform. But I want to share the discussion I had with him yesterday (Sunday) about Trump's opening salvo in the Great American Trade War:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=R6WN...
Retaliation beyond tariffs: Canada is beginning to target Elon's companies directly, not just tariffing imports from the U.S. Will be watching to see if this spreads to financial services, oil & gas, tech, and other companies in Trump's orbit.
www.ft.com
Trump does care about equities, but I am unconvinced that a 1.5% fall in stocks--even if this materializes after markets open would materially make Trump reconsider the Great American Trade War.
Trump can rely on plenty of laws to implement his tariff ambitions. (He could even ask Congress for new powers if he can sell his vision). But IEEPA--the 1977 law frequently used for sanctions--should not be one of those laws.
My take in @lawfare.bsky.social: www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-...
"Courts should find that allowing Trump to waive his magic sharpie to sign an IEEPA Executive Order imposing tariffs would upset the balance Congress has long sought to strike when it delegates its tariff authority to the president," writes @petereharrell.bsky.social.
In a new Carnegie paper, I map the web of rules the US has created to regulate Chinese apps, software, and connected devices. It's not just TikTok: this will be a key pillar of US-China relations, alongside tariffs & export controls. Plus policy recs!
carnegieendowment.org/research/202...
Top questions for Lutnick confirmation today:
1. Details on tariff plans, including legal authorities?
2. Will he continue CHIPS?
3. Export control lessons from DeepSeek?
4. What Chinese ICTS devices/software should the Department's ICTS office focus on as potential security risks?
A 20% universal tariff and 25% tariffs on Mexico and Colombia aren't going to make coffee prices come back down....
Good question. Section 122 was not cited in Trump's Jan. 20 trade EO. My theory is that 150 day tariffs don't serve Trump's main objectives: Foreigners won't make concessions because they will just wait out 150 days. And 150 days isn't long-enough to drive on-shoring. Trump needs long-term tariffs.
This is good news. After years of abuse, it is past time to reign in the US government’s snooping on American citizens’ messages without a warrant.
Will be interesting to see next week if Trump’s Trade EO, which starts a deliberative process on tariffs that will play out over months and involve lots of analysis, or if Trump’s repeated remarks of “25% tariffs starting Feb. 1!!!” prevail. Definitely the “let’s see what happens” trade Presidency.
Tomorrow at 10:30 am, the CSIS Economic Security and Technology Department welcomes Reta Jo Lewis, Chair of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, to discuss how the newly introduced Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative can bolster U.S. economic security.
Register: www.csis.org/events/secur...
Reps. Moolenaar and Krishnamoorthi joint statement and letter out in support of the planned AI chips partner deployment rule is an interesting counterpoint to some of the (at times colorful) opposition out from industry over the past several weeks.
Today's Department of Commerce action starting the process to ban Chinese-made drones illustrates a point I've been making for the last year: bans on devices and software due to perceived security risks will be as important an element of U.S.-China decoupling as are tariffs and export controls.
Today’s exhibit of the rest of the world getting tired of Chinese overcapacity: Mexico’s 35% textile tariffs. www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
On Lawfare Daily, @sranderson.bsky.social spoke to Ashley Deeks and @keichensehr.bsky.social about their law review article “Frictionless Government and Foreign Relations,” the dangers that can arise when there is broad consensus on policies and strategies policymakers can embrace for managing them.
I’ve been pretty pessimistic about a Trump Presidency, but even I never predicted that he would shut down the federal government in the -1st month of his term.
AirTags for high-end semiconductors! Multi-GPU units cots a few hundred grand each. There has to be a way to actually track that stuff....
CISA officially recommending use of encrypted messaging apps "such as Signal." Amazing how massive Chinese hacking has gotten the USG to suggest Americans take communications security seriously (compared to the prior position of opposing encryption...) www.cisa.gov/sites/defaul...
The incoming Trump team has an opportunity to undertake the most important re-write of the global trading order in more than 30 years--or to stumble into costly tariff wars. My advice, as a former official, to the new team, in
@foreignaffairs.com. www.foreignaffairs.com/united-state...
IEEPA, a statute originally passed in 1977 to deal with time limited emergencies, is now used for everything from sanctions to cloud services KYC to Chinese investment restrictions. I agree with many of the specific uses, but it is past time for Congress to examine the statute and look at reforms.
Interesting that Commerce is considering banning Chinese WiFi routers, citing security risks and using the same “ICTS” authority used for Chinese connected cars. My take: “connected device restrictions” will become a 3rd pillar of US-China economic statecraft, alongside tariffs & export controls.
Pleased to co-author with CJ Mahoney a new Carnegie Endowment piece on how the Trump Administration can use the 2026 USMCA renegotiation to strengthen U.S. industry, build supply chain resilience, and promote secure supplies for clean energy materials: carnegieendowment.org/research/202...
There is sort of a pyramid of jobs in Washington, and the higher you get, the fewer the jobs. And also, people come to see that they can also be influential from the outside.
