Absolutely! Probably would not happen without mass secularization :)

When Paul VI got rid of the papal tiara (three crowns), it was a very strong symbolic move. It represented political as well as religious power. Given this and the Vatican II, I would say 60s, but it sounds strangely late 😀.

Congrats!

📢 New publication! 📢

So happy to see this paper finally out @epsrjournal.bsky.social !

Looking at public perceptions of party positions in 29 elections across 20 European countries, I test whether populist radical parties are seen as more moderate when they are part of a government coalition.

👇🏼👇🏼👇🏼

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Most legislators do not make many personal attacks, but there are extreme outliers, with some attacking at more than 10 times the overall mean. Attacks are also 3 times more common on social media than in speeches, press releases, and newsletters.

An analysis of politicians’ public statements reveals that personal insults don’t increase donations or the probability of reelection—but ad hominem attacks do increase media attention, likely the end goal for an emerging subset of politicians. In PNAS Nexus: https://ow.ly/VSz150Ywsrj

Hundreds of thousands fill Prague's Letná Plain to protest Czech government An estimated 250,000 people gathered in Letná on Saturday as organizers warned of democratic backsliding and criticized the Babiš government.

Eventful weekend! In 🇨🇿, a pro-democracy grassroots movement showed striking strength. Around 250,000 people mobilized across diverse views and party allegiances (though mostly critical of the current government), united in their commitment to democracy. www.expats.cz/czech-news/a...

New short paper w @jkalla.bsky.social !

Candidates gain from moderation, but less than many theories expect.

Many conclude voters must not care about issues.

This is wrong. Small *average* effects mask large effects on specific issues & are consistent with widespread issue-based voting 🧵

Thank you. The workshop you organize was incredibly helpful for this kind of research! That makes 2 papers, only at my end, which are published because of it.

And yes, this comes from a few core ESS items. If I remember correctly (we checked early), they were worded and measured consistently. Of course, response rates have declined over time.

I can only speculate, but it seems to reflect how redistribution relates to other attitudes. Since the pandemic, it has become more disconnected from social beliefs. Inflation, the war in Ukraine, and broader affordability concerns may have further detached it from ideology. At least, that’s my take

Many thanks to: @filipkostelka.bsky.social, @indubioproreto.bsky.social, Hanspeter Kriesi, our reviewers, and countless others who advised us or encouraged us along the way.

Check out the paper here: osf.io/preprints/ps...

Our findings highlight the limits of applying conventional left–right logic to belief systems in post-communist countries—something unlikely to change through generational replacement. At the same time, we observe meaningful belief structures reflecting the distinct contexts of the three countries.

Using original surveys from 🇨🇿 🇭🇺 🇱🇹 (N ≈ 4,000), we significantly expand the set of attitudinal items to include many issues salient in the region (e.g., Russia). We model generational belief systems as networks. Although differences exist, alignment with conventional patterns is again very modest.

Focusing on specific issues, we find that the youngest cohort was initially much more aligned on issue pairs involving EU integration and redistribution. However, this changed over time as they converged with other cohorts.

We use ESS data from 9 countries to investigate alignment across four core attitudes (EU, redistribution, immigration, and LGBT minority attitudes). Although modest generational differences in alignment existed, they were not consistently present across countries and decayed over time.

Post-communist CEE countries underwent turbulent change of de facto regimes while converging with Western Europe—from authoritarian rule, through the transformations of the 1990s, to EU accession. This shaped attitudes, but did it produce conventional left–right belief systems in younger cohorts?

We share a new article, forthcoming in Public Opinion Quarterly, titled: Not Your Mama’s Ideology (But Close) Modest Generational Differences in Ideological Alignment in Post-Communist Europe. The picture shows its title page on OSF.

🎉Excited to share our forthcoming paper in POQ! And don’t worry—it’s not all about our mums 😉. With @lenkahrbkova.bsky.social and @matejjung.bsky.social, we ask: did younger generations in post-communist Europe develop more conventional left–right belief systems?
Tl;dr: not really. (🧵)

2 two-year postdocs on children’s political socialization at Aarhus University - Vacancy at Aarhus University Vacancy at Department of Political Science, Aarhus University

🔥 POSTDOC POSITIONS ON CHILDREN'S POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 🔥

Wanna understand young people's beliefs about political leadership, politics, and power? Then this is your chance! I'm looking for two 2-year postdocs to join my ERC-funded research project @au.dk
international.au.dk/about/profil...

