Justice Thomas has been championing NYT v Sullivan’s reversal for some time now

Dersh tried and found a sympathetic Trump appellate judge in dissent last year

Don’t sleep on Kash Patel’s @theatlantic.com lawsuit as another right-wing attempt to get SCOTUS to overturn NYT v. Sullivan.

Two federal appeals courts within a week of each other tell Spirit and Frontier they gotta remit security fees they kept from passengers who didn’t end up traveling

CA10: www.ca10.uscourts.gov/sites/ca10/f...

CA11: storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2026/04/...

C. The Purcell Principle The Supreme Court "has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of an election." Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 589 U.S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1(2006) (per curiam)). This is because "'clourt orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls." Purcell, 549 U.S. at 4-5. Because

the risk of confusion increases as election dates draw nearer, courts considering an application for an injunction shortly before an election must "weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election cases and [their] own institutional procedures." Id. at 4. At the same time, the Supreme Court has "not forbidden all change close to an election." Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Bostelmann, 977 F.3d 639, 642 (7th Cir. 2020). Rather, "[hlow close to an election is too close may depend in part on the nature of the election law at issue, and how easily the State could make the change without undue collateral effects. Changes that require complex or disruptive implementation must be ordered earlier than changes that are easy to implement." Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 881 n. 1 (2022) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Indiana's primary election day is set for May 4, 2026—a little less than three weeks from the day of this order. Accordingly, the court must consider whether the relief sought by Plaintiffs would be so disruptive as to be barred by the Purcell principle. See, e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm., 589 U.S. at 423-25 (district court violated Purcell principle by issuing injunction five days before scheduled election and providing relief for which the plaintiffs did not specifically ask; Common Cause Ind. v. Lawson, 978 F.3d 1036, 1042 (7th Cir. 2020) (staying injunction issued five weeks before an election); Am. Council of Blind of Ind. v. Ind. Election Comm'n, No. 1:20-cv-3118, 2022 WL 702257, at *6-7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 9, 2022) (denying relief that would be "too disruptive" but granting relief that "would not constitute the kind of significant change or result in confusion that the Purcell principle seeks to avoid").

Although an injunction would leave Defendants with little time to implement changes, the primary concerns underlying the Purcell principle-confusion and disruption—are largely absent here. In more cases than not, "merely requir[ing] the revival of previous practices" will not prove so disruptive that the Purcell principle bars relief. League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248 (4th Cir. 2014). Such is the case here. The requested relief only requires Defendants to accept student IDs as a form of voter identification-something Indiana has already done for nearly two decades. Defendants protest that they will need to update the election materials they have already printed. But a comparison of Indiana's materials before and after SB 10 shows how little those materials will need to change. The only relevant change that Indiana made to its Election Administrator's Manual is the addition of a single sentence that states "documents] issued by an educational institution" can no longer "serve as photo ID for purposes of voting." (Compare Dkt. 96-2 at 1100 (updated manual), with Dkt. 86-7 at 241 (2024 manual without sentence)). Other training materials similarly address SB 10 in little more than a sentence. (See Dkt. 96-2 at 1223, 1260, 1286). Any necessary changes would therefore not introduce the sort of complexity that Purcell seeks to avoid, especially when one considers that student IDs otherwise meet the criteria for photo identification established by Indiana's voter ID law. Allowing voters to use their student 3 In his declaration, the Director of Elections for the Marion County Election Board ("MCEB") Indiana's most populous county—confirmed that "[i]f student IDs were once again allowed to be used in Indiana, MCEB could and would reincorporate the portions of those

IDs to vote "would not require a significant expenditure of resources by Defendants or election officials, would be a feasible change to implement in advance of the upcoming election, and is unlikely to cause voter confusion that would cause voters to be discouraged from voting." Am. Council of Blind of Ind., 2022 WL 702257, at *7. Defendants also claim that Plaintiffs' delay in requesting an injunction is fatal to their request for preliminary relief. But Plaintiffs filed this suit weeks after SB 10 was enacted— they did "not unduly delay[] bringing the complaint to court." Merrill, 142 S. Ct. at 881 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Nor did they delay filing this motion for preliminary injunction. "Delay in pursuing a preliminary injunction may raise questions regarding the plaintiff's claim that he or she will face irreparable harm if a preliminary injunction is not entered." Ty, Inc. v. Jones Grp., Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 903 (7th Cir. 2001). "Whether the defendant has been 'lulled into a false sense of security or had acted in reliance on the plaintiff's delay' influences whether we will find that a plaintiff's decision to delay in moving for a preliminary injunction is acceptable or not." Id. (quoting Ideal Indus., Inc. v. Gardner Bender, Inc., 612 F.2d 1018, 1025 (7th Cir. 1979)). Neither circumstance is present here. The court will not penalize Plaintiffs for the time it took them to gather the evidence necessary to support their motion for preliminary injunction. See Rose v. Raffensperger, 143 S. Ct. 58(2022) (mem.) (vacating stay). Purcell does not present a bar to Plaintiffs' request for relief. As such, the court will consider whether Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief. materials that discussed student IDs into its training and Election Day operations for forthcoming elections. (Dkt. 96-2 at 803).

The district court said Purcell didn’t apply: www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/...

CA7 allows Indiana to exclude student IDs from acceptable forms of voter identification at the polls.

Trump/Trump/Biden panel invokes Purcell principle, says lower court order blocking the exclusion came too close to the election.

media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/Opin...

We have to prosecute them.

Theft

Leon!

Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

I’ll count it www.supremecourt.gov/orders/court...

