Title: Domestic Power Consolidation, Leader Survival, and Chinese High-level Visits Abstract: How do domestic power grabs influence international diplomacy in an era of great power competition? This article theorizes why leaders who concentrate power by weakening checks and balances—such as extending term limits, undermining courts, or marginalizing rivals—are more likely to pursue high-level diplomatic engagement with China. We argue that these leaders seek external legitimacy, economic resources, and strategic alignment to stabilize their rule, and that Chinese high-level diplomatic visits offer a means to achieve these goals. Leveraging data on incumbent takeovers and official Chinese presidential and premier visits from 1998 to 2020, we find that countries experiencing such takeovers are significantly more likely to receive Chinese high-level visits. This effect is strongest for presidential visits, which signal a deeper diplomatic endorsement, and remains robust across multiple model specifications. The findings demonstrate how domestic political change reshapes global diplomatic alignments and contributes to emerging scholarship on authoritarian consolidation and China’s international strategy.
🚨NEW ARTICLE🚨
Cao and Hsuan-Yu Lin (2026) explore how domestic power grabs shape diplomacy with great powers. They find that countries that undergo leader power concentration are more likely to receive high-level diplomatic visits from China.
doi.org/10.1093/fpa/...