Conditionally accepted at the APSR (w/ @scottclifford.bsky.social & @patrickpliu.bsky.social):

Why does political information so often change beliefs but NOT attitudes? We highlight the role of belief relevance, or the extent to which beliefs bear on attitudes.

EEPGW Call for Papers Spring/Summer 2026 Hi all, The East European Politics Grad Workshop welcomes submissions for Spring/Summer 2026 paper presentations. The EEPGW online workshop will be held one Friday a month between 11:00-12:00 AM ES...

🚨 A reminder! 🚨

The call for our Spring/Summer 2026 series is due THIS Friday, March 6 @ 11:59PST.

Presenters only need an abstract to submit:
docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1F...

Great event. I highly recommend applying.

🧵on my new paper "Synthetic personas distort the structure of human belief systems" w Roberto Cerina I'm v excited about...

🚨 Do synthetic samples look like human samples?

We compare 28 LLMs to the 2024 General Social Survey (GSS) to find out + develop host of diagnostics...

Nick Vivyan, Chris Hanretty (@chanret.bsky.social) and I have a new book out: “Idiosyncratic Issue Opinion and Political Choice”. The core of the book is making the argument that citizens’ views about political issues neither reduce to an ideological orientation nor to a lack of substance. (1/10)

How Petr Pavel and 100,000 protesters held illiberalism at bay Czech President Petr Pavel’s unflinching position combined with organised civic mobilisation have shown how liberal democracy can prevail against illiberalism.

Czech President Petr Pavel and a hundred thousand protesters have shown how liberal democracy can prevail against illiberalism.

✍ @jrovny.bsky.social @sciencespo-cee.bsky.social blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2...

Disentangling the Sophistication-Emotion Link: Political Interest and Confidence-in-Knowledge, but not Knowledge, Drive Emotional Responses - Political Behavior Why do some people feel stronger emotions about politics than others? Past work suggests that political sophistication, consisting of knowledge and interest, is related to feeling strong emotions abou...

🎉 New paper out in Political Behavior (with @gijsschumacher.bsky.social & @mrooduijn.bsky.social)

Why do some people feel stronger emotions about politics than others?
💡Not political knowledge, but interest and confidence-in-knowledge drive emotional engagement.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
🧵

Do ordinary Republicans and Democrats really avoid each other in everyday life? In a new working paper with Delia Baldassarri, we present descriptive and experimental evidence to challenge the view that partisanship drives the formation of social relationships.

osf.io/preprints/so...

1/15

My colleague Kevin Munger asked me and a bunch of editors to sit and think through AI and peer review. Our take:

osf.io/9sxnc/files/...

We envision an increased (!) involvement of humans in the evaluation of social science.

📰While I read all sorts of bizarre depictions of the Davos speech in American media, I’ve got to love the simplicity of Czech public radio. The headline reads: Ungrateful Canada, Denmark, and Europe on the wrong path. In Davos, Trump scolded the world, praising only himself.

Abstract It is widely accepted in political science – and remarkably established in public discourse – that status anxieties fuel a far right backlash against progressive politics. This narrative suggests that right-wing conservatives perceive the status of women, racial, or sexual minorities as threatening. Using open-ended survey questions fielded in Germany, we show that women and minorities indeed figure in people’s perceptions of status hierarchies, but in very specific ways: First, overall, people still perceive status as largely socioeconomically determined. Second, sociocultural groups figure in perceptions of who is gaining/losing status, less so in perceptions of the top/bottom of society. Third, more than conservative voters, it is social progressives who mention women and minorities as “winners”. While on race/ethnicity, we find evidence for a backlash, on gender and sexuality we find more evidence for a progressive momentum. This matters for progressive politics today and for how we empirically study status concerns.

New article out in @cpsjournal.bsky.social with Tabea Palmtag and @dpzollinger.bsky.social 📝
We use open-ended survey questions (in Germany) to assess how and among whom social status shifts are perceived. This tests cultural backlash narratives in voters' perceptions.

🔗 doi.org/10.1177/0010...