Specifically, the Roberts majority isn’t yet interested in cleaning up the mess it made in the lower courts on the federal felon-in-possession firearm ban so long as no court below has struck the law down, nor does it want to use that law as the vehicle to further restrict Congress’s power.

25-5343 BEAIRD, KENDRICK J. V. UNITED STATES The motion of petitioner for leave to proceed in forma 2 pauperis is granted. The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to the following question: Whether Stinson v. United States, 508 U. S. 36 (1993), still correctly states the rule for the deference that courts must give the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Whether 18 U.S.t. $ 924(g/(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II. Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III. Whether 18 U.S.C. $ 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crassed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

SCOTUS makes a gun case about not guns
www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25...

BARRETT, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 19-123 SHARONELL FULTON, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT (une 17, 2021] JUSTICE BARRETT, with whom JUSTICE KAVANAUGH joins, and with whom JUSTICE BREYER joins as to all but the first paragraph, concurring. In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), this Court held that a neutral and generally applicable law typically does not violate the Free Exercise Clause-no matter how severely that law burdens religious exercise. Petitioners, their amici, schol-ars, and Justices of this Court have made serious arguments that Smith ought to be overruled. While history looms large in this debate, I find the historical record more silent than supportive on the question whether the founding generation understood the First Amendment to require religious exemptions from generally applicable laws in at least some circumstances. In my view, the textual and structural arguments against Smith are more compelling. As a matter of text and structure, it is difficult to see why the Free Exercise Clause-lone among the First Amendment freedoms-offers nothing more than protection from discrimination. Yet what should replace Smith? The prevailing assumption seems to be that strict scrutiny would apply whenever a neutral and generally applicable law burdens religious ex-ercise. But I am skeptical about swapping Smith's categorical antidiscrimination approach for an equally categorical

BARRETT, J., concurring strict scrutiny regime, particularly when this Court's resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws and other First Amendment rights—like speech and assem-bly—has been much more nuanced. There would be a number of issues to work through if Smith were overruled. To name a few: Should entities like Catholic Social Services— which is an arm of the Catholic Church—be treated differently than individuals? Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012). Should there be a distinction between indirect and direct burdens on religious exercise? Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 606-607 (1961) (plurality opinion). What forms of scrutiny should apply? Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (assessing whether government's interest is "'compelling'"), with Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437, 462 (1971) (assessing whether government's interest is "substantial"). And if the answer is strict scrutiny, would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise challenges to garden-variety laws come out the same way? See Smith, 494 U. S., at 888-889.

Guessing Barrett (and Kavanaugh and/or Roberts) still has the same questions from 2021 www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20p...

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Colorado's so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, preschools must ensure all families have an "equal oppor-tunity" to enroll regardless of, inter alia, race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits numerous exemptions from this requirement, both categorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only "children of color," "gender-nonconforming chil-dren," "the LGBTQ community," low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gen-der. The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado's decision to exclude Catholic preschools. Applying Employment Division v. Smith, it held that Colorado's secular exemptions and discretion did not undermine general ap-plicability. In so doing, the court sided with the minority position in an entrenched and acknowledged 7-4 split over what kinds of exemptions and discretion undermine general applicability. The court also eschewed Carson v. Makin, concluding that its rule was inapplicable because Colorado's exclusion was not "on the explicit basis" of religion. The questions presented are: 1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.

2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institu-tions. 3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled.

By excluding QP3, the Roberts majority signals it still doesn’t have the votes to overturn Smith, happy just to render it an empty husk

www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/25...

Pennsylvania's motor-voter system effectively screens non-citizens from voter registration • Pennsylvania Capital-Star The audit also revealed problems with PennDOT’s data security protocols and recommended tighter internal controls.

Pennsylvania's auditor general, a Republican, audited 210,000+ new voter registrations under Gov. Shapiro's new motor voter system to see if noncitizens were registering to vote.

They found one. One.

And that was because a PennDOT staffer erred. It was fixed before the driver left the office.

Gonna spend the next two years spamming every elected Dem about the concept of "damnatio memoriae." Chisel his name off every inscription. Build over the various Trump Towers like they're Nero's Golden House. Remove him from physical memory, not to forget but as a sign of disrespect to the man.

US Southern Command: On April 19, at the direction of #SOUTHCOM commander Gen. Francis L. Donovan, Joint Task Force Southern Spear conducted a lethal kinetic strike on a vessel operated by Designated Terrorist Organizations. Intelligence confirmed the vessel was transiting along known narco-trafficking routes in the Caribbean and was engaged in narco-trafficking operations. Three male narco-terrorists were killed during this action. No U.S. military forces were harmed. @DeptofWar #OpSouthernSpear UNCLASSIFIED

We murdered three more people in boats today

Sir Patrick Moore’s Monocle

This is some next level Mike Mulligan stuff

Bob Ross to the rescue

Yep

So good!

... and when this is all over, there will be people who will say we need to move on.

The federal government will need detrumpification and it needs to be merciless.

Just sobbed hardest I have since my mom died in 2020.

She missed these trials by a few months.

One of most ruthless cancers. Hard to fathom that maybe she'd still be here.

I feel such a hole inside.

In case you're wondering if we should fund mRNA research instead of another stupid war ... yes.

Iron rule of professional wrestling:

When there’s a Spanish announcer’s table, somebody’s going through it

The Inflation Reduction Act was the single most aggressive investment in rural America since the New Deal.

Direct investment, high wage jobs, energy security, you name it. It was all there.

Too bad it happened 200 years ago and all the records of it are lost forever.

Every day, my anti-Chadha coalition gets just a little bit stronger …