NEW | CTP’s @nicholasacarl.bsky.social and @briancarter.bsky.social assess risks and opportunities for the US in Iran in their latest report, “The State of the Axis of Resistance.”
Read the full report: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the...
Here are their key points:
(1/3)
The worsening sectarian tension could very easily evolve into a large-scale conflict that would threaten to destabilize Syria and its political transition.
Alawites already feel disenfranchised and fear the future, as recent Economist polling and other reports indicate. The insurgents likely aim to take advantage of these dynamics.
There is a concerted information operation by anti-government groups to spread sectarian narratives and some false reports of killings that support insurgent objectives. Both the insurgents and these accounts appear to be driving sectarian tension to delegitimize the interim government.
There is a serious risk that Alawite insurgents take advantage of the violence to present themselves as defenders of the local community. Sectarian tensions will likely continue to mount since the government cannot adequately protect civilians, and disinformation is exacerbating the crisis.
My latest covers the efforts by Alawite insurgents to foment sectarian conflict to undermine and destabilize the interim Syrian government covers the recent uptick in both real and unconfirmed sectarian violence in western Syria. Read here: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ala...
The US policy of "managing escalation"--a policy that only allowed the Houthis themselves to escalate--has failed, and a new approach is needed.
Shipping prices have fallen from a peak in Summer 2024, but the Houthis can resume attacks on maritime shipping for any reason they choose. Right now that reason is Israeli actions, but in the future the Houthis could attack maritime shipping for any other reason.
The US could deter the Houthis if the US imposed real, long-lasting costs on the group for its actions.
The Houthis announced yesterday that they will resume attacks on maritime shipping. The US air campaign against the Houthis will not deter the group, as I've previously argued. These attacks drive up the cost of goods due to increases in shipping costs. www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the...
One disclaimer: Insurgent presence in an area does not imply that the insurgents “control” that area or that insurgents maintain a persistent presence there. You can read our definition of "presence" in full at the link above.
The sectarian killing that occurred between March 5 and 7 will inflame the fighting and make it harder to defeat this insurgency.
Damascus likely faces a long, taxing counterinsurgency campaign that will constrain its bandwidth at a critical time. The insurgents are not defeated; they've merely gone back into hiding. They are still conducting hit-and-run attacks.
Assadist, Alawite insurgent leaders designed the March 5-7 offensive in the coastal region to trigger sectarian violence against Alawites, which could in turn buoy support for the insurgency. These leaders almost certainly did not intend to seize terrain or overthrow the government.
Assadists have already organized insurgents in the coastal areas, and they may be cooperating with groups like Hezbollah.
This does not mean that these disparate cells and organizations will not coalesce over time. Assad loyalists (Assadists) are well-positioned to lead a broader insurgency across Syria because they are the best-organized and most-experienced anti-government fighters.
The best organized insurgents are Alawites in coastal areas, but armed cells are also emerging in Damascus, Aleppo, and Deir ez Zor. The Alawite insurgent and other, smaller and less-organized armed cells elsewhere in the country have diff. motives and are not a monolith.
I created a new map layer for @thestudyofwar.bsky.social and @criticalthreats.bsky.social that shows insurgent presence across Syria. The new Syrian interim government faces a nascent insurgency across the country. Read more here: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/und...
One thing that’s clear is that while Syria has a Ministry of Defense it does not have a military. Faction integration is current more hypothetical than anything else
The int'l cmty should not offer blanket or unconstrained assistance to the interim government, but instead offer substantial economic aid on conditions requiring transparent, accountable, international community-supported reconciliation that will fairly bring war criminals of all sects to justice.
The burgeoning insurgency highlights the need for an international community-backed reconciliation and political process that will assuage the concerns of Syrian minorities and transparently bring Assadists to justice for their crimes.
The insurgency gives openings for ISIS to resurge elsewhere in Syria and for Iran and its partners to re-entrench themselves in Syria. The Russians, too, could seek to re-enter the country.
The violence has already driven sectarian reprisals against the Alawites, which will likely empower Assadist elements, as they are the best organized and could rapidly strengthen the insurgency.
The insurgency is driven by Assadist regime remnants and a mounting sense among Syrian Alawites that the government is suppressing and marginalizing them.
The insurgency is still relatively small, but the interim government is continuing to contribute to the Alawite and minority grievances that are fueling the insurgency in various ways.
The emerging insurgency in western Syria underscores the need to engage with and support Damascus--though not without conditions. This insurgency stands only to help US adversaries and damage US interests in the Middle East. Read here: www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/the...
Important, after repatriating 15K since 2021 (3K in 2025) Iraq has now paused repatriations from Syria after US funding cuts to its transit camp Jedda 1. Iraqis are the majority of Al-Hol residents: "Baghdad pushes for global action on Al-Hol repatriation" shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Bagh...
New | A burgeoning insurgency led by pro-Assad elements is emerging in western Syria. (1/3)
www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/ira...
Trump can't have a pro-Israel foreign policy when he has a pro-Russia one.
Now the Israelis are considering dialing back intelligence cooperation over fears of Trump's pro-Russia posture.
www.ynetnews.com/article/b1d8...
This is a sure fire way to give Iran the opening it wants to rebuild its networks in Syria. A probable IRGC-backed group already popped up on Feb 27. My question for those championing Israeli operations in southern Syria: how does this end?