Clarifying the conceptual dimensions of representation in neuroscience Nature Reviews Neuroscience - Appeals to representation are widespread, despite neuroscientists’ uncertainty about what kind of findings count as evidence for such claims. In this...

www.nature.com/articles/s41...

Making methane visible Nature Climate Change - Optimized infrared hyperspectral imaging can now detect methane gradients on a sub-m2 scale. This can facilitate remote assessment of methane sources and sinks to improve...

Free link rdcu.be/e9b6

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The elusive nature of consciousness A writer grapples with neuroscience’s hardest problem

My review of Michal Pollan's book on consciousness: www.science.org/eprint/FTJG7...

Congratulations!!!

The worst thing was lying about patients’ symptoms

Just do science

I agree that the line of thought I was sketching is hard to test. But I call your attention to the last sentence of the article: "A breakthrough will be needed for progress, and failing to recognize that a breakthrough is needed may not be conducive to nding it."

There are a couple of paragraphs that are supposed to be a reply to this point

I’d be glad to do that

Understanding whether consciousness depends on computational roles, biological realizers, or both, is crucial for assessing the prospects of consciousness in AI and less complex animals. end/

subcomputational biological realizers favors consciousness in simpler animals. Current theories of consciousness are 'meat-neutral', but if specific physical substrates are necessary, AI may never achieve consciousness. 3/

processes, are necessary for consciousness. By contrasting computational roles with their subcomputational biological realizers, I show that there is a systematic tension in our criteria for consciousness: prioritizing computational roles favors consciousness in AI, while prioritizing 2/

Computational functionalism claims that executing certain computations is sufcient for consciousness, regardless of the physical mechanisms implementing those computations. This view neglects a compelling alternative: that subcomputational biological mechanisms, which realize computational 1/

Can Only Meat Machines be Conscious? New paper in Trends in Cognitive Sciences, free download until November 26 with this URL: authors.elsevier.com/a/1luwh4sIRv...

Hmmm…my reply is somewhat similar drive.google.com/file/d/1cIUk...

See tiny red line of link to today's actual news

Hilarious!

I’m shocked my book is on this list. But, cool! Great company.

Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility Fetal and infant brains offer clues to when human experience begins

Consciousness before birth? Imaging studies explore the possibility | Science | AAAS www.science.org/content/arti...

Goodby global workspace and higher order theories

First order theories of consciousness win again

EEG Decoding of Conscious versus Unconscious Representations during Binocular Rivalry Abstract. Theories of visual awareness often fall into two general categories, those assuming that awareness arises rapidly within visual cortex and those assuming that awareness arises more slowly as...

direct.mit.edu/jocn/article...

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Yes and the opposite makes much more sense. To get a conscious state you need a carefully orchestrated group of events but if any one of them goes wrong you fail to get consciousness. Many of those misfires will be unconscious so that is why there are more ways of having an unconscious state

Ned Block: Consciousness, Artificial Intelligence, and the Philosophy of Mind YouTube video by Robinson Erhardt

Excellent interview of @neddo.bsky.social (www.youtube.com/watch?v=wM1f...)

They don’t mention the dorsal visual system which is adapted to fast motor responses

authors.elsevier.com/a/1kHSZ4sIRv...

in this short letter in TICS, @matthiasmichel.bsky.social & @jorge-morales.bsky.social argue against the episodic memory deficit interpretation of aphantasia proposed by @andreablomkvist.bsky.social.

a lack of imagery awareness may be all there is

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