It's actually about $6. Each USD is 152,500 tomans as of today.

One million toman, the unofficial currency, is equivalent to 10 million Iranian rials per night. Last year's minimum wage in Iran was about 104 million rials per month, meaning you could earn that amount by spending just 10 nights on the streets.

By the way, one million toman is less than 6 euros.

The picture is AI, and I very much doubt the event.

Graph from NetBlocks showing network connectivity in Iran from 24 February 2026 to 21 April 2026. The y-axis represents normalized connectivity, ranging from 0% to 100%, and the x-axis represents the dates. The green line representing Iran's connectivity is high through the initial time period, with a sharp drop on the morning of 28 February. The continued drop in connectivity aligns with a nation-scale internet blackout imposed by authorities after joint military strikes by the US and Israel. A brief restoration was observed on 18 March. The minimum and current connectivity levels are indicated as 1% and 1%, respectively. The chart has a dark background with a red horizontal arrow labeled 'SHUTDOWN' indicating the disruption period, and the NetBlocks logo in the lower left corner with the Mapping Internet Freedom slogan.

📵 The #Iran internet blackout is now in its 53rd day after 1248 hours of disconnection from global networks. As authorities work to develop tiered access for select users and businesses, the human impacts and economic harms of this digital censorship measure continue to spiral.

I believe the feeling is shared by many IRGC officials.

It could go even further. For example, both Araghchi and Ghalibaf are former IRGC members. However, Araghchi has almost no influence within the IRGC, whereas Ghalibaf has a lot. On the other hand, Vahidi, as the commander of the IRGC, has much more influence over the negotiations than Araghchi does.

The IRGC will never publicly get involved in the negotiations. But when Araghchi comes and declares the Strait is open, it means he has someone in the IRGC who allows him to make that claim. That someone has apparently been outplayed by the other, more hardline elements.

I'd say that the IRGC vs IRGC is a more important topic these days than that. Understanding the depth of its heterogeneity and which parts of it want which outcome.

The regular army (Artesh) is really not as important in this war as the IRGC; the same goes for non-IRGC government officials.

Graph from NetBlocks showing network connectivity in Iran from 24 February 2026 to 20 April 2026. The y-axis represents normalized connectivity, ranging from 0% to 100%, and the x-axis represents the dates. The green line representing Iran's connectivity is high through the initial time period, with a sharp drop on the morning of 28 February. The continued drop in connectivity aligns with a nation-scale internet blackout imposed by authorities after joint military strikes by the US and Israel. A brief restoration was observed on 18 March. The minimum and current connectivity levels are indicated as 1% and 1%, respectively. The chart has a dark background with a red horizontal arrow labeled 'SHUTDOWN' indicating the disruption period, and the NetBlocks logo in the lower left corner with the Mapping Internet Freedom slogan.

📉 #Iran's internet shutdown has entered its 52nd day after 1224 hours. Metrics show that the general public remain cut off from international networks, while authorities continue efforts to segregate users and provide selective access to favored groups.

Possibly not, but we might end up with a serious disagreement between the people who have all the guns.

If that actually occurs, predicting what happens next will be nearly impossible.

If the war were to restart because of recent events, the IRGC would almost certainly not have the full support of the Islamic Republic’s government, even among some of the hardliners.

Well, at least they want to respond. If and how they actually do is a whole different matter.

They apparently weren't.

They should already have been in Tehran by now if that was indeed where they were headed.

I'm 100% sure he also posted it. He must have deleted it. Other channels have too. I'll delete this as well.

Perhaps a better question is whether they will even respond. This could be seen as a test of resolve among themselves. The other side could also place the blame on the hardliners, arguing that this is the result of the hardliners' blocking the negotiations.

If true, given the current mood among the regime's hardliners, this will be seen as a major escalation. The question is how the IRGC will respond.

📸 Israeli Merkava tank in the ruins of Bint Jbeil (southern Lebanon).

The town is being rapidly destroyed by Israel.

They have shown, again and again, that if it comes to it, they're fully prepared to do whatever they can to drag the whole world down with them.

Tansim News, an IRGC-affiliated news outlet, has claimed that there will be no negotiations until the blockade is lifted. However, I’m pretty sure the Islamic Republic’s government, including Ghalibaf, wants to join the negotiations in Pakistan.

In the shadow of the recent agreements and internal conflicts, I would like to note that it has now been more than 40 days since Mojtaba Khamenei's appointment as the supreme leader, yet we still have neither a voice message nor a video of him.

Those threats came at the same time as Ghalibaf, in his public speech, asked the supporters to hold on to the streets. However, he also mentioned the limitations of the IR armed forces and admitted the strength of the US and even the Israeli army, something I've never seen in my lifetime.

One of the key ways of suppressing the people has been the nighttime gatherings of regime supporters ever since the war began. We now realise that they were recently being paid for it, based on their contributions. After the recent events, many of them have threatened to leave the streets.

The attacks from regime supporters on Araghchi, and in some circles on Ghalibaf, have apparently been larger than I thought.

The IRIB is also shocked that they haven't been kept up to date on the updates, so they can sell them to the regime's supporters. Whatever they agreed on, it's unsaleable.

Graph from NetBlocks showing network connectivity in Iran from 24 February 2026 to 19 April 2026. The y-axis represents normalized connectivity, ranging from 0% to 100%, and the x-axis represents the dates. The green line representing Iran's connectivity is high through the initial time period, with a sharp drop on the morning of 28 February. The continued drop in connectivity aligns with a nation-scale internet blackout imposed by authorities after joint military strikes by the US and Israel. A brief restoration was observed on 18 March. The minimum and current connectivity levels are indicated as 1% and 1%, respectively. The chart has a dark background with a red horizontal arrow labeled 'SHUTDOWN' indicating the disruption period, and the NetBlocks logo in the lower left corner with the Mapping Internet Freedom slogan.

⏱️ The internet blackout in #Iran has now surpassed the 1200 hour mark, continuing in its eighth week as of day 51.

As peace negotiations appear to flounder, one of the most important factors for Iranians, the restoration of international connectivity, is still overlooked.

I put it under the 2010s–present. There are still debates about whether the regime actually knew about it beforehand. In any case, events such as that wouldn't have happened without years of prior support from the Islamic Republic.

You can see that they don't even want you to follow the news from the Islamic Republic's officials, such as the Foreign Minister, who announced that the Strait is "completely open", but only and only the IRGC itself.

This is not merely a misunderstanding within the regime.

The opposition already hated Ghalibaf for many reasons; he was also not appreciated by the "reformists" of the regime, and, in a very short time, he had also made himself an enemy of the hardliners after the result of the negotiations.

If not by mistake, he must have had a very good reason for it.

In my opinion, there are two possible explanations for this recent fiasco over the Strait's reclosure. Either the hardline base of the IRGC is extremely unhappy with the results of the negotiations, or the other side is trying to put on a show to satisfy the regime's support base for now.