The US is delaying Japan’s Tomahawk missile purchase as the Iran war burns through stockpiles. I’ve warned that the high use and slow replenishment of TLAMs would create a gap. The readiness bill is now due and allies are bearing the cost. My comments: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
If the PLA invades, Taiwan could stop them at the shore w/UUVs, drone boats, swarms, missiles, & mines layered into a 4 ring gauntlet from the strait to the beach.
Taiwan can create this Hellscape. We explain how.
warontherocks.com/2026/03/hellscape-taiwan-a-porcupine-defense-in-the-drone-age/
Casual reminder that the US has only procured 322 Tomahawks in the last 5 years. If the US shot 850 in Iran + a low estimate of 250 for strikes in the Middle East and Nigeria, it is clear replenishment rates do not match expenditure rates. The math doesn’t math, as they say.
Trump’s way of war promises “war without entanglement.” But it means strikes, re-strikes—and now potentially boots on the ground. The Iran war is exposing the limits, risking the very forever wars Trump ran against.
My latest essay for @bloomberg.com (gift link): www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Iran’s arsenal has taken a hit, but it likely isn’t exhausted. Launches are sustained and Saudi Arabia is increasingly in focus. The pattern suggests recalibration, not depletion: Iran can impose outsized costs by causing just enough pain. My analysis @bloomberg.com www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
The Iran war has shifted from strikes to a sustained operation with no clear end in sight. That raises big questions about munitions depth, the pace of operations, and targets. I joined @bloomberg.com Here’s Why podcast to unpack how these could shape the conflict. youtu.be/vp9EkC9xjAw
100%. Cannot stress enough how this is both a procurement and production issue, and why this matters for deterrence.
The US is firing limited advanced munitions - TLAMs, PAC-3s, JASSMs - at a breakneck pace, but replenishing them will take years and billions. Iran is waging a cost-imposing battle on the US defense industrial base -- and it is working.
@bloomberg.com gift link: www.bloomberg.com/news/feature...
The Bloomberg powers that be finally let @mgerrydoyle.bsky.social and I do what we do best: nerd out about munitions.
Have a listen as we discuss drones and missiles, and the force readiness trade offs of the Iran war. www.bloomberg.com/news/audio/2...
Did you steal my joke?!
I talked with @cnn.com about why the most immediate concern is Gulf air defense interceptor inventory -- not US stockpiles. Even if Iranian attack intensity slows, America's Gulf partners have already fired air defense missiles at a faster rate than they can be built.
www.cnn.com/2026/03/04/p...
A short- to mid-term military risk isn't the US running out of interceptors or PGMs in this conflict per se. It is the opportunity costs.
Back to doing what I do best: pointing at things on maps. (It's a wargamer thing).
I walked through Iran's retaliatory strikes, what it has left in the arsenal, and what the “big wave” of strikes Trump promised might mean with Bloomberg TV.
www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/...
Iran fired 1200+ projectiles at 5 countries in the first 48 hours. Most were drones. These saturation attacks aim to overwhelm air defenses and drain interceptors. $20-50K Shaheds vs. $4.19M air defense interceptors put US partners on the wrong side of the cost curve.
US destroyers launched Tomahawks at Iranian targets, but here’s the problem: America doesn’t have unlimited TLAMs. The Trump admin burned through big numbers in earlier strikes on Iran, Houthis, and Nigeria without replenishing stockpiles. And TLAMs would be vital in a potential China fight.
Iran’s initial response was fast: SRBMs hit US bases in the Gulf. MRBMs are needed for continued strikes on Jordan and Israel, but Tehran may not have as many. Further retaliation and scale of damage hinge on stockpile depth: what was rebuilt after the 12-Day War and what survived the first wave.
As the DoD vs. Anthropic deadline looms, its unclear which DPA authorities may be used. But DPA has emerged as a favorite tool of the Trump admin -- from taking equity stakes to compelling an AI firm, with big implications for defense tech.
My take @bloomberg.com: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
To Trump, limited air and missile strikes on Iran may look like a quick win. But without a clear objective, limited campaigns often turn into long, costly endeavors. Iran gets a vote too and its response may defy US expectations.
My thoughts @bloomberg.com: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Trump's military surge now has the real strike capacity and key enablers needed for weeks of strikes on Iran. I told @financialtimes.com the scale of this buildup signals credible strike preparation. But sustaining it without action would be incredibly costly -- and risky. www.ft.com/content/a7da...
Trump’s Middle East buildup has him backed into a corner: he needs a good ROI for the significant forces and resources tied up. This makes strikes more likely — or else this may be one of the costliest bluffs in history if he doesn't go through with it.
blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
We did the math on the US naval buildup in the Caribbean. The total: $2.9B. At its height, costs topped $20M a day. Much was already funded, but combat operations cost extra -- and opportunity costs are difficult to quantify.
My latest for @bloomberg.com: www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
Shifting a carrier strike group and F-35s from the Caribbean to the Middle East shows the US can surge forces, but raises the real risk of overstretch. Repeated retaskings are trading tomorrow’s readiness for today’s pressure campaigns.
blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
Iran’s missiles are its only credible deterrent against US and Israel, putting bases, shipping lanes, and energy infrastructure in range. Tehran won’t agree to cap missile stockpiles because it needs large numbers to overwhelm defenses and hit targets.
For more: blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
Great conversation on @bloomberg.com TV last night on prospects for US-Iran talks. I’m not optimistic. Why? Because both sides haven’t agreed to what they’re negotiating. That’s a recipe for unmet expectations and failed talks that make military strikes more likely. youtu.be/R4y_GdOQG1g
Iranian gunboats tried to seize a US-flagged tanker. The US then shot down a Shahed drone approaching its aircraft carrier.
I told @bloomberg.com Iran is making “a dangerous play at a time when the US has amassed significant firepower in the Middle East.”
www.bloomberg.com/news/article...
The new NDS tries to hedge by designing forces for China and everything else. But that risks ending up with two different force structures -- and that comes at a high cost. Thanks to @defenseone.bsky.social for featuring my take: www.defenseone.com/policy/2026/...
The 2026 NDS upends force planning. Homeland and Western Hemisphere first means fewer forward deployments, more reliance on surge forces. But surging depends on access from allies and a force built for China that may not fit new missions.
More on the Terminal: blinks.bloomberg.com/news/stories...
