Preprint: Levels of Office and Voter Accountability for Democratic Norm Violations
⚠️New paper fothcoming in POQ! ⚠️
With @marcjacob.bsky.social and @seanjwestwood.bsky.social, we worried about norm-violating local politicians rising to higher office. We tested when voters defect from such politicians in local, state and federal races.
osf.io/preprints/ps...
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In short, heterogeneous coalitions do backfire electorally, but mainly because voters feel distant from the coalition’s overall composition, not just because they dislike a particular partner party. More here: papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.....
Zooming in on this case, @ugurozdemir.bsky.social and I have examined when too much diversity in pre-electoral coalitions backfires; that is, when they reduce support from voters who might have backed any of the constituent parties if they had run separately.
A case in point for this decision problem is the 2023 Turkish general election. A highly diverse opposition alliance united behind a single presidential candidate, while the main opposition party (CHP) opened its parliamentary lists to candidates from smaller allied parties.
Party leaders often face a tough choice: should they join forces with other parties in pre-electoral coalitions or run alone? The stakes are even higher when opposition parties try to unseat an authoritarian incumbent.
Thanks so much for visiting, Ben --you're doing excellent work!
. @notredame.bsky.social @robert-habeck.de
The Kellogg Institute is now officially on Bluesky! Please spread the word and follow us!
Haha, you just caught me ;) I'm not from Baden-Württemberg, though.
German vibes on the Notre Dame campus in Indiana
Consider following the wonderful Kellogg Institute community at the University of Notre Dame: go.bsky.app/CoZB5N8. Kellogg is a vibrant group of graduate, visiting, and faculty fellows working on topics related to democracy and human development worldwide.
"Backsliding occurs either when citizens knowingly consent to erosion of democracy because they find the incumbent highly appealing or when citizens unconditionally oppose the incumbent, so that the incumbent can remain in office only by backsliding." (Luo/Przeworski 2023, QJPS)
A new Stigler Center working paper proposes a mechanism linking legislative gridlock to voters’ support for candidates who hold extreme policy positions.
@marcjacob.bsky.social, @bartonelee2.bsky.social (Stigler Affiliate Fellow), @grattonecon.bsky.social (UNSW):
www.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/rese...
✨ We're back this Friday (2/2) at 11AM EST w/ @hannafolsz.bsky.social and @slucek.bsky.social (Stanford) presenting "Losing my Religion? How Partisan Polarization Drives or Tempers Secularization" + @marcjacob.bsky.social (Stanford) discussing.
Link+paper via email list: eepg-workshop.github.io
15 days left to apply to present at PRL's Annual Meeting March 21-22 in NOLA! polarizationresearchlab.org/annual-meeti...
polisky
Is gridlock causing polarization? 🧐
Proud to be interviewed and have my work with @marcjacob.bsky.social and @grattonecon.bsky.social featured on my favorite podcast!
Check it out — link below 👇
Thank you for the invitation Wiola Dziuda, Anthony Fowler, and William Howell
t.co/v4Otr7cMSi
2) As Manes already pointed out, support in the cities was among the lowest in 2019. So the vote share was already comparatively low there. Also in the 2019 election, PiS support did not substantially increase in the cities, but almost everywhere else.
I was surprised by this as well. I can think of two factors. 1) In relative terms, both cities and more rural regions welcomed refugees: Powiat Grójecki, Wrocław, Powiat Pruszkowski, Przemyśl, and Powiat Rawski, along with Warsaw, saw the largest inflow relative to their populations.
The party could win additional % across the country in 2019 compared to 2015, so the level of support was quite high in 2019 even in the Northeast. But I agree that floor effects may be present.
This is an important point. Just to provide a bit more context: In 2019, PiS performed well even in the Northeast.
The 2023 election was fundamentally different; this time, the opposition, not PiS, mobilized more voters.
There was already a substantial increase in turnout in the 2019 elections, during which PiS gained compared to 2015. These electoral gains were mainly related to improved economic conditions and public goods provision (see papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers....).
and 3) the relative number of Ukrainian refugees seems unrelated to PiS punishment.
2) increased turnout harmed PiS in all regions,
1) PiS lost particularly in 2019 strongholds,
Three tentative patterns emerged in last Sunday’s Polish elections at the regional (powiaty) level:
Based on exit polls in Poland: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość - 200 seats, Koalicja Obywatelska - 163 seats, Trzecia Droga - 55 seats, Lewica – 30 mandatów, Konfederacja – 12 seats.
What this means is that the anti-PiS coalition has 231 seats and can form a cabinet.
POLECONUK Webinars:
Our next event is on Monday, 16 Oct 2023.
@bartonelee2.bsky.social will present "From Gridlock to Polarization", with @marcjacob.bsky.social and @grattonecon.bsky.social. Join us at 3 pm UK time!