Nagge adiinge yarata ndiayam pakkudam

The first cow doesn’t drink dirty water

Cattle Wahala This study finds that rustled cattle from the Sahel ends up in Ghana, where insurgents increasingly rely on trusted intermediaries, such as butchers and traders, to sell livestock into Ghana’s licit m...

And the full report, co-authored with Kars de Bruijne, for @clingendael.bsky.social here:
www.clingendael.org/publication/...

How stolen cattle links Ghana to the jihadist conflict in the Sahel Cattle rustling is a profitable revenue stream for insurgents and threatens the stability of the West African region.

Read the @newhumanitarian.bsky.social piece here: www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/202...

In the longer term, we argue that targeted and realistic investments in Ghana’s domestic rearing and market system may help deter rustling and smuggling and contribute to national development.

Enhancing cross-border coordination, on a national and local level, as well as investigating and prosecuting Ghanaian butchers and merchants selling stolen livestock, could help disrupt JNIM supply chains in the shorter term.

While these Ghanaian cattle merchants who sell stolen livestock are not directly linked to JNIM militants, they are an important part of a larger system that is fueling conflict in Burkina Faso and Togo, and contributing to instability in northern Ghana.

We found that evolving conflict dynamics in south east Burkina Faso have forced JNIM to rely on a smaller group of butchers and merchants to sell stolen livestock, which has led to the rise of a new group of intermediaries further down the supply chain in Ghana.

Over 8 million livestock have been stolen in Burkina Faso since 2017, according to FAO.

My recent work with @clingendael.bsky.social and @newhumanitarian.bsky.social investigates how cattle rustling and smuggling methods and supply chains are changing amid conflict on Burkina-Togo-Ghana border.

In the longer term, we argue that targeted and realistic investments in Ghana’s domestic cattle rearing and market system may help deter rustling and smuggling and contribute to national development.

Enhancing coordination between regional governments, on a national and local level, as well as investigating and prosecuting Ghanaian butchers and merchants selling stolen livestock, could help disrupt JNIM supply chains in the shorter term.

While these Ghanaian cattle merchants selling stolen livestock are not directly linked to JNIM militants, they are an important part of a larger system that is fueling conflict in Burkina Faso and Togo and contributing to instability in northern Ghana.

In short, we found that shifting conflict dynamics in south east Burkina Faso have forced JNIM to rely on a smaller group of Burkinabe butchers and merchants to sell stolen livestock, which has led to the rise of a new group of intermediaries further down the supply chain in Ghana.

Fulani Responses to Pastoralist Crisis and Mass Violence Fulani communities in West Africa are being scapegoated for violence perpetrated by certain groups of semi-nomadic herders in response to a...

4️⃣ #Fulani communities in West Africa have suffered several violent attacks in recent years - while being scapegoated for violence themselves.

The situation is deeply rooted in a crisis of #pastoralism, as @jamescourtright08.bsky.social explains in his policy brief

📃 t1p.de/s9myh

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Free Trader A Little Understood Part of the New Deal

The tariffs are part and parcel of the Trump regime's effort to break the clock of the New Deal.
www.unpopularfront.news/p/franklin-d...

Map of Selected Violent Attacks on Fulani between 2015 and 2019

#Fulani communities in West Africa have suffered several violent attacks in recent years - while being scapegoated for violence themselves.

The situation is deeply rooted in a crisis of #pastoralism, as @jamescourtright08.bsky.social explains in his policy brief 👉
t1p.de/s9myh

a man is covering his eyes with his hands in front of a group of men . ALT: a man is covering his eyes with his hands in front of a group of men .

Me: I can’t believe UK voters chose to torch their economy with Brexit. That can never be topped.

American voters:

In the longer term, governments and their foreign partners should support pastoralist livelihoods (enforcing existing grazing areas and establishing livestock corridors) and invest in physical infrastructure and justice systems in rural communities.

In the short term, governments should re-assess their relationship with communal militias/vigilantes and consider the potential benefits of negotiating, or at least allowing local communities to speak, with armed groups.

The response of communities directly affected by violence–fleeing–is ensuring immediate survival, but also potentially expands violence against Fulani into new areas.

Taking up arms—whether alongside jihadist insurgents, bandits, or even as secular self-defense militias—has failed to protect civilians and only exacerbated the scapegoating and violence.

Efforts by Fulani cultural or human rights associations to defend Fulani communities have become captured by political interests, crumbled under internal schisms, or harassed into silence by military governments.

None the less, across the region communal militias, and to a lesser extent security forces, scapegoated entire Fulani communities, resulting in massacres in parts of Mali, Burkina Faso and Nigeria that amount to ethnic cleansing.

It is important to note that while Fulani herders are over represented among Sahelian insurgents and NW Nigerian bandits, these are different groups of Fulani. Pastoralists are NOT fighting as a united ethnic movement, but in reaction to similar local conditions.

The current crisis has its roots in the long durée erosion of pastoralist livelihoods. Localized security crises beginning around 2010 ignited these deeper tensions, and people from subgroups of Fulani herders in the central Sahel and NW Nigeria joined militant groups.

Fulani Responses to Pastoralist Crisis and Mass Violence Fulani communities in West Africa are being scapegoated for violence perpetrated by certain groups of semi-nomadic herders in response to a...

Over the last decade, Fulani civilians in parts of West Africa have been targeted for mass violence after being accused of being jihadists or bandits.

Read how these communities are responding by organizing, fighting, or fleeing in my piece for Megatrends.

www.megatrends-afrika.de/publikation/...

Today, let's pay attention to Mahmoud Dicko's return to Mali. His arrival is expected this afternoon (it might not happen though)

Fulani Responses to Pastoralist Crisis and Mass Violence Fulani communities in West Africa are being scapegoated for violence perpetrated by certain groups of semi-nomadic herders in response to a...

#Fulani communities in West Africa are being scapegoated for violence perpetrated by certain groups of semi-nomadic herders - in response to a crisis in #pastoralism.

@jamescourtright08.bsky.social explores how Fulani communities are responding by organising, fighting or fleeing 📃 t1p.de/s9myh

I can’t take seriously any demand for reducing aid dependency that begins with taking away services from the poorest of the poor. To me that is not aid - those are reparations that they are entitled to because of the structural injustices they endure. Start with military aid and then we can talk.

But when it comes to cutting aid budgets no one says “let’s spend less money on Israeli or Egyptian military capacity”. Instead you want to start by taking healthcare and education away from people who have been made vulnerable by the structural injustices you create and benefit from.

🇧🇫| #BurkinaFaso: At dawn, #JNIM reportedly took control of several military positions in #Djibo. The city has been under siege for over two years now. At the end of 2023 JNIM attempted a massive attack on the city that was repelled thanks to the Burkinabé TB2 drones.