This is impacting navies who are expected to be able to assert a new form of sea control. One defined by its persistence, its geographic extent, and the fact that it needs to be exercised in peace as well as in war.
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In recent years there has been a quiet revolution in maritime strategy. States now view large swathes of the world’s oceans as having major economic value, and increasingly view them as having value in terms of sovereignty and identity.
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The French have gone one step further and are discussing the concept of sea bed control – although exactly how that could be practical given the limits of technology and resource is unclear.
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This means that govts are demanding that navies be able to persistently monitor and ultimately control huge swathes of ocean all of the time. The desire and expectation to be able to respond is coming up against the realities of the limits of navies both legally and in terms of capability.
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The sudden focus on critical maritime infrastructure is the third major shift in perceived value. Areas of sea hundreds or thousands of miles from the coast now have critical value for the security of the state. This infrastructure is also permanently there, unlike a ship.
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This extra-legal territorialisation has driven a reimagining of presence. Naval forces are being called upon to assert sovereignty over “blue land”, and do so persistently. We’ve seen this with coastguard and militia ops, but most notably through the development of permanent structures at sea.
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Extra-legal territorialisation has seen states reinterpreting certain economic and resource rights granted by UNCLOS into something far closer to formal sovereignty. This has been most notable in the SCS, but is much wider as seen by the consistent reframing of EEZs as “our waters”.
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Legal territorialisation has been driven by UNCLOS. 200nm EEZs have given nations rights across broad swathes of what was high seas, and with rights comes responsibilities. The growth in coastguards & dramatic expansion of MDA are results of this process.
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This has changed in three broad ways which I set out as:
1) legal territorialisation;
2) extra-legal territorialisation;
and 3) growth of critical maritime infrastructure. All three mean that states see value in more of the seas more of the time.
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Stansfield Turner set out the classic definition of sea control – noting that it was limited in area and time. This did not matter as you only needed to control the specific bit of water for the time you were using it.
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Traditional concepts of sea control were grounded on the foundational notions that the seas could not be owned and they had no intrinsic value. Its value came from being able to use it as a means of communication.
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My latest article is out. It argues that sea control has been reimagined in recent years, driven by a dramatic change in the value that states place upon the seas. This in turn is impacting navies across the globe.
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www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
It will be interesting to see how much longer the Aus govt can walk its tightrope over the Iran war as the economic implications really begin to bite and they need someone else to blame.
Tying everything back to the war makes sense in terms of domestic politics, but could cause tensions with US.
'd love to claim credit for this... but others have been pushing this line far more successfully than I have.
The main thing is that the message is getting through.
tandfonline.com/doi/full/10....
Got a number of thoughts about the NDS26 and Marles' speech today, but I was quite taken by this comment.
On one level it is a statement of the obvious - but to me it seems inconceivable that a politician would have said this 10 years ago. This alone is progress.
Why, when we are talking about the absolute fundamentals of Australian security, can we not use plain English? Language that says what we actually mean, and can be understood by the public.
Much of the NDS 26 so far is as expected, but it is notable the degree to which it avoids discussion of the US 🐘 in the room.
This is a particularly egregious example - working with the US to support global rules and norms is increasingly a contradiction in terms
The afternoon's reading - in between meetings...
So far, so much the same
www.defence.gov.au/about/strate...
In 2024-5 5,918 individual vessels called at Australian ports, the vast vast majority of which were foreign flagged. The idea that having 12 Australian flagged vessels will make any meaningful difference to this shipping task is absurd.
12 ships might be a useful supplement to enable requisition in the event of a crisis like a national disaster, or as a minor support to military sea lift.
They will have no meaningful impact on Australian dependence on foreign flagged vessels for trade. The numbers are far too small.
It is not only the delay in the strategic fleet that is the issue here. The entire concept has been misunderstood.
The Taskforce report successful managed to conflate the need for some vessels to requisition in the event of a crisis, with resilience of overseas trade.
www.afr.com/politics/fed...
I talk a little bit about the challenges in terms of 🇦🇺 Army’s littoral manoeuvre concept here.
2/
www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpre...
Indonesian overflight discussions with the US have huge implications for 🇦🇺.
Many of these flights would likely originate from 🇦🇺, and the same access dilemma is a fundamental issue with current ADF strategic approach.
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www.reuters.com/world/china/...
A couple of thoughts on the 🇺🇸 apparent declaration of blockade.
1) Subject to a couple of caveats it is legal.
The first slightly embarrassing one is that legal blockade is an act of war - and 🇺🇸 has refused to call the “operation” a “war”.
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Congrats to all.
Noteworthy that this is the first time ever that two admirals have been successive CDFs. Arguably an indication of the growing realisation of the maritime slant to 🇦🇺 defence and security.
It could be argued that this is about pressuring 🇨🇳 to force 🇮🇷 to the table, but I’m not sure.
Surely it will force up oil prices overall, and 🇺🇸 tolerance for that seems far lower than 🇨🇳.
The last point is speculation as it’s outside of my bailiwick.
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The last point is around time. This measure will take time to impact 🇮🇷.
It could be a bargaining chip in negotiations - I don’t know enough about them to really comment - but in terms of actual effect, it suggests that 🇺🇸 is preparing for a long haul.
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The second major point is that this again reinforces the sense that this entire conflict has been run with very little thought or planning.
If you wanted to pressure 🇮🇷 and were willing to take the flack, this should have been done from the start.
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The second is that the blockade must be “effective” and apply equally.
Outside of the Gulf that should be straightforward. There might be a query over “effectiveness” in terms of intra-Gulf traffic, but this would be legally contentious.
